Jews and Arabs in the State of Israel: Is There a Basis for a Unified Civic Identity?
Ilana Kaufman

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POLITICAL STANDING IN A JEWISH STATE:
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
Jews and Arabs in the State of Israel: Is There a Basis for a Unified Civic Identity?

ILANA KAUFMAN

INTRODUCTION

On 23 March 1999 a piece written in the political column of *Yediot Ahronot* called for its readers to vote for Azmi Bisharah, the Arab Palestinian candidate for prime minister. It read as follows: 'the basic principles of the Left are freedom and equality … the Left demands more equitable distribution of profit and equal rights and participation of all citizens. In Bisharah's platform the state has to be a state of all its citizens'. The writer was Tanya Reinhart, Professor of Philosophy at Tel Aviv University. The phrase 'Israel as a state of all its citizens', which was raised by a few Arab intellectuals and politicians a decade ago, has become salient in the Jewish public discourse. It refers to a demand to change the legal, political and cultural definition of the relations between the state of Israel and its Jewish and Arab citizens, and to make it resemble the relationship between citizen and state in the Western states. The major argument made in favour of this modification with regard to the Arab–Jewish cleavage is that the 'Jewish and democratic' formula is an oxymoron: Israel cannot be both, and the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel cannot, and will not for long accept second-class citizenship. The state should therefore turn into a liberal civic state, which could express the multicultural reality of Jewish and Arab existence.

But what do we mean by a liberal 'civic state'? The purpose of this article is to outline some of the major implications of adopting a formula of a 'civic nation state', which is prevalent in the West, and the likelihood of their acceptance by the Arab Palestinian and by the Jewish communities. This will be done (1) through a brief outline of the theoretical models of a civic nation state to be found in the West; (2) by pointing to ideas in this direction that have been publicly aired in Israel in the past; and (3) by assessing their possible impact.

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The argument that I will make is that although the concept of a Jewish state is a major issue in the political debate, its resolution in the direction of a civic nation state is far in the horizon. The significant neutralizing of cultural–national components entailed in this change rule out under current conditions any significant support for it among both Jews and Arabs. Certain indicators, however, point to the possibility that under conditions of peaceful stability in the area, some version of the multicultural civic nation state model may evolve in the future.[1]

THEORETICAL MODELS

Under the influence of the French revolution, the ideal of the liberal nation state is a state that protects and promotes the rights and welfare of the *individual* members of a self-governing *nation*. The crucial question is what are the criteria for belonging to the nation: does the nation consist of all the citizens who live within the territory of the state, or only of those who meet certain social or cultural criteria, such as language, religion and tradition? Among states that consider themselves to be committed to liberal values and democracy this question received a variety of different empirical and ideological answers. Each set of answers form a particular ideal model for dealing with cultural differences within the population of the state and for the ties between the individual and the state.

I distinguish first between three models: the ethnic state, the multination state, and the civic nation state. In the civic nation state model the government and the legal system are based on the explicit principle that the state is culturally 'neutral'. The nation consists of the citizens of the state of whatever cultural identity, and the criteria governing inclusion in it are universal: anyone who fulfils the necessary criteria may join. In contrast, in the ethnic model there is one culturally defined nation with which the state is culturally identified, and the state is expected to nurture the cultural–national character of that nation. In the multination state, there is more than one nation. The state is culturally neutral, but is organized as a confederate to enable cultural autonomy to its constituent national parts.

However, if we look closer at the *actual* civic nation states we can see that this model itself consists of various sub-models or versions: the liberal night-watch state (as in the USA), the republican visionary state (as in France or Quebec) and the multicultural state (as in Anglo-Canada or Australia). The two sub-models that are relevant for the discussion of Israel are the republican version ('the visionary state'), which is closer to the ethnic end of the scale, and the multicultural version, which is close to the multinational end of the scale. Unlike the individually oriented 'night-watch' state, in republican and multicultural sub-models, officially recognized and sustained cultural identity is considered necessary for

solidarity, and part and parcel of democratic rights. The two sub-models differ from each other, however, in the extent to which this recognized identity should be homogeneous; the demand for homogeneity in the republican version is all-encompassing; here the policy of the 'melting-pot' for creating a common nationality and common civic values is pursued with vigour. In the multicultural version, the degree of homogeneity that is considered desirable in the public domain is minimal, and there is no expectation that all will adhere to liberal values, except for the principle of tolerance.[2] The policy of the 'melting-pot' is therefore only minimally applied. Furthemore, the state is identified with the multiplicity of values, and specialized groups are granted special rights, either as compensation for past discrimination and mistreatment or in order to correct the imbalance inherent in their weakness as a cultural minority.

How does this apply to Israel? There is an ongoing controversy among academics in Israel on how Israel should be described: an ethnic state that is neither liberal nor democratic;[3] an ethnic state that is democratic but not liberal;[4] a problematic liberal democracy;[5] or an ethno-Republican democracy.[6] I tend to support the latter formulation. But this is irrelevant for my discussion. In none of those formulations is Israel 'a state of all the Israeli citizens' in the same way that 'France is a state of its French citizens', as was put by Chief Justice Shamgar.[7] The reason is simple: there is no identity between nationality and citizenship. And when nationality is a supra criteria for rights, there is alienation and potential conflict on the part of the excluded.

Before proceeding to discuss two possible versions of the civic nation state in the Israeli context, it should be pointed out that unlike the question of *Israeli* nationality, the official definition of the *Jewish* national identity has been the subject of prolonged debate and crises in Israeli politics. Although the official distinction between the Jews and Arabs was indirectly the cause for these crises, the crises themselves, and the questions they raised, focused on internal Jewish self-definition, and did not refer to relations between Jews and Arabs. The classification by law of individuals according to their nationality and religion, and its registration on an identity card, was done explicitly to grant special immigration rights under the Law of Return to Jews, and to bar Arab Palestinians from enjoying the same right.[8] The desire to discourage as much as possible Jewish–Arab intermarriages and to keep in place the monopoly of religious marriages was another reason for such registration. These rules and regulations have been challenged, but not from the Jewish–Arab angle. The state has been repeatedly called upon to distinguish between the religious and the national components of Jewish identity, and to curtail the Orthodox monopoly on Jewish matters. These challenges are so far unsuccessful in the political and judicial arena.[9] The recent pressure to change the official mode of registration, and even the wording of the Law

of Return, has come from two quarters: from the non-Orthodox Jewish religious movements based in America, and from the political parties representing the 100,000-strong non-Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union, who were granted citizenship under the Law of Return.[10]

APPLYING THE CIVIC NATION STATE MODEL TO ISRAEL

The Israeli Hebrew Version and Its Supporters

The Israeli Hebrew version combines components of the republican visionary state with the American type of 'night-watchman' state. It therefore involves privatization of certain aspects of social life that are currently considered part of the state's business. This version also has close affinity to ideas put forth by the Canaanite movement that developed among the Jewish population of Palestine in the 1940s within the so-called Committee for Solidifying the Hebrew Youth and, after 1948, the Young Hebrews Group. The Canaanites supported the establishment of a territorial Hebrew nation state, consisting of Hebrew-speaking inhabitants in the territory where ancient Hebrew civilization was moulded. The Arabic-speaking inhabitants of the land were considered to be the descendants of the Hebrews, who had been conquered by Islamic and Christian forces and forced to adopt a foreign culture. The mission of the future state was to bring back the inhabitants of the land to their original authentic Hebrew culture. It was expected to impose the Hebrew language as a language common to all, to maintain a strict separation between religion and state, and to grant full equality to all its citizens. The Canaanite ideology thus called for severing all ties with existing national and religious cultures outside the borders of the state, whether Jewish or Arab, secular or religious, and for replacing these with a Hebrew Canaanite identity.[11]

The Israeli Hebrew version of a civic nation state that will be presented below is based not on the ancient Hebrew past, but rather on the anti-colonial struggle of the Jews against British rule in Palestine. Israel's Declaration of Independence is therefore seen as the event that forged the nation.[12] This version aspires to integrate the state of Israel into its surroundings and to consider its Jewish and Arab citizens as belonging to one nation. According to this version the Jews living in Israel belong to a different nation from the Jews in other parts of the world and those Arab citizens of Israel who wish to do so may become part of that nation and cease from being defined as a national minority. By defining all citizens of Israel as belonging to one nation – the Israeli nation – by virtue of their citizenship, this version has the aim, among others, of eliminating the present discrimination and social and political differentiation between Jews and Arabs in Israel. The basic premise of this version is that in this day and age Judaism as a religion is not identical to Judaism as a culture

and a nationality. The carriers of Jewish culture and identity, whether religious or not, are an ethnic group whose members belong to various nationalities. Those among them who chose self-determination and established a sovereign nation are members of the Israeli nation. The culture of the nation is secular Hebrew Israeli culture, the culture of the national nucleus of Jews who established the state and determined its way of life. According to this version the Arab culture of the Arab citizens of the state will thus become limited to the private sphere, and greater assimilation into Israeli Hebrew culture will take place. The Israeli Hebrew culture will also be defined rather narrowly: religious culture, whether Jewish, Muslim or Christian, will become secondary.

This version differs from the Canaanite one in that it does not call for a complete severance from Jewish culture and religion, but rather considers the Hebrew culture that developed during the period of Jewish settlement in Palestine and after the establishment of the state of Israel as the heir of historical Jewish culture.[13] Jews in the free world who are citizens of their states and choose of their own free will not to participate in the sovereign life of Israel are not part of the nation. The Zionist movement is seen as the liberation movement of the Jewish people, who justly demanded a place of their own under the sun, and indeed fulfilled their right to self-determination in a national territory. However, the Zionist movement's role ended with the establishment of the state and the absorption of the great waves of immigrant Jews fleeing from Europe, Asia and North Africa. Adherence to Zionist ideology even after it has fulfilled its aim represents a grave distortion of the normal development of nation states; it has been the major reason why no normal national consciousness has developed, why peace has not come to the region and why the country's Arab citizens feel alienated from the state.[14]

During the 1940s ideas of this kind were expressed by members of the Irgun delegation in the United States, particularly by Shmuel Marlin and Hillel Kook who formed the 'Committee for the Liberation of the Nation' in 1944.[15] Because he wished to mobilize the support of American Jewry for the Irgun's plan for a Jewish state without raising the spectre of 'double loyalty' (and perhaps also because he understood that mass immigration from the United States was unlikely), Kook differentiated between 'Jews' and 'Hebrews'. For Kook this tactic became an ideological principle, according to which American Jews belonged to the Jewish religion, but to the American nation, and not to a non-existent Jewish one. The Jews in Palestine as well as stateless Jews in Europe and those being persecuted in other countries, who wished to work towards national sovereignty in Palestine, belonged to the 'Hebrew nation'. Thus American Jews could feel solidarity for and support their Hebrew co-religionists without belonging to the same nation. In a letter that Kook sent to Chayim Weizmann in April 1945 he criticized the Zionist movement for not

making the distinction between Jews who were citizens of other states and those who intended to become citizens of the Jewish state. In the letter, he questioned the future roles of the Zionist movement's institutions and raised casuistically the question of the future status of 'the Muslims and the Christians in the Jewish republic'.[16] However, the rest of the Irgun delegation, as well as members of the organization in Palestine, rejected this approach[17] and were unhappy even with the tactics. After having been elected to the Constituent Assembly on the Herut party list after the establishment of the state of Israel Kook continued, together with others of the 'La-Merhav' group (such as Ari Jabotinsky), to adhere to this position and deplored the lack of a constitution proclaiming in formal terms the existence of the nation.

Ideas similar to Kook's were expressed also in Palestine, by former members of the Irgun and Lehi (the Stern Gang) who formed the 'Maavak' (Struggle) group before independence, and 'Semitic Action' a decade later.[18] The members of Semitic Action published their principles in 1957 under the title of 'The Hebrew Manifesto'.[19] This time the impetus for giving public expression to these ideas was not the relations with American Jewry but rather the lack of a peaceful settlement of the conflict with the Arab world and, in particular, Israel's participation in the Sinai Campaign together with Great Britain and France, the former colonial powers. Israel's cooperation with these powers was seen as being in blatant conflict with the interests of the state and as demonstrating that Israel was independent and sovereign in name only. According to the 'Manifesto' true independence necessitated not only changing Israel's international and regional orientation but the introduction of far-reaching social and political changes as well. The major changes that had to be implemented in this view were the abolition of the official status of the Jewish Agency, the severance of religion from the state and the introduction of absolute equality among all citizens of the state. Thus it demanded, for example, that Israel's Arab citizens become 'integrated as full partners in every aspect of the state'. According to this approach the school curriculum should be uniform (with an emphasis on Hebrew), while religious instruction should be given as an extra-curricular activity subsidized by the state.[20]

Many of these ideas were promoted by the 'Ha'olam Haze' movement founded by Uri Avneri in 1965, which achieved representation in the Knesset following the elections of 1965 and 1969. Among the movement's demands were the legislation of a constitution that would authorize the Supreme Court to abolish the Emergency Laws, the abolition of military rule over the Arab population, an end to land confiscation and a complete separation of church and state.[21]

From the 1970s on, it is possible to discern between 'dovish' and 'hawkish' versions of this approach. The hawkish version absorbs the

successes of the Palestinian national movement in awakening the national
consciousness of the Palestinians in the area, and uses it to differentiate
between the Palestinian and Israeli nations. In 1975, following the interim
agreements signed by Israel and Egypt and the emergence of the proposal
for a Jordanian–Palestinian confederation, Kook and Marlin republished
their programme for political and constitutional reform.[22] During the
1980s several other developments contributed to further exposition of
this version: the increasing power of the Kahana movement and religious
extremism among Jews, the adoption of an amendment to Basic Law –
The Knesset, section 7a (1985) defining the state of Israel as 'the state of
the Jewish people' and proposals for a constitution that would retain that
definition among its basic premises.[23]

At this point in time it was Professor Yosef Agassi who formulated a
detailed version of the Israeli Hebrew option based on Kook's ideas.[24] Its
basic assumption is that Israel should react to the beginnings of the
formation of a Palestinian nation by recognizing that nation and its right
to a sovereign state. However, the state of the Palestinian nation should
replace and be located on the present territory of the Kingdom of Jordan
(where, in his opinion, no Jordanian nation has evolved) and in other
parts of Mandatory Palestine as would be agreed upon by such a state and
the state of Israel.[25] At the same time the Israeli nation will have to
undergo a process of 'normalization' in the spirit of Kook's ideas. This
would require of the Jewish state that it make its citizens undergo a change
of consciousness, which would involve severing the right to self-
determination both from the Jewish religion and from the ideology of
Zionism; the former could bring about the establishment of a theocracy, a
regression to a pre-modern state of affairs, a deterioration in the civil
rights of both Jews and non-Jews and an identity crisis that could cause
large-scale emigration; the latter is based on the delusion of an
'ingathering of the exiles' and the concentration of all Jews in Palestine.
This delusion is also one of the causes of discrimination against Arab
citizens and incites the Arabs against 'the Zionist threat'; instead of
creating a place of refuge for Jews who are citizens of their countries it
exposes them to accusations of lack of loyalty to their countries. The state
of Israel's commitment to the interests of the Jewish people is detrimental
to the interests of the nation residing in Zion and deprives it of its right
to demand of the state that it promote that nation's happiness and welfare.

An alternative basis for the right to self-determination is the emergence
an Israeli nation. This is a process that has reached an impasse, and is in
need of an active constitutional operation. Therefore this version calls first
of all for declaring that Israel is a 'secular Israeli republic' rather than the
'state of the Jews' or 'the state of the Jewish people'. The solution to the
first problem, that of the danger of a theocracy, lies in a constitution that
would ensure that the institutions of the state and those of religion be

separated. The Knesset would engage in legislation on national secular matters and desist from clerical legislation, leaving that task to religious institutions. All denominations will receive some state support for their institutions. In order to deal with the delusion of 'ingathering of the exiles' the Law of Return would have to be amended. Instead of granting automatic citizenship to any Jew, the state would only grant automatic asylum to Jews who were suffering persecution. They, and other Jews who wish to emigrate to Israel, would not be granted automatic citizenship: their cases would be considered according to laws of immigration and citizenship that did not discriminate on the basis of origin, race or religion, and taking into consideration the ability to absorb them and the sense of social justice of the members of the nation. While the majority of immigrants would naturally be Jews, non-Jews who are able to make a significant contribution to society will be able to immigrate and join the nation. Anyone having Israeli citizenship would perforce have Israeli nationality and this fact would be registered in one's identity card, with no mention of religious or ethnic affiliation (just as it is today with respect to passports). The state and its symbols would still have a distinctly Hebrew cultural flavour, but mainly in the linguistic sphere.

What classifies this version as hawkish is the solution it offers for the question of how to deal with the national identity of the Arab citizens. Kook and Marlin supposedly adopt the liberal formulation that 'we must aspire to it that within the Israeli nationality every citizen of the state, be he Jewish, Druze, Muslim, Christian, etc., will be equal before the law not only in theory but also in fact; such equality would include also an equal right to employment – including the civil, diplomatic and military services', and that 'an Israeli Arab, as any other citizen of the state, can adopt the Israeli nationality if that is his wish'.[26] However, they propose, as does also Moshe Sharon, formerly the prime minister's adviser on Arab affairs, that in order to prevent Israel from becoming a binational state, it is necessary, in addition to providing 'truly full civil equality', to compel the Arabs to become an integral part of the Hebrew national state, in which Hebrew will be the sole official language and the main language of education.[27] Agassi explains that after the state becomes a civic nation state, the stateless Palestinians living under Israeli control and the Palestinians with Israeli citizenship will have to decide whether they wish to join the Israeli nation. Those who shall choose Israeli citizenship and nationality will be able to preserve their ethnic identity as Arabs, Muslims, Christians and Druzes, but only as individuals. In other words, they will have to choose between resident status (i.e., loss of their Israeli citizenship) and full citizenship with all privileges and obligations, including military service.[28] Such an act of revoking citizenship on a large scale is unprecedented in liberal states. There are those who propose an even more extreme form of the Israeli Hebrew option, one that marks a

complete break with liberal principles (and directed toward ultra-Orthodox Jews and Arabs). According to this proposal a new citizenship law would be formulated, one 'which does not endow automatic citizenship through birth or immigration, but takes into consideration the services which the citizen renders the state'.[29] The political movement that seemed to be closest to adopting this option in recent years is the now defunct Tzomet party.

The dovish version of this approach, on the other hand, excludes the Palestinians living beyond the 1948 armistice lines (who are considered to have the right to self-determination and a state of their own), and does not propose revoking the citizenship of the Palestinian citizens of Israel. It is based on the assumption that many Arab citizens 'have become acclimatized into the country's cultural life … and have adopted Hebrew as their cultural language', and were thus capable of identifying with a state that was free of any ethnic or religious connotations.[30] Since the disappearance of the 'Ha'olam Haze' movement (whose principles have been mentioned above) from the political arena, no political movement has openly adopted this version. However, the Meretz movement, and in particular the Ratz component of the movement, shows an affinity to some of these ideas.[31]

A Multicultural Israeli State and Its Supporters

The multicultural version of this approach also involves officially relegating ethnic and religious identities to the private sphere. However, unlike the Hebrew version, it does provide for the cultivation of multiculturalism by the state, according to the demands of the various groups. Thus the state would, in this version, reflect the Israeli Jewish majority culture and, to a certain extent, also the minority Israeli Arab culture, but not through any formal legal definition. As in the Israeli Hebrew version, the state would not entirely abandon the cultivation of a 'nation' with a common civic culture and common myths, but unlike that version, this would not be a homogeneous Hebrew culture but rather one that provides some support for the cultural heterogeneity of the population. In this version greater emphasis would be placed on cultural variety itself as a source of social cohesiveness. Still, in the long run the multicultural option also contains within itself the potential for the spontaneous evolution of a new and homogeneous culture.

Support for such a multicultural version of an Israeli state has come only from such people as *Ha'aretz* editor-in-chief Gershon Schocken and writer Anton Shammas. In 1985 Schocken published an article in response to statements made by some rabbis who were opposed to meetings between Jewish and Arab youth because of the danger of intermarriage.[32] Schocken claimed that the opposition to such meetings was a relic from a time when the Jews constituted a religious community, not a sovereign

people living in its homeland. The Jews must, as did other conquering people in history, begin the process of fusing the two people so that 'through a process of mutual influence the conquered people gradually accept the culture and the way of life of the dominant people'. Schocken points out that 'this is not an entirely unidirectional process' and does not expect secondary ethnic identities to disappear entirely; however, he does believe that the elimination of prohibitions and prejudices will pave the way for an inevitable process of 'the gradual formation of a unified Israeli nation' that would encompass every ethnic in the country.

At the same time a Palestinian writer, who writes in Hebrew, Anton Shammas, published a newspaper article criticizing the fact that Israel's Declaration of Independence defines Israel as a Jewish state; it opened a heated debate in the Jewish public opinion.[33] Shammas favoured an Israel that was 'democratic' and not 'Jewish', in which nationality and citizenship would be equivalent and all of whose citizens would have the same rights and obligations irrespective of ethnic background. Unlike the Israeli Hebrew option, this version's historical starting point is Israel within its pre-1967 borders, and therefore the Israeli nationality-cum-citizenship would automatically be issued to those living within these borders. The Law of Return would be rescinded in its entirety, and no provision would be made for persecuted Jews. The fact that Shammas writes in Hebrew would seem to indicate that this language would be adopted by Israel's Arab citizens as a communicative tool at a mother-tongue level, even though he does also support giving the Arab language an equal *de facto* status. The fact that he is in favour of intermarriage also indicates that he favours the creation of a new Israeli nation.

Another version of the Israeli option that has an affinity to the multicultural model, although it is not identical with it, is the 'leftist–Marxist' version. The Israel Communist Party, and other left-wing groups that broke away from it in the 1960s such as the 'Matzpen' group came out in favour of a secular Israeli state as the expression of the right to self-determination of the Jewish nation created in Palestine.[34] This version evolved under the influence of Marxist ideology and Soviet policy (after May 1947). According to this model the Israeli state was to have served the interests of the Jewish and Arab proletariat, while remaining neutral with respect to religious and ethnic questions. Thus it was to have been a state that rejects the Zionist ideology and its perception of Jewish interests, while serving also as the object of patriotic identification by the Arab citizenry. However, this model, in keeping with the Soviet model of dealing with national minorities and in contrast to the liberal model, does not require doing away with the cultural differences between the (Jewish) majority and the (Arab) minority. True, this version assumes that the state will reflect the culture of the majority, whose language will be the dominant one, but will not discriminate against the minority, either

individually or collectively. Therefore the platform of the Israel Communist Party in the 1950s, and that of the New Communist List in the 1960s, demanded a secular constitution, separation of religion and state, equal rights and the abolition of all legal and practical differences between Jews and Arabs. The party was committed to communist rules of organization, which demanded that it reflect the ethnic composition of the population of its territory, and the New Communist List did indeed act accordingly until the 1980s; its leadership was predominantly Jewish and the party considered itself to be patriotic and exhibited the symbols of the state at its ceremonies and conventions. Until the mid-1950s both Jewish and Arab members of the Israel Communist Party demanded that Arab men be included in Israel's system of compulsory military service.[35] The Communist Party was always careful to refer to Israel's Arab citizens as 'the Arab masses' and not as 'Palestinians', and its demand for 'equal civil and national rights' referred mainly to the cultural sphere and was couched in terms of the protection of private property, such as opposition to the confiscation of land.[36] Although the political discourse of the Communist Party has since been 'Palestinized' to a great extent, this political position remained unchanged in the 1990s; in the words of the head of the party's list in the Knesset (since May 1999), Muhammad Barake: 'The State of Israel should indeed express the right of the Jewish people to self-determination, but at the same time it must also be the state of all its citizens, in which ethnic and religious groups live under conditions of civic equality'.[37]

The idea to transform Israel from a Jewish state to a 'state of all its citizens' lies on the theoretical borderline between a multicultural nation state and a binational state. (The latter model, as may be recalled, is not discussed in this article, for it involves a different set of governmental and political principles.) The political history of the phrase, 'a state of all its citizens' and its current political usage demonstrate the possibility of different interpretations. However, the tracing of the ideas of its most ardent advocates suggests that what they have in mind is a binational state, rather than a multicultural nation state.

'The state of all its citizens' as a legal–political term has its roots in the aforementioned change proposed by the Progressive List for Peace (PLP) members of Knesset to the amendment to the Basic Law adopted on 31 July 1985. According to the amendment, Israel is defined by law as 'the state of the Jewish people', and any list to the Knesset that does not recognize it in its platform could be banned from running. The proposal of the PLP (that was rejected) was either to drop the phrase referring to Israel as 'state of the Jewish people' or, to add to it, 'and its Arab citizens'. In giving his reasons MK Mati Peled of the PLP specifically referred to the need to recognize the existence of the national Palestinian minority 'as an equal partner in the state.'[38]

This theme was picked up by Azmi Bisharah, who on 11 April 1992 founded the Alliance for Equality. The group put out a manifesto declaring its basic ideas. The first topic in the group's manifesto was entitled 'Israel as a State of its Jewish and Palestinian Citizens', and it suggests a multicultural conception. It stated that:

> the alternative to the definition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people is not the creation of a unified and a homogeneous collective, which cancel the uniqueness of its components, but the creation of equality among those who are different. It should be recognized that the society in Israel includes different sub-groups, that their unique development is a condition for the development of the collective as a whole. In this collective not only Jews and Palestinians need to have full expression, but also women and men, Mizrahim and Ashkenazim Orthodox and secular and those of other religions and beliefs. All would sustain their uniqueness on the basis of equal partnership.[39]

But another topic in the manifesto entitled 'Autonomy for the Palestinian Minority' demanded 'cultural self-rule' and placed the groups' agenda closer to the binational model. These two demands alongside the demand to grant recognition to the Arab population as a national minority became the hallmark of the Balad party, which Bisharah's group set up with others before the 1996 elections.[40] The three principles were included in the official goals of the party when Balad ran for the first time as a separate party in May 1999. In a series of articles before the 1996 elections explaining his ideas concerning these demands, Bisharah expressed his lack of trust in the ability to form a civic Israeli nation state, because 'even if (the definition of) nationality would be restricted in a manner that would not include the rest of the Jews in the world, it would still apply only to the Jewish Israelis, and would exclude the Arabs … Israelization negates the Arab Palestinian identity, and includes the eradication of (its collective) memory'.[41]

CONSEQUENCES FOR MAJORITY–MINORITY RELATIONS

Theoretically, the Israeli civic nation state model in either one of its two versions constitutes a perfect solution to the problem of the relation between the 'majority' and the 'minority' in the civic domain, for it entails the abolition of the structural distinction between the two, and a blurring of the social distinction. However, many of its implications are such that at the moment it is far from acceptable to the majority in both communities.

The major consequence of either version would be a significant reduction in the perceived inequality of the Arabs *vis-à-vis* the Jews in a variety of areas. Limiting the scope of the Law of Return or abolishing it outright, as well as the abolition of Zionist institutions or extending their

scope to the entire population, would remove many of the manifestations
of superiority and preferential treatment that the Jewish population enjoys
at present as a consequence of Israel being defined as a Jewish state.
Prohibiting by law any discrimination for the purpose of furthering the
interests of the Jewish community alone (such as the expropriation of
land, unequal public appropriations and investments, etc.)[42] would do
away with current practices and prepare the ground for promoting the
equality of Israel's Palestinian citizens. In the same way, removing the
limitations on the purchase of national (Jewish) land by Arabs and
prohibiting discrimination in housing would bring about a certain
decrease in the current social and geographical separation between Jews
and Arabs. Rigid social barriers will also weaken thanks to the possibility
of civil marriage and personal cultural coexistence, without the necessity
of 'crossing the lines', culturally and religiously, by means of religious
conversion. A prohibition on discrimination in the job market on
irrelevant grounds would tend to increase the equality of opportunity
among Arabs on a personal level.

However, the two versions also differ significantly in their
consequences, on both instrumental and social–symbolic levels. The Israeli
Hebrew option in fact forces the Arab minority to become assimilated into
the culture of the majority, even if the assimilating Hebrew culture is not
equivalent to Jewish culture. There is no guarantee that even pressure to
assimilate such a culture will not arouse violent resistance on a religious
basis, because of the affinity between 'Jewish' and 'Hebrew' cultures.[43] One
can of course claim that the socialization of the Arabs through the Hebrew
language, and even more so their inclusion in the army, will have the effect
of removing one of the main means (the demand that applicants be 'army
veterans') for discriminating against them, and will make it more difficult
to mark them in the job market or in public.[44] However, forced
mobilization into the army or denial of citizenship are patently non-liberal
actions, which would create a large public that refused to serve in the army
and was denied political and social rights, like the Palestinians who came
under Israeli rule in 1967. If that were to happen, the chances of irredentist
tendencies and an uprising would be considerable. The implementation of
this option would also entail a certain withdrawal of the state from social
and developmental functions that are now performed for the Jewish
Zionist community; instead, the state would transfer the responsibility for
resource allocation to market mechanisms. The result would be that social
mobility among Arabs would be selectively determined by means and
special skills, thus not operating on a scale sufficient to close the huge gaps
between Arabs and Jews that exist at present.

While the Israeli multicultural option cannot ensure that such a
scenario will not occur, it does contain within itself the means for
ameliorating it, by mechanisms of affirmative action and allocation of

resources for narrowing the gaps. Such resources could to a certain extent be allocated by autonomous bodies within Arab society, similar to the autonomy that the Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox Jews have with respect to their educational system. That way the minority will enjoy greater power. However, here too the logic of the capitalist–liberal paradigm would limit the change in the socio-economic gap between Arab and Jews. Israeli society will be more clearly divided along a social axis that crosses cultural and ethnic lines. As the Arab middle class grows, two contradictory developments in relations are to be expected: the Jewish and Arab middle classes will become physically closer and experience greater social contact and, all things being equal, social stereotypes on both sides will become weaker.[45] But tensions are also to be expected at this level, because of affirmative action. Furthermore, affirmative action does not solve the asymmetry in blue-collar professions: it is probable that a great part of the Arab population will continue to be represented disproportionately at the lower socio-economic levels and that the struggle over resources will create competition and tensions between Jews and Arabs, which could result in the appearance of radical racist movements such as the Kahanist movement.[46]

Still, opening the army to everyone and providing the choice of alternative national service, as is the case in this version, should do away with one of the main instruments for excluding Arab citizens from the community on both symbolic and instrumental levels. The adoption of national symbols that are not specifically 'Jewish' and the integration of Arab citizens into the national political, judicial, executive and academic systems should also help in reducing the feeling of alienation and in increasing the identification of the Arab population with the state.

Once the Arabs are clearly perceived as Israelis the present tension resulting from their marginality with respect to both the Israeli and the Palestinian arenas would diminish, and their ties with their Palestinian brothers and with the Arab world would probably become less crucial. On the other hand, they may again be perceived by the Arab world (as they were before 1967) as having abandoned their Arab heritage and the Arab nation. In the multicultural version this drawback would be less noticeable: Arab culture would not fade away, because cultural and educational organizations dedicated to the preservation of Arab Palestinian language and heritage would coexist with the Israeli culture common to all. The state would provide material and moral support for disseminating local Palestinian culture (for example, the traditions of the Galilee, the 'Triangle', the Negev) and the Arabic language to those who want it (as it would for other sub-cultures, such as Russian and Amharic). Their ties with the Arab world would not be interfered with, although they would not be considered authentic members of the Arab people. Nevertheless, either version is certain to provoke widespread fear of the

loss of Arab identity. In order to overcome this the state could permit its
Arab citizens, in cooperation with the Palestinian state, to hold dual
citizenship, Israeli and Palestinian.

IS SUCH A CHANGE FEASIBLE?

The idea of transforming Israel from a Jewish state to a civic Israeli nation
state will be vehemently resisted by some sections of the Jewish public
(notably the Orthodox public), and opposed in various degrees by the
rest.[47] This is reflected in the wide support for the 'Jewish and democratic'
formula, however interpreted, as the legal legitimization of the relations
between state and society. Even those in the Jewish public who are in
favour of constitutionally curtailing the power of Orthodox Jewish
parties[48] and those who favour 'the complete integration of the Arabs' in
the state, have not abandoned Zionism in favour of the idea of an Israeli
civic nation.[49] Only a minority of Jews are willing personally to intermarry
with Arabs, and only a minority believe that Arab citizens' loyalties would
be to the state of Israel, rather than to a neighbouring Palestinian state.[50]

   The Arab Palestinian citizens, being a minority, would probably
demonstrate a greater ability than do the Jewish citizens to make the
distinction between their citizenship and their nationality and religious
faith. Therefore, a liberal state that would remove social barriers and
promote mobility through mixed communities, personal friendships and
integrated schools, would be welcomed by many.[51] This will probably
reflect also on Arab willingness to perform national or military service.[52]
Others would have reservations and prefer the existing separation
between the communities, particularly in housing and education, as long
as these are of a high quality, as is the case today in Nazareth, for
example.[53] However, if pressure were to be applied on the Arab
population to adopt a civic national Israeli identity, it would probably
result in a bitter reaction and cause tensions between the various Arab
Palestinian sub-communities. The multicultural model would probably be
acceptable to many of the Christians, to a minority of secular Muslims[54]
and to the Druze community as well, although the latter would have
reservations (owing to the fear of intermarriage); however, it would
probably be vehemently resisted by religious Muslims and by those with
an accentuated national orientation.[55] The religious Muslim conception,
similar to the Jewish Orthodox one, does not distinguish between the
national and religious identity, and demands that the public and private
spheres be conducted according to the rules of the Sharia (Muslim
religious law). The implementation of liberal policies such as equality
between the sexes, induction into the army and developing loyalty to an
Israeli identity at the expense of their Islamic identity and their attachment
to the Arab Islamic world would be rejected outright as constituting an

existential threat.[56] Those with an accentuated Palestinian consciousness would also react with an adamant refusal to the possibility of becoming integrated into an Israeli Hebrew identity that would replace the Palestinian one. The argument would be that the loss of the Palestinian identity would in fact perpetuate Arab inferiority. They would also reject the multicultural version as unrealistic and as something that would distort the Palestinian national consciousness, which is the sole means, in their opinion, of enabling the Palestinian minority in Israel to extricate itself from a fate of structural inferiority.[57] The majority (81 per cent) in the Arab community, as is the case in the Jewish community, reject the idea (on a personal level) of integration through intermarriage between Jews and Arabs.

CONCLUSION

The probability that Israel in the near future will transform from a Jewish state to a to a civic nation state in which Jews and Arabs will share a national identity is low. This is true with regard to either the Hebrew civic version or the multicultural versions of the model. The international recognition that has been accorded to the existence of a 'Jewish state', and the high degree of legitimacy that the concept still enjoys among its Jewish majority are the primary reasons for this assessment. In addition, Zionist ideology and practice have been bolstered over the past decade by the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the immigration of nearly a million people to Israel under the Law of Return. Since 1976 the Arab Palestinian minority have gradually raised their protest against the Zionist structure of the state. They are defending their land rights, demanding equal appropriations, and the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. But these protests were on the whole through legal means, making this minority one of the most quiescent national minorities in the twentieth century.[58] Even if protest should become more militant, the indicators are that this minority would prefer change in the direction of a binational state rather than in the direction of an Israeli civic nation state.[59] Any attempt to implement the Israeli Hebrew version, which would mean forcing the Arabs to become assimilated into Hebrew culture and language, can be expected to lead to violent resistance, particularly on the part of the Islamic movements.

Would the attainment of a stable settlement with the Palestinian people and the other Arab states increase the chances for changing the paradigm of Israel to a civic nation? In the short term, probably not. The Palestinian state with which a settlement would be reached will be an ethnic Palestinian state with many of the same features that characterize the ethnic Jewish state. The Jewish majority will probably feel that with the creation of such a state it has done its share in solving the Palestinian

national question, and thus there would no longer be any moral validity to the demands of the Palestinian minority within Israel to change Israel's ethnic Jewish definition.

But in the more distant future, it is possible to foresee the change of the Israeli state to a multicultural civic nation state model. The growing internal tensions in Israeli society in the last decade have focused to large degree on the question of collective identity. The conception of Israel as a Jewish nation state that was in the past treated as a 'given', is under strain. A number of interconnected factors have served as a catalyst for this development: the ebbing chances of an all-out war with the Arab states and the face-to-face conflict in the *intifada* with the Palestinians; the ideological and structural changes in Israel from a collectivist, mobilized society to a more individualist, secular, and globalized society; and finally, the absorption of large-scale, relatively less assimilating migration from Russia and Ethiopia.

All these had an effect on the suppressed Jewish–Arab cleavage. Its criss-crossing with the religious–secular cleavage resulted in the engraving into law in 1985 the formula of 'Israel as a Jewish and democratic state', and set off a chain reaction. The growing protest against the formula from within the Arab community resulted in increasing uneasiness of the liberally inclined Jewish public with the contradiction between the ethnic ('Jewish') and the civic ('democratic') principles of legitimization. So far it only led to the appropriation of the phrase 'Israel as a state of all its citizens' as a complementary phrase to Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.[60]

But if the discourse on individual rights grows stronger, and informal autonomous communities (such as separate neighbourhoods for ultra-Orthodox, religious and secular Jews, and for secular and religious Arabs) grows further apart, the demand for an overall change of the relationship between the state and the citizens will become stronger. The early signs of process that we are witnessing point, unfortunately, to an illiberal or an uncivil multicultural reality. The mission may therefore be to find a way to turn it into a more civic and liberal one.

NOTES

1. It must be stressed at this point that what is under discussion here is *not* a consensual binational structure in which the country's resources are officially divided between two ethnic groups, or an autonomy granted to a national minority within a state which is officially defined as 'belonging' to a different, majority, nationality; rather, what is discussed here is a liberal civic *nation* state.
2. See, Yossi Yonah, 'Fifty Years Later: The Scope and Limits of Liberal Democracy in Israel', *Constellations*, Vol.6, No.3 (Sept. 1999), pp.411–28.
3. Oren Yiftachel, 'Israeli Society and Jewish–Palestinian Reconciliation: "Ethnocracy" and Its Territorial Contradictions', *Middle East Journal*, Vol.51, No.4 (1997), pp.505–19.
4. Sammy Smooha, 'Minority Status in an Ethnic Democracy: The Status of the Arab Minority in Israel', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol.13, No.3 (1990), pp.389–413.

5. Benjamin Neuberger, 'Democracy with Four Flaws', *Panim*, No.9 (Spring 1999), pp.104–8 (in Hebrew).

6. Yoav Peled, 'Ethnic Democracy and the Legal Construction of Citizenship: Arab Citizens of the Jewish State', *American Political Science Review*, Vol.86, No.2 (1992), pp.432–43.

7. *Neiman v. Chairman of the Central Elections Committee for the Twelfth Knesset*, 1988, Piskei Din 42:4 (in Hebrew).

8. See Ben-Gurion's letter to the Sages of Israel in which he says that the registration could not be annulled because 'at times that on all borders there are people who are infiltrating into the country from the neighboring enemy countries, and are the source of severe danger to the well being of the state and its people, it is necessary that a legal resident in Israel would be able to identify himself with an official and authoritative document.' (quoted in Benjamin Neuberger, *Religion, State and Politics*, Tel Aviv, 1994, p.79, in Hebrew).

9. The move by the interior minister in 1958 to register the children of immigrant couples of mixed marriages as 'Jews' on the grounds of their subjective feeling was blocked politically by the Jewish Orthodox party in the coalition. In 1962 the High Court of Justice refused to accord rights under the Law of Return to a Jewish convert (*Roffaizen v. Minister of Interior*, 72/1962). In 1968, the court accepted the plea to register as Jews children of mixed couples on the basis of the subjective feeling (*Shalit v. Minister of Interior*, 58/1968), but the decision was overturned by legislation in 1970. Attempts by secular Jews to have the court order their nationality registration as either 'Hebrew' or 'Israeli' rather than 'Jewish' failed as well (*Tamarin v. The State of Israel*, 907/1970; *Shelah v. The State of Israel*, 653/1975).

10. Bills to erase the nationality classification from the identity card have been suggested, and failed in the 13th, 14th and current 15th Knesset. The two most recent bills were by Roman Bronfman and Yuli Stern (*Divrei Ha-Knesset*, 19 Jan. 2000) who represent Russian immigrants. This solution may eventually be accepted in order to avoid a pending ruling by the High Court of Justice on registrations of non-Orthodox conversions. Calls for amending the Law of Return to limit non-Jewish immigration have been made by Orthodox politicians. See the above Knesset debate.

11. Yaakov Shavit, *From Hebrew to Canaanite*, Jerusalem, 1984 (in Hebrew); Boaz Evron, *The National Account*, Tel Aviv, 1988, pp.354–6 (in Hebrew).

12. Yosef Agassi, *Between Religion and Nationality: Towards a New Israeli Identity*, Tel Aviv, 1993, p.108 (in Hebrew); Uri Avnery, *Israel Without Zionism*, New York, 1971, pp.15–17.

13. Agassi, *Between Religion and Nationality*, pp.202, 208; Avnery, *Israel Without Zionism*, pp.174–7.

14. Agassi, *Between Religion and Nationality*, pp.188–96.

15. Judy Baumel, *Between Ideology and Propaganda – the Etzel Delegation in the United States 1939–48*, Jerusalem, 1999 (in Hebrew).

16. Agassi, *Between Religion and Nationality*, p.158. This wording echoes the language and approach expressed by Herzl in his fictional book *Altneuland* concerning the character of the future Jewish state. In a description of the festive Passover dinner (Seder) in the home of Jews who had come to Palestine from Galicia there appear as guests a Russian Orthodox priest from Zepphoris, a Franciscan monk from Tiberias and a 'venerable' Muslim from Haifa.

17. They probably identified with Ahad Ha-'Am's position that a Jewish state is valueless unless it is committed to developing Jewish culture. See his 'Jewish State and Jewish Troubles', in *Collected Writings of Ahad Ha-'Am*, Jerusalem, 1949 (in Hebrew).

18. Avnery, *Israel Without Zionism*.

19. 'A Model of a Different Israel – Forty Years to the "Hebrew Manifesto"', *Ha'aretz* , 1 Oct. 1997 (in Hebrew).

20. Quoted from 'The Hebrew Manifesto', ibid.

21. Zikhroni, *The Versus 119: Uri Avnery on the Knesset*, Tel Aviv, 1969, p.16 (in Hebrew). The movement split before the elections of 1973; some of its activists founded a movement called 'Alternativa' in the 1980s, which entered parliament as part of the 'Progressive List for Peace'.

22. Hillel Kook and Shmuel Marlin, 'A Proposal for a National Debate', *Ha'aretz*, 18 April 1975 (in Hebrew).

23. Yoav Peled, 'Strangers in Utopia: The Civic Status of Israel's Palestinian Citizens', *Theory and Criticism*, Vol.3 (Winter 1993), p.30.

24. Agassi, *Between Religion and Nationality*. The first edition of this book was written in 1980 and published in 1983.

25. Ibid., pp.232–44.
26. Kook and Marlin, 'A Proposal for a National Debate'.
27. Moshe Sharon, 'Is the Middle East Ready for Peace?', *Nativ*, Vol.10, Nos.1–2 (1997), p.68 (in Hebrew).
28. Agassi, *Between Religion and Nationality*, pp.210–11.
29. Rafi Yisra'eli, 'A Company of Dodgers', *Ha'aretz*, 23 Feb. 1998 (in Hebrew). See also his book, *Arabs in Israel: Friends or Foes?*, Jerusalem, 2002, pp.2225–6 (in Hebrew).
30. Evron, *The National Account*.
31. See Shulamit Aloni, 'From Cradle to Grave: Why Does the Appellation "Israeli" Offend Them So?', *Politika*, Vol.17 (Oct. 1987), pp.11–13.
32. 'The Curse of Ezra', *Ha'aretz*, 29 Aug. 1985 (in Hebrew).
33. See the following articles by Shammas (all in Hebrew): 'A New Year's Day for Jews', *Ha'ir*, 13 Sept. 1985; 'We (Who is that?)', *Politika*, Vol.17 (Oct. 1987), pp.26–7; 'The Russian Doll's Guilt', *Ha'ir*, 24 Jan. 1986; 'The Morning After: "Palestinians", "Israelis" and Other Imaginings', in Elie Rekhess and Tamar Yegnes (eds.), *Arab Politics in Israel at a Crossroads*, Tel Aviv, 1995, pp.19–31. The main rebuttal came from A.B. Yehoshua, *Ha'ir*, 31 Jan. 1986.
34. M. Vilner, 'Fifty Years of Struggle of Our Communist Party' (in Hebrew), *Fifty Years of the Communist Party in Palestine/Israel*, Tel Aviv, April 1970, p.38; Nira Yuval-Davis, *Matzpen: The Socialist Organization in Israel*, Jerusalem, 1977, p.40.
35. Sara Ozacky-Lazar, 'The Interaction between Jews and Arabs in the State of Israel: The First Decade 1948–1958', PhD thesis, Haifa University, Department of Middle East History, 1996, p.33 (in Hebrew).
36. Maki, *The 15th Congress*, Tel Aviv–Jaffa, 6–8 Aug. 1965, 1968 (in Hebrew). The Central Committee, CPI (Rakah) *The 18th Congress*, Haifa, 15–18 Dec. 1976, p.43 (in Hebrew).
37. 'Panel, Jews and Arabs in the Peace', in Rekhess and Yegnes, *Arab Politics in Israel at a Crossroads*, p.96.
38. *Divrei Ha-Knesset*, Vol.42, No.30, pp.3906, 3899. This legislation was a direct result of the attempt to disqualify the Progressive List for Peace from running in the 1984 elections, for its allegedly anti-state platform. The attempt was foiled by a Supreme Court ruling (*Neiman v. Chairman of the Central Elections Commission for the Eleventh Knesset*, 1984, Piskei Din 39:2, 1985) which ruled that there was not sufficient evidence to disqualify. A second attempt to disqualify the PLP in 1988 on the basis of the new legislation also failed on the same grounds (*Ben Shalom v. CEC*, 1988, Piskei Din, 43:6–7, 1988) But the dissenting opinion saw in the PLP's demand to add the Arab citizens as 'owners' of the state as negating the basic principles of the state.
39. An undated manifesto.
40. Ilana Kaufman and Rachel Israeli, 'The Odd Group Out: The Arab-Palestinian Vote in the 1996 Elections', in Asher Arian and Michal Shamir (eds.), *The Elections in Israel 1996*, Albany, 1999, pp.85–116.
41. Azmi Bisharah, 'The Revelation of Intentions', *Fasl al-Makal*, Vol.26, Nos.6–7, 1997 (in Arabic), pp.6–11.
42. On overt and covert institutionalized discrimination see David Kretzmer, *The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel*, Boulder, CO, 1990; on inequality in welfare services see Zeev Rozenhak, *The Origins and Development of the Dual Welfare State: The Arab Population in the Israeli Welfare State*, PhD thesis, Hebrew University, 1995 (in Hebrew).
43. That is precisely what occurred in Thailand when the Muslim Malay minority was declared to consist of 'Thais of Muslim extraction', who were then pressured into assimilating into the Thai Buddhist majority. See Eric Cohen, 'Citizenship, Nationality and Religion in Israel and Thailand', in Baruch Kimmerling (ed.), *The Israeli State and Society: Boundaries and Frontiers*, Albany, 1989, pp.66–92.
44. On direct and indirect discrimination of Arabs in the job market see Noah Lewin-Epstein and Moshe Semyonov, *The Arab Minority in Israel's Economy*, Boulder, CO, 1993. Benjamin Wolkinson, 'Recruitment and Selection of Workers in Israel: The Question of Disparate Impact', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* Vol.17, No.2 (April 1994), pp.260–81.
45. On the contradiction-ridden social contact between Jews and Arab professionals see Dan Rabinowitz, *Overlooking Nazareth*, Cambridge, 1997, pp.137–45.
46. On the relation between socio-economic distress and voting for Kahane see Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled, 'Thorns in Your Eyes: The Socioeconomic Basis of the Kahana Vote', in Asher

Arian and Michal Shamir (eds.), *The Elections in Israel, 1984*, Tel Aviv, 1986, pp.189–208.

47. Smooha and Ghanem found that none of the Jewish religious people they polled defined themselves as 'Israelis' first. In contrast, 60 per cent of those who defined themselves as non-religious chose 'Israeli' as their first identity. Sammy Smooha and As'ad Ghanem, *Ethnic Religious, and Political Islam among the Arabs in Israel*, working paper no. 14, The Jewish Arab Center, University of Haifa, March 1998.

48. In the May 1999 elections the Shinui party, which ran under a radical anti-Orthodox banner jumped from two to six representatives.

49. The main reason for favouring territorial compromise, according to the Zionist political parties that favour such a policy, is the need to preserve the 'Jewish majority'. Indeed, in a 1996 Tami Steinmetz survey 68.6 per cent claimed that preserving a Jewish majority in Israel was more important than preserving the territorial integrity of the Land of Israel (Palestine). Ninety-seven per cent of those polled by Smooha and Ghanem expressed their explicit support of the Law of Return. The massive immigration from the former Soviet Union since 1990 has strengthened this trend, ironically, among the secular-leaning Jews. The majority of the immigrants are secular and a large proportion are not even Jewish. They are therefore seen as a demographic counter-balance to the Orthodox Jews.

50. In the Tami Steinmetz survey (above) only 10.5 per cent expressed willingness to marry an Arab. Twenty-two per cent believe that Arabs would be more loyal to Israel, 19 per cent they would be equally loyal both to states and 48 per cent that they would be more loyal to a Palestinian state.

51. According to the Tami Steinmetz survey (above) 90 per cent of the Arabs who were polled were willing to enter into such relations, as compared with 60–67 per cent of the Jews. On the reasons for preferring studying together with Jews see Rabinowitz, *Overlooking Nazareth*, p.84.

52. Surveys conducted after the signing of the Oslo accords showed that 42–54 per cent were in favour of civilian national service as a substitute for military service, while 21 per cent were in favour of military service: Issam Abu Rayya, *National Service for the Arabs in Israel?*, Beit Berl, 1994, p.25 (in Hebrew).

53. Rabinowitz, *Overlooking Nazareth*, pp.82–3.

54. Smooha and Ghanem found that 90 per cent of the Druzes and 60 per cent of the Christians (but only 48 per cent of the Muslims) define themselves as Israeli Arabs. Among the Arabs who were polled support for the main principles of the liberal model reached 40.4 per cent.

55. According to the survey of Smooha and Ghanem 45.6 per cent of all Arabs consider their religious identity to be the most important one, 31.4 per cent the civic Israeli identity and 23 per cent the national Palestinian one.

56. Rayya, *National Service for the Arabs in Israel?*, pp.15–16.

57. See Azmi Bisharah's article 'Equality and Communal Rights', in the Democratic National Alliance's organ *Fasl al-Maqal*, 10–16 July 1997 (in Arabic), as well as Azmi Bisharah, 'The Israeli Arab: Studies in a Split Discourse', in Pinchas Genosar and Avi Bareli (eds.), *Zionism in Today's Debate*, Center for Ben Gurion's legacy, 1996 (in Hebrew).

58. This observation was made before the October 2000 violent outburst. The participation in the outbreak of the *intifada al-Aqsa*, which resulted in the death of 13 Arab citizens by the police, no doubt opened a new chapter in the protest activities of the Arab citizens in Israel.

59. Smooha in his surveys has found this to be the case. See S. Smooha, 'Ethnic Jewish Israel as a Prototype', in R. Gabison and D. Hacker (eds.), *The Jewish-Arab Rift in Israel: A Reader*, 2001, p.96. The most recent version of this idea developed among Palestinian intellectuals, led by Edward Said is that binationalism on the whole of the contested territory should replace the Oslo approach for solving the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. See, for example As'ad Ghanem, 'The Option of a Binational State on the Whole Area of Eretz Israel/Palestine', in Sara Ozacky-Lazar, As'ad Ghanem and Ilan Pappé (eds.), *Seven Roads: Theoretical Options for the Status of the Arabs in Israel*, Givat Haviva, 1999, pp.271–303 (in Hebrew).

60. See the language of Supreme Court Judge, Misahael Heshin, *Myron Eizakson v. Rasham Hamiflagot ve hatnua ke shinui*, PD, 2316/96.