



Co-existence in Selected Mixed Arab–Jewish Cities in Israel: By Choice or by Default?

Ghazi Falah, Michael Hoy and Rakhal Sarker

[Paper first received, November 1997; in final form, May 1999]

Summary. In this paper, we use a data-set based on a survey of the perceptions about co-existence between Arabs and Jews as held by the inhabitants of five mixed Arab–Jewish cities in Israel: Acre, Haifa, Jaffa, Lydda and Ramla. Our main purpose is to determine the relative importance of various factors which contribute to the level of satisfaction with co-existence in Israel as perceived by the inhabitants themselves. Our choice of explanatory variables is motivated by a consideration of issues relating to the specific historical context of Jews and Arabs living together in these cities; and, an awareness of more general sociological considerations which may bear on the degree of satisfaction with co-existence. Our empirical analysis suggests that the variables relating to the specific historical evolution of Arab–Jewish relations—especially in the context of the urban setting—have the greatest explanatory power in understanding perceptions of co-existence. Basic sociological factors also hold some explanatory importance.

1. Introduction

According to the *Cambridge International Dictionary of English* (1995, p. 254), the word ‘co-exist’ means “to live or exist together at the same time or in the same place”. It can also mean living together in mutual tolerance while practising different lifestyles, speaking different languages, sharing different cultures and professing different political and religious ideologies. The term co-existence embodies all these aspects of human interactions and more when applied to the Arabs and Jews living in various mixed cities in Israel.¹ While effective communication among various culturally and ethnically diverse groups of people is a necessary condition for peaceful co-existence in an urban environment, sharing cultural values, politi-

cal views and religious ideologies with mutual respect and admiration are essential for lasting peace with co-existence in mixed cities.

Since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, a number of fundamental changes have taken place in almost all cities in Israel. In line with Israel’s declaration of independence which proclaimed that “the Land of Israel was the birthplace of the Jewish people which shaped their spiritual, religious and national identity”, these changes were well planned and executed to generate, protect and propagate Jewish identity throughout Israel. The Arab–Israeli war between 1947 and 1949, the creation of Is-

Ghazi Falah is in the Centre for Urban and Community Studies, University of Toronto, 455 Spadina Avenue, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S 2G8. Fax: 416 978 7162. E-mail: gfalah@chass.utoronto.ca. Michael Hoy is in the Department of Economics, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario, Canada N1G 2W1. Fax: 519 763 8497. Email: mike@css.uoguelph.ca. Rakhal Sarker is in the Department of Agricultural Economics and Business, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario, Canada, N1G 2W1. Fax: 519 767 1510. E-mail: rsarker@agec.uoguelph.ca.

rael and the subsequent push renewed Jewish identity and led to a mass exodus of Arabs from various cities in Israel (Falah, 1996b). The properties left behind by Arabs were transferred to state ownership and, in urban areas and vacated Palestinian cities, the state authorised a semi-official public housing agency called *Amidar* to administer those properties. This agency sold some of the abandoned houses to Arab residents through a 'key money' arrangement (a sort of long-term lease), thus maintaining some control over the properties. In general, most of the vacated houses were sold to non-Arabs. It is to be noted here that between 1948 and 1966, the Israeli government instituted a military administration in the areas of Arab concentration which imposed severe restrictions on their freedom of movement and economic opportunities, and placed them under surveillance and military law (Lustick, 1980; Kretzmer, 1990). Such treatment also drove some of the remaining Arabs from Israel. Consequently, many cities where Arabs were in the majority became populated by a Jewish majority. The Arabs who did not flee to neighbouring countries accepted Jewish rule and minority status. Even after accepting Jewish rule, however, these Arabs maintained their own identity. In some urban centres, these two ethnic groups continued to live together in close proximity. Such co-existence between Arabs and Jews in various mixed cities, however, has not always been harmonious. There have been some disputes and conflicts over time. However, unlike those cities in the West Bank such as Hebron and East Jerusalem, most of these conflicts in mixed Arab-Jewish cities have been non-violent in nature (Lustick, 1980; Falah, 1996a). This is an interesting point. The co-existence in mixed Arab-Jewish cities must have generated some mutual understanding and tolerance between these two groups which may have contributed to the non-violent resolution of ethnic conflicts. If we can obtain a better understanding of this co-existence, its degree and the factors contributing to the levels of perceived harmony or satisfaction with co-existence, then that understanding can

be used to inform public policies designed to promote more peaceful co-existence between Arabs and Jews not only in the mixed cities but also in the wider state of Israel. Such an understanding may also go a long way to create mutual trust among Arabs and Jews and may even contribute to the 'on again-off again' peace process in the Middle East.

The major objective of this paper is to determine the relative importance of various factors which may contribute to the level of satisfaction with co-existence in five mixed Arab-Jewish cities in Israel. To the best of our knowledge, no attempt has been made in the past to determine empirically in such a formal fashion the factors contributing to the formation of the perception of co-existence and the level of satisfaction with co-existence. It is this piece of information that we attempt to generate in this study by focusing on 5 selected cities in Israel: Acre, Haifa, Jaffa, Lydda and Ramla. In 1994, the number of Arabs living in these cities were 10 800, 25 700, 15 600, 10 600 and 9 500 respectively, which represented about 9 per cent of the total Arab population in Israel.² In terms of the percentage of Arabs in the population for each of these cities, Acre has 24 per cent Arabs (compared to 26 per cent in 1961), Haifa 10 per cent (2 per cent in 1961), Lydda 21 per cent (8.3 per cent in 1961) and Ramla 17 per cent (9.5 per cent in 1961). For Jaffa, equivalent to District 7 of the city of Tel Aviv—Yafo, the percentage of Arabs in 1983 was 17.5 per cent (compared to 8.5 per cent in 1961).³ Note that the percentages of Arabs in these cities increased substantially between 1961 and 1994, except for Acre which experienced a slight decline. Of all Arab cities, these 5 mixed cities account for about 89 per cent of the total Arab population in Israel living in cities.

In the following section, we provide an overview of the relevant literature concerning Arab-Jewish relationships in mixed cities and demonstrate how these considerations provide a framework for analysing our data and providing relevance to the results. This section reviews previous analyses and discussions of the specific his-

torical context of the development of Arab–Jewish relations in mixed cities, as well as a brief discussion of more general social theories which propose to explain the sources of behaviour and beliefs of individuals from different cultural backgrounds sharing space. The latter aspect of this discussion is not meant to be a complete comparative review of the literature, as this is not the focus of this paper. However, given the nature of our data, it is important to provide some framework within which we can address the issue of whether it is the specific historical reality of the evolution of mixed cities in Israel that is most important for developing attitudes about co-existence or whether it is general sociological factors, such as individual or household characteristics (for example, education level, gender, household income), that are more important. Although the sets of variables which relate to each of these perspectives are not entirely mutually exclusive, the two sets of arguments do suggest some differences in the relative importance of different sorts of factors that would affect personal views on co-existence within mixed cities. The results of our empirical analysis demonstrate that variables associated with the specific historical reality of the Arab–Jewish situation in mixed cities do seem very important while, although some of the general sociological factors are relevant, they are perhaps not as influential as one might expect.

In section 3, we describe our data-set and the methodology used for the empirical analysis. The results of the empirical analysis are described in detail in section 4. The empirical analysis is motivated by the two sets of considerations mentioned in the previous section and we are able to compare the relative importance of these alternative factors in influencing personal views on the degree or level of satisfaction with co-existence in mixed cities. Our data-set includes a question asking each individual his/her perspective concerning his/her degree of satisfaction with co-existence between Arabs and Jews both within the person's city of residence and within Israel overall. By taking

into consideration the development of Arab–Jewish relations both in an urban context and in a more general (state) context, we are able to draw some lessons from the comparison. In particular, we argue that understanding any differences in which factors affect how people feel about co-existence within their specific cities of residence as opposed to within the state of Israel can be helpful in developing strategies for promoting a higher level of satisfaction with co-existence and a more tolerant and peaceful environment both within mixed cities and within Israel. We point out some policy implications of these results and then, in section 5, we provide some concluding remarks.

2. Co-existence and the Arab–Jewish Relationship in Israel: An Overview

This section provides an overview of the literature relevant for our study. The first part deals primarily with perspectives on the historical realities of the Arab–Jewish relationship in Israel. From this literature, we gain some insight into what sorts of variable or personal characteristics may influence individuals' perceptions about co-existence between Arabs and Jews. We also consider more general theoretical considerations from the sociological literature relating either directly or indirectly to questions of co-existence between different cultural groups. These considerations direct our empirical analysis.

Israel is a society which is deeply divided along ethnic lines with a Palestinian Arab minority of about 15 per cent and a Jewish population which is divided almost equally between Jews of European and Afro-Asian origin. Moreover, democratic rights are not equally shared by the Jewish majority and the Arab minority. This is reflected in the dissenting statement of the Deputy President Elon on the issue of whether to allow the Progressive List for Peace (PLP), a joint Arab–Jewish party, to compete in the Knesset election in 1988. He wrote:

The principle that the State of Israel is the

state of the Jewish people is Israel's foundation and mission, and the principle of the equality of rights and obligations of all citizens of the State of Israel is of the State's essence and character. The latter principle comes only to add to the former, not to modify it; there is nothing in the principle of the equality of civil rights and obligations to modify the principle that the State of Israel is the State of the Jewish people, and only the Jewish people (quoted in Peled, 1992).

Thus, at the fundamental level of identification and belonging, there cannot be total equality between Arabs and Jews in Israel. Evidently, the Jewish majority has the greatest institutional/representational power and they have full access to all public goods. Since many social rights in Israel have been tied to performance in military service, most Arab citizens of Israel either do not have those rights or are entitled to smaller benefits (Kretzmer, 1990). Perhaps because of such discriminatory treatment, the Arabs in Israel developed better ability to endure injustice, to use collective protests within the confines of Israeli law, to define their identity as Arabs and to determine the demographic balance in the country. The perceptions of threat, security and conflict also differ markedly between Arabs and Jews in Israel. The perceived institutional power of the Jewish majority is not translated into a sense of security for Jews. Their sense of insecurity emanates from factors such as Arab feelings that they have always lived there, a high Arab birthrate, the rise in Arabs' national consciousness and the fear of Arabs in Israel joining the Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories. The same set of factors, however, evokes a sense of reassurance among the Arabs. The perception of threat and insecurity among Arabs, on the other hand, originates from factors such as discussions about the expulsion of Arabs, expropriation of Arab lands and development of more Jewish settlements in occupied territories, erosion of democratic values in Israel and Arab emigration from Israel. Ironically, these factors

do not matter to the majority of Jews in Israel because to them these are essential components of the internal development of Israel as a Jewish state and the sustenance of its Jewish culture and identity (Rouhana and Fiske, 1995). For the Jewish majority, political affiliation is more important than other factors such as religious values, readiness to have an Arab friend, gender and age in determining their perception of power, threat and security (Rouhana and Fiske, 1995). For the Arab minority, however, religious values and provision of discriminatory public services, land expropriation and expansion of Jewish settlements are the most important determinants of their perception of power, threat and insecurity in Israel (Shamir and Sullivan, 1985; Rouhana and Fiske, 1995). It is against this background that we consider the perception of co-existence among the Arab minority and the Jewish majority in mixed cities in Israel.

The Jewish majority population displays a wide range of levels of both tolerance and intolerance to the presence of Arabs in their state and in their cities (Shamir and Sullivan, 1985). At one end of the spectrum are the extremist groups in the Jewish sector who do not believe that co-existence with Arabs is either possible or desirable. For them, the best strategy is to transfer all Arabs out of Palestine and render Israel/Palestine a purely Jewish country (Nisan, 1986, p. 108). It is clear that, for these individuals, co-existence with the Arabs does not mean much; it is not a negotiable issue because they do not want co-existence to develop. Members of this group, which is currently represented by the *Moledet* political party that gained two seats in the May 1996 Knesset election, often exploit political events and hostilities in the region to promote their views (Nisan, 1986). Although those who actively promote the view that Arabs should be transferred out of the state are a minority, the relevance of this attitude is not insubstantial.⁴

A large part of the Jewish majority accepts the fact that the Arabs in Israel are a given reality that need to be accommodated using democratic means or by the legal means that are available as controlled by the Jews. Yet

the underlying principle is that Jewish demands should be implemented first and not be superseded by the demands (or needs) of the Arabs. The logic behind this is imperative: Israel is a Jewish state and the Arab minority should not expect Israel to grant them equal rights. Another justification also often mentioned involves security or historical factors: i.e. the Arabs in Israel are a part of the Palestinians who fought against the Jews during the 1948 War and were not prepared to accept the creation of Israel during that war. According to Alouph Hareven's (1981) survey of the attitudes of Jews towards the Arab minority conducted in 1980, only 40 per cent were willing to grant equal rights to the Arab minority in Israel. Smooha's (1984) figures for a 1976 survey are somewhat more elaborate, but still reveal a similar trend: the configuration of the Jewish responses to the statement "Arabs can be equal citizens in Israel as a Jewish-Zionist state and can identify themselves with the state" are: 29.5 per cent yes; 19.2 per cent possible; 20.5 per cent doubtful and 30.8 per cent not possible (Smooha, 1984, p. 36). This majority group is indifferent to what their Arab neighbours call better terms of co-existence. For this group, co-existence is acceptable as long as the Arabs learn to adjust to Israel's distinctive situation as a Jewish state. The persistence of such a view is likely to create an unstable situation: the Arabs will continue to push for equal rights and will accuse the Jews of blocking progress in this direction. At the same time, the Jews will continue to demand that their Arab neighbours demonstrate loyalty and even at times solidarity with the Jewish majority hegemony (especially members of the right-wing Likud party) (Al-Haj and Rosenfeld, 1988, p. 56). Our empirical analysis in section 4 shows that local accommodation by the Jewish-dominated city institutions is an important factor in shaping Arabs' perceptions concerning their satisfaction with co-existence.

To the left of the labour party are a third but relatively small grouping of Jews who engage in intensive contact with Arabs at

various levels and via the mediation of their political party activists. The *rapprochement* between this group and the Arabs was possible because of their political stance in solving the wider Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They adhere to a two-state solution—i.e. they support the creation of an Israeli-Palestinian state. A similar political agenda is held by most Arabs in Israel. Yet this group perceives co-existence between Arabs and Jews as a positive venture that will eventually lead to the attainment of a durable peace in the region. The statement of 'peace at home first' (before solving the wider conflict with the Arab countries) is fully accepted by this group and appeals to many Arabs in Israel. One should note that the members of this group see themselves as no less Zionist than the other previous groups. They often claim that because Israel is militarily stronger than their Arab enemies, it can take risks and make territorial compromises. This group is under constant attack by other Zionist political parties (especially the religious ones and by the right-wing groups) because of their secular views and their liberal stance and links with the Arabs. As Stock (1981, p. 40) notes in a similar context:

Jews who advocate the creation of such symbiotic institutional settings are sometimes accused of being 'do-gooders', or romantics, or of being motivated by unwarranted feelings of guilt.

Although many Arabs in Israel favour the political stance of this group, they are not necessarily willing to support its programmes or vote for its parties in national elections. This is partially because this group does not seek to promote structural changes in the Israeli system and society so as to make Arab integration possible. Generally, they are perceived by the Arabs as acting with a political agenda in mind to moderate their Arab co-partners and penetrate Arab localities in search of their votes. In addition, their Arab associates (i.e. party activists) are often discredited because of accusations that they are Zionist-minded in their arguments with their fellow Arabs. In short, this group faces a

crisis of authenticity when one judges their perceptions of co-existence. More than any other Jewish group in Israel, the Jewish left perceives co-existence as an issue of mutual co-operation (and integration) between minority and majority citizens, but does not necessarily call for assimilation. Shamir and Sullivan (1985, p. 302) have summarised Jewish tolerance towards the Arabs

Among Jews, tolerance is explicitly part of left-wing ideology, which is one of relative accommodation of Jewish and Arab nationalism. The right-wing position is nationalistic and less accommodating toward the Arab world, and espouses the view that peace can be assured only through military strength. The leftists are more willing to risk concessions for what they believe could be a lasting peace with the Arabs.

This view is supported by our empirical findings in that, for Jews, political affiliation is a major factor determining their perceptions of co-existence with Arabs.

How do the Arabs in Israel perceive co-existence? Are they divided among themselves into subgroups where such divisions reflect political or religious diversities that shape their perceptions? The answers to these questions depend on how the Arabs are represented and by whom (see Haidar, 1987). Most Israeli (or Jewish) writers present the Israeli Arabs as being divided into three religious groups who in turn have different degrees of loyalty to the state of Israel. The Druze are perceived as the most favoured because their members serve in the Israeli army. The Christians come next, while the Moslems are the least accepted (Rosen, 1970, pp. 27–30; Stendel and Hareouveni, 1973; Yiftachel, 1992, p. 78). Rekhess (1981) has linked political behaviour of the Arabs in Israel to national identity, concluding that Arabs who vote in support of the Zionist-led political parties manifest a positive identity, while those who do not support such parties manifest a negative one. Al-Haj and Rosenfeld (1988, p. 151) have documented a case where a senior government representative has labelled Arab leaders by

expressions such as radical and moderate or positive forces versus negative forces. In his studies of the political orientation of the Arab minority of Israel, Smootha (1984, p. 62) classified the Arab leadership into three broad categories:

- (1) *Accommodating leadership*: leaders “who co-operate with the authorities ... and who are affiliated with the Zionist political parties”. According to Smootha (1984, p. 108), accommodating Arabs “accept their status as a minority in a Jewish state but pursue piecemeal change and benefits by operating from within”.
- (2) *Reserved leadership*: leaders who “acquiesce with the general political framework but openly protest and voice demands for change ... They recognize Israel and accept the tenet of Arab–Jewish co-existence yet challenge the Jewish–Zionist character of the State”.
- (3) *Dissident leadership*: leaders who challenge the Israeli system as a whole. According to Smootha (1984, p. 108), dissident Arabs “oppose Israel’s existence and their minority status within the country”. Smootha (1984) singles out the *Abna’ al-Balad* (i.e. sons of the village) group to represent the ‘dissident’ Arabs in Israel, but he fails to tell the entire story. The *Abna’ al-Balad* is a small nationalist Palestinian activist group whose activities are within the framework of Israeli law. Although successful in local elections in Arab villages and towns, traditionally they refuse to take part in Israeli parliamentary elections because they believe that a Zionist institution such as the Knesset (which passes laws that suppress the Arabs) cannot help the Palestinians in Israel. They want Israel to be a state for all of its citizens and absentees (and not an exclusively Jewish state). In short, they would like to see a society with freedom of religion for all (Slater, 1988, p. 17).

The classification of the Arabs in Israel into social, religious or diverse political groups

as defined by Israeli hegemony has serious limitations. First and foremost, such a rigid division portrays the Arab attitude as static and fatalistic in nature—i.e. those individuals who are born Christian or Druze or those whose parents are ‘co-opted’, for example—will be expected to follow the destiny of their respective sub-group orientation. The reality is rather different. Kanaana (1976, p. 163) pointed to a case where members of Israel’s Arab minority who have attempted to assimilate into the Israeli Jewish culture but failed, eventually returned to their villages and became “strongly anti-Israeli, anti-Jewish and strongly pro-Arab nationalist”. Secondly, this world-view fails to explain the many ‘islands of resistance’ at the grass roots identifiable across all social groups and in various localities—in Bedouin camps, in villages and towns and in mixed Arab-Jewish cities (see Minns and Hijab, 1990). From this perspective, Arab reality in Israel is better addressed as a continuum that has been and continues to be exposed to various degrees of pressure, while experiencing the difficulties and humiliations of Arab minority status in Israel.

At one end of the continuum are the weakest elements in society who found themselves having to live under certain circumstances and who are prepared to forsake integrity and dignity by fully accepting/cooperating with the powerful imposed ideology. Supported by generous Israeli institutional mediation, one should not be surprised to find at this point of the continuum, that there are groups that ‘proudly’ call themselves the ‘Zionist Druze movement’ (Azriyali and Abu Roqun, 1989, p. 4) and the ‘Christian-Zionists’ (Emmett, 1995, p. 57). These two groups are very small and are often used for propaganda purposes. Once their ‘bosses’ cease to support them, it is likely that they will vanish. Yet, at the other end of the continuum, there are several Arab groups and individuals who do not necessarily form groups or movements in public and who have a strong attachment to their lands and homes. They accept that living in Israel is a given reality that cannot be reversed easily, or at least not over the short

term. Palestinian identity is an important element in their contact and engagement with others. For them, co-existence with the Jews is geographically and economically possible, but is socially meaningless unless the wider Israeli-Palestinian conflict is resolved—including the return of Palestinian refugees to their homeland. This group possesses a high level of awareness and continuously engages in drawing boundaries around themselves so that the cultural influence on them of the Jewish majority will be rendered minimal. This does not mean that members of this group have no contact in their everyday life with Jews and have no Jewish friends. On the contrary, members of this group occasionally seek to change the Jewish environment and thus to intensify their contacts. Such contact reflects the will to ensure that the Palestinians’ right to live in dignity in their homeland should be repeatedly made clear to the Jews whenever and wherever circumstances permit. Between those two extremes lie the majority of the Arab population who live Israeli lives, placed under various levels of pressure emanating from the Jewish environment (Jiryis, 1976; Zureik, 1979; Lustick, 1980; Minns and Hijab, 1990; Falah, 1989, 1993). While they are loyal to state laws and orders, they are not all prepared to express solidarity with state policies and majority aspirations. They do not seek to jeopardise their existence in their homeland by excessively provoking the Jewish majority or by denying the existence of the Jewish state. At the same time, in their response to conditions dictated by both the state and the Jewish majority, this group endeavours to maintain its integrity and bonds with the wider Palestinian nation with whom their state (of Israel) has been at war for several generations.

Thus the Arab minority has to demonstrate a double loyalty: to the state of Israel as citizens and to the Palestinian nation. This notion was documented in a response (dated 17 June, 1976) sent by Arab leaders in Israel and the heads of Arab local councils to Israel’s Prime Minister, the late Yitzhak Rabin. Among other things, the letter notes:

Your Honour's clear response that Israel is a Jewish state whose purpose is the realization of Zionist yearnings while safeguarding the equal rights of the Arabs in the spheres of culture and religion, leads us to fear that this declaration regarding our status as an Arab nation in Israel, this incomplete perception, will lead to treating the Arabs as subjects and not as citizens with equal rights. We feel, and we ask Your Honour to respect that feeling, that we are equal partners in the country, and that the Israeli–Arab conflict can no way justify any lessening of the right of the Arabs to equality and the recognition of their national affiliation, which is a historical fact. We have great confidence in the victory of democracy and justice, and we believe that co-existence in peace and brotherhood in Israel between the two nations is an historical imperative and should be realized in such a way as to serve the interests of peace. We should decrease existing points of conflict and find solutions to them. The major point of contention which is liable to lead to the danger of the two nations drawing further apart is the denial of our status as a national minority and the failure to recognize our right to keep the land on which our forefathers lived, as well as the lack of concern for promoting the level of local services on the basis of equality, and the absence of coordination with the Arab local authorities regarding the subject of planning and development in our villages in the areas of agriculture, industry, and housing (cited in Al-Haj and Rosenfeld, 1988, pp. 147–148).

As has been already noticed from the content of the above letter, the Arab minority in Israel perceive co-existence with the Jewish residents as a fact of their everyday life. Yet 'co-existence' is rooted in the very geographical reality that characterises their minority situation. They see themselves as intrinsically linked to their homelands. Any action on the part of the Israeli authorities (or the Jews in general) that displaces them from

their land and homes or makes them into an underclass is viewed as being contradictory to their understanding of co-existence. Co-existence between Arabs and Jews in Israel, as perceived by the Arab minority, is grounded in territoriality. As such, co-existence should guarantee smooth and natural continuity in their places of residence. This right arises from the fact that the Arabs belong to the country and this right is essential for them in order to exist as a nation, not merely a loosely structured cultural or ethnic group. Relying on a different argument, Schnell (1994, p. 115) is the first to note that the Arabs in Israel see "co-existence with the Jews in the State of Israel [... as] a matter of territoriality". This approach to co-existence takes us a long way towards understanding how Arabs and Jews conceptualise co-existence in their mixed cities.

In the presentation of the empirical results (section 5) we do indeed see that different factors are significant for determining the perception of co-existence between Arabs and Jews. From the Jewish sample, we find that whether an individual holds right-wing or left-wing political views has a very strong influence on perception of co-existence, as suggested by the literature reviewed in this section, while for the Arabs, straightforward political affiliation is not such a strong factor, although a more optimistic view of co-existence arises for those Arabs who feel that local services are provided in a non-discriminatory fashion. That is, the extent to which Arabs feel that their rights, and in particular their property rights, can be exercised is demonstrated by our empirical analysis to be an important factor influencing Arabs level of satisfaction with co-existence.

In addition to the above issues relating to the specific historical context of Jews and Arabs living together in mixed cities, it is also important to consider more general sociological considerations which may bear on the degree of satisfaction with co-existence in an urban setting as well as in an overall sense. The levels and frequencies of social interaction between Jews and Arabs are influenced by a host of economic, socio-

political and cultural factors which to some extent at least are independent of the events that created the mixed cities as they continue to evolve. Although we do not purport to compare systematically the various arguments provided in the literature concerning these issues, we do wish to provide the rationale for considering various sociological factors as determinants of personal perspectives on co-existence between Arabs and Jews both within the mixed cities and more generally. To this end, we draw upon a number of existing ideas concerning social interactions among various ethnic groups in an urban environment (Fischer, 1984; Krupat, 1985). While these theories do not deal with co-existence directly, the issues discussed in them are nevertheless related to the level of satisfaction with co-existence.

Consider, for example, the compositional theory. According to this theory, people's behavioural traits are determined by their economic conditions, cultural characteristics and marital and family status (Gans, 1962a, 1962b, 1967). Thus, people living in rural areas may behave differently and develop different attitudes from their urban counterparts due to differences in their socioeconomic characteristics. The population composition, rather than its concentration (i.e. number), is at the heart of this theory. This theory, therefore, denies that urbanisation can alter people's way of life and personalities and predicts that smaller ethnic groups or minority groups will endure even in a highly urbanised environment and that we should not observe much difference—for example, between the views of individuals within a cultural group in different cities. In section 4, we demonstrate that this is in fact not the case. Even when accounting for differences in sociological characteristics of individuals who live in the various cities we study, there are differences between cities in the overall degree of satisfaction with co-existence.

The sub-cultural approach to understanding relations among ethnic groups also suggests some considerations for analysing our data. According to this theory, greater urban-

isation, leading to increased human concentration in cities and increased heterogeneity among people, will make close social ties even stronger for minority groups (Fischer, 1984). Thus, in cities with a sufficiently large number of people (commonly known as a 'critical mass') with a similar background, these people will form groups or organisations which can flourish in a way which supports their very own sub-culture. When they come in contact with other sub-cultures, there could be disagreements, tensions and even conflicts initially. However, as the groups get to know each other through time, they establish some forms of mutually beneficial communication and exchange. Such communication and exchange will eventually lead to mutually acceptable influences among various sub-cultures. This theory, therefore, predicts that the identity of a minority group is less likely to disappear in an ethnically mixed urban environment. Thus, according to this theory, we can expect the Arab minority in mixed cities not only to retain its language and culture, but also to develop useful communication and exchange with the Jewish majority. One can also expect the reverse and, relevant to our empirical analysis, consider the thesis that those Jews who are more frequently exposed to Arabs and/or have some knowledge of the Arabic language develop more favourable views concerning Arabs living in Israel. We do in fact find such influences to be relevant in explaining personal perceptions concerning the degree of co-existence within mixed cities.

As will be seen in our discussion of the results of our empirical analysis, we do not attempt to determine in a systematic way which sociological theories are best supported by our data. Rather, our purpose in using the above-noted sociological perspectives is primarily as a guide in the selection of variables with a few specific conjectures being suggested. Both the sub-cultural and compositional approaches appear to have some merit in explaining the empirical regularities that we observe and so we believe both have something to offer in helping to

explain personal views on co-existence within mixed cities in Israel, although we do find relatively stronger support for the sub-cultural approach compared to the compositional theory of social interaction. As will be argued in section 4, however, the consideration of variables relating to the specific historical evolution of Arab–Jewish relations—especially in the urban context—have the greatest explanatory power in understanding perceptions of co-existence.

3. Data Description and Statistical Methodology

This section briefly explains the sampling procedure used to gather empirical data for the present study. It also describes the data and provides a brief overview of the statistical methodology used for data analysis. During the period of March–May 1991, two surveys were conducted among Arabs and Jews living in five ‘mixed’ cities in Israel about the levels of their satisfaction with co-existence between Arabs and Jews in these cities and in Israel. The interviewers who worked on this survey were mostly Arab and Jewish students studying in various Israeli universities. They were instructed not to impose their own values on the respondents and not to explain to the interviewees different facets of the term ‘co-existence’. Each interviewee had to have his or her own understanding. Despite the various interpretations that may have been made by the interviewees, there is still a fairly good account of the common denominator that the term signifies. Both Arabs and Jews perceive co-existence as a positive enterprise based on the principle of sharing space, neighbourhood, services and cultural values. Two random samples of 600 Arab households and 570 Jewish households were selected from the 5 selected ‘mixed’ cities chosen for this study. A full account of the sampling methodology used to collect data from Arab and Jewish households in these cities can be found in Falah (1997).

It should be noted here that, due to the fact

that the survey was conducted during the daytime when the male head of household (or any other adult male) was very often absent from home, the number of females interviewed was significantly higher than the number of males interviewed in both surveys: of the total Arab households interviewed, there were 67.4 per cent females. The percentage of female respondents interviewed in the Jewish survey was 65.5 per cent. We report the average responses for our dependent variable by gender and we include a gender dummy variable in the regressions in order to avoid any possible bias.

Statistical Methodology

As mentioned above, the perception of co-existence is proxied by two binary variables in this study and we are interested in specifying a relationship between each of the two alternative dependent variables and a set of covariates (i.e. independent variables). In order to determine the factors influencing the perception of co-existence in mixed Arab–Jewish cities in Israel, we used the logit regression model. This is based on the logistic cumulative density function given by:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Prob}(y = 1) &= P_i = F(\mathbf{X}_i^T \beta) \\ &= 1/(1 + \exp(-\mathbf{X}_i^T \beta)) \\ &= \exp(\mathbf{X}_i^T \beta) / [1 + \exp(\mathbf{X}_i^T \beta)] \end{aligned}$$

where, P_i is the probability of favourable co-existence and is a function of a set of independent variables repented by the vector \mathbf{X}_i .⁵

The log likelihood function corresponding to the logit function is given by

$$\begin{aligned} \ln L &= \sum_{i=1}^N y_i \ln F(\mathbf{X}_i^T \beta) + \sum_{i=1}^N (1 - y_i) \ln [1 - F(\mathbf{X}_i^T \beta)] \end{aligned}$$

This function was maximised using the maximum likelihood procedure to estimate the logit regression model. Since the first-order conditions for maximisation yield non-linear equations, the Newton–Raphson iterative procedure is used to compute the parameter estimates and their standard errors (see Greene, 1997, pp. 873–885 for details).

The Empirical Model

The major objective of this research is to determine the relationship between co-existence and a set of socioeconomic variables. Thus, only those questions in the survey that are relevant to the theme of co-existence were analysed. It is to be noted here that belief in or satisfaction in co-existence is necessarily a subjective concept. In view of this, the respondents were purposely given no additional explanation or ideas about the meaning of the term ‘co-existence’. We believe that this allowed us to elicit the respondent’s own perspectives on co-existence. Despite the variations in people’s views of the concept of co-existence, satisfaction in co-existence on a personal level is critical if a pluralistic and ethnically diverse community is to live in a stable and peaceful social environment. Hence, it is the relationship between these subjective views and socioeconomic variables that we have selected to be central in this study. Below we explain how the subjective concept of ‘co-existence’ has been specified empirically and what empirical specifications (i.e. functions) have been used for representing the perception of co-existence in mixed Arab–Jewish cities.

In order to specify ‘co-existence’ empirically, we examine the configuration of answers for the two questions:

- (1) To what extent—in your opinion—is there co-existence between the Jewish and Arab citizens in Israel (within the green-line border).
- (2) To what extent—in your opinion—is there co-existence between the Jewish and Arab citizens in your city?

The respondents were asked to select one of the following options for an answer: 1 = To a very high extent; 2 = To a high extent; 3 = To some extent; 4 = To a low extent; and, 5 = There isn’t any co-existence. These five responses were collapsed into two responses: satisfied with co-existence (responses 1, 2 and 3) and not satisfied with co-existence (responses 4 and 5).

Two alternative specifications are used for

representing the perception of co-existence in mixed Arab–Jewish cities. The first one relates to co-existence in Israel and the second one relates to co-existence in the city where the respondent was residing at the time of the survey. As noted above, the perception of the presence or absence of co-existence was transformed from a five-scale response to a binary (0, 1) form by collapsing responses 1–3 into 1, and 4 and 5 into 0. The equation used to determine the factors influencing the perception of co-existence for the Arab sample was as follows

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Perception of co-existence}_j = & \\ & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{ NCOND}_j + \beta_2 \text{ MSERV}_j + \beta_3 \\ & \text{LTEN}_j + \beta_4 \text{ GENDR}_j + \beta_5 \text{ EDCAN}_j + \beta_6 \\ & \text{AGE}_j + \beta_7 \text{ INCOME}_j + \beta_8 \text{ RLIGS}_j + \beta_9 \\ & \text{RLIGN}_j + \beta_{10} \text{ UNSTU}_j + \beta_{11} \text{ OHOME}_j \\ & + \beta_{12} \text{ HLIVC}_j + \beta_{13} \text{ POPMX}_j + \beta_{14} \\ & \text{POLAF}_j + e_j \end{aligned}$$

The equation used to determine the factors influencing the perception of co-existence for the Jewish sample was as follows

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Perception of co-existence}_j = & \\ & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{ NCOND}_j + \beta_2 \text{ GENDR}_j + \beta_3 \\ & \text{AGE}_j + \beta_4 \text{ EDCAN}_j + \beta_5 \text{ RAFLN}_j + \beta_6 \\ & \text{UNSTU}_j + \beta_7 \text{ OHOME}_j + \beta_8 \text{ LTEN}_j + \beta_9 \\ & \text{LCAPT}_j + \beta_{10} \text{ ALAPT}_j + \beta_{11} \\ & \text{KARBC}_j + \beta_{12} \text{ POLAF}_j + \beta_{13} \\ & \text{POPMX}_j + e_j \end{aligned}$$

The definitions of the explanatory variables used for the Arab and Jewish samples are given in Table 1.

4. Results and Discussion

Our empirical analysis focuses on explaining the differences among individuals concerning their feelings about co-existence in ‘mixed’ Arab–Jewish cities and in Israel. We use the individual characteristics of the respondents, many being explicitly social or political in nature, as well as characteristics of the city, neighbourhood, etc. to explain these differences. We find that certain social realities and political views have significant effects on the individuals’ perceptions of co-existence. Although our focus is on the ques-

Table 1. Explanatory variables used in the Arab and Jewish samples

Variable	Coding of response
<i>Arab sample</i>	
Neighbourhood living conditions (<i>NCOND</i>)	1 if good, 0 otherwise
Municipal services (<i>MSERV</i>)	1 if non-discriminatory, 0 otherwise
Length of tenure (<i>LTEN</i>)	1 if pre-1948, 0 otherwise
Gender (<i>GENDR</i>)	1 if female, 0 otherwise
Education (<i>EDCAN</i>)	1 if the respondent has at least 11 years of schooling, 0 otherwise
Age (<i>AGE</i>)	1 if the respondent is 39 years old or younger, 0 otherwise
Income (<i>INCOME</i>)	1 if the respondent's income is higher than 1000 NIS, 0 otherwise
Religious (<i>RLIGS</i>)	1 if the respondent is religious, 0 otherwise
Religion (<i>RLIGN</i>)	1 if the respondent is a Moslem, 0 otherwise
University student (<i>UNSTU</i>)	1 if the respondent is a university student, 0 otherwise
Ownership of a house (<i>OHOME</i>)	1 if the respondent owns a private home, 0 otherwise
In-house living conditions (<i>HLIVC</i>)	1 if good, 0 otherwise
Population mix in the neighbourhood (<i>POPMX</i>)	1 if appears segregated to the interviewer, 0 otherwise
Political affiliation (<i>POLAF</i>)	1 if the respondent is affiliated with Arab political parties, 0 otherwise.
<i>Jewish sample</i>	
Neighbourhood living conditions (<i>NCOND</i>)	1 if good, 0 otherwise
Gender (<i>GENDR</i>)	1 if female, 0 otherwise
Age (<i>AGE</i>)	1 if the respondent is 39 years old or younger, 0 otherwise
Education (<i>EDCAN</i>)	1 if the respondent has at least 11 years of schooling, 0 otherwise
Religious affiliation (<i>RAFLN</i>)	1 if religious or traditional, 0 otherwise
University student (<i>UNSTU</i>)	1 if the respondent is a university student, 0 otherwise
Ownership of a house (<i>OHOME</i>)	1 if the respondent owns a private home, 0 otherwise
Length of tenure (<i>LTEN</i>)	1 if the respondent has been living in the house for at least 10 years, 0 otherwise
Living conditions in apartment (<i>LCAPT</i>)	1 if good, 0 otherwise
Arabs living in same apartment building (<i>ALAPT</i>)	1 if yes, 0 otherwise
Know Arabic (<i>KARBC</i>)	1 if the respondent can write/read/speak Arabic, 0 otherwise
Political affiliation (<i>POLAF</i>)	1 if the respondent is affiliated with right-wing or extreme Jewish political parties, 0 otherwise
Population mix in the neighbourhood (<i>POPMX</i>)	1 if appears segregated to the interviewer, 0 otherwise.

tion of co-existence within mixed cities, by including views concerning co-existence within Israel we can improve our understanding of the factors that contribute to the formation of peoples' attitudes towards peaceful co-existence. For example, women are more

likely than men to respond positively to the question on co-existence within Israel, but there is no significant impact of gender on the question of co-existence within the city. This suggests that the more optimistic perspective of women is not just a reflection on

women's experiences in their city environments, but rather is a general difference in perception. Other variables turn out to be relevant only in terms of individuals' city-specific attitudes.

Consider first the results shown in Table 2. In terms of the overall city averages for responses to the question of perceptions of co-existence between Arabs and Jews, the ranking for positive perceptions of co-existence is highest in Haifa for Arab respondents and second-highest for Jewish respondents. This also applies to respondents' views concerning perceptions of co-existence between Arabs and Jews within the country. Among all mixed Arab–Jewish cities in Israel, Haifa has the largest Arab community. The total Arab population in Haifa is larger than the combined Arab population of Acre and Jaffa or Lydda and Ramla. Haifa is also an important metropolitan centre in Israel which hosts a number of public institutions, government offices and the central court of justice. There are also a wide variety of organisations and recreational facilities where Arabs and Jews meet each other on a daily basis. Moreover, Haifa is known for its exceptionally beautiful landscape which is a great attraction to many Arabs and Jews living in this city. In fact, many Palestinian Arabs call Haifa '*Arus el-Bahar*' (The Bride of the Sea). The exceptional natural beauty of Haifa and its cosmopolitan atmosphere may have contributed to the overall positive perception of co-existence among its Arab residents.

The ranking of which cities' residents respond most favourably to each of these questions is quite consistent for the Jewish respondents (see Table 2). The mean values of the two alternative measures of the dependent variables are statistically significantly correlated for the Jewish sample, but not for the Arab sample.⁶ This suggests, at least for the Jewish sample, that people's local perspectives of co-existence between Arabs and Jews are consistent with their national perspectives of co-existence. This is consistent with the literature reviewed in section 2 which suggests that Jewish attitudes are driven significantly by overall political

views. However, the same is not true for the Arab sample and it appears that Arab respondents are more concerned about issues relating to co-existence within cities than within Israel. These differences are also reflected in the regression results which are discussed next.

In discussing the regression results, we take special note of those explanatory variables which are statistically significantly related to the dependent variable at the 10 per cent level ($t = 1.648$) and at the 5 per cent level ($t = 1.96$) of significance. All significance levels relate to two-tailed testing. The results from the Arab sample are discussed first, followed by a discussion of those from the Jewish sample. The section concludes with a discussion of the implications of the empirical results.

Arab Sample

Table 3 shows the results for the Arab sample. In terms of the goodness-of-fit measures, the likelihood ratio test and the R^2_{LRT} , both models fit the data well.⁷ However, the fit is better when co-existence within the city (Y_2) is used as the dependent variable instead of using co-existence in Israel as the dependent variable. This is perhaps due to the fact that the respondents are more familiar with their city surroundings than with those in the whole country and this result highlights the importance of considering peoples' local, urban-specific experiences when considering Arab–Jewish relations in the context of urban living.

Variables which have a statistically significant impact on Arabs' perceptions of co-existence within the city are: the provision of municipal services; population mix; age of respondent; home ownership; and, all of the city-specific dummy variables relative to the base case (Haifa). When considering which factors are significant determinants of perceptions of co-existence between Arabs and Jews within the country, we find the statistically relevant variables to be: sex of respondent; age of respondent; family income; and, some statistically significant differentiation

Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the dependent variable by gender

Sample cities	Arab sample						Jewish sample					
	Co-existence in Israel (Y1)			Co-existence in the City (Y2)			Co-existence in Israel (Y1)			Co-existence in the City (Y2)		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Acre	0.470	0.590	0.523	0.306	0.333	0.318	0.606	0.760	0.713	0.909	0.920	0.917
Haifa	0.739	0.640	0.680	0.928	0.930	0.929	0.539	0.756	0.654	0.855	0.907	0.883
Jaffa	0.346	0.543	0.495	0.692	0.852	0.813	0.400	0.591	0.519	0.750	0.788	0.773
Lydda	0.417	0.734	0.647	0.583	0.771	0.718	0.515	0.441	0.465	0.697	0.515	0.574
Ramla	0.579	0.673	0.648	0.632	0.712	0.690	0.381	0.715	0.548	0.619	0.857	0.738
Overall sample	0.556	0.634	0.606	0.658	0.778	0.735	0.502	0.652	0.593	0.793	0.593	0.679

The number of male and female respondents are as follows:

Arab Sample: Acre M = 49, F = 39; Haifa M = 69, F = 100; Jaffa M = 26, F = 81; Lydda M = 24, F = 61, Ramla M = 19, F = 52.
Jewish Sample: Acre M = 33, F = 75; Haifa M = 76, F = 86; Jaffa M = 40, F = 66; Lydda M = 33, F = 68; Ramla M = 21, F = 21.

Table 3. Factors determining the level of satisfaction with co-existence in mixed Arab-Jewish cities in Israel: the Arab sample

Explanatory variables	Coexistence in Israel (Y1)	Coexistence in city (Y2)
Neighbourhood conditions (X1)	0.195 (0.841)	0.360 (1.255)
Municipal services (X2)	0.613 (2.451**)	1.116 (2.758**)
Length of tenure (X3)	0.206 (0.933)	-0.223 (-0.750)
Sex (X4)	0.340 (1.683*)	0.381 (1.50)
Education (X5)	-0.074 (-0.326)	-0.376 (-1.244)
Age (X6)	0.152 (0.737)	0.794 (2.920**)
Income (X7)	0.419 (1.933*)	-0.093 (-0.334)
Religious (X8)	0.066 (0.241)	0.052 (0.153)
Religion (X9)	0.164 (0.764)	0.352 (1.213)
University student (X10)	0.279 (0.433)	-0.502 (-0.667)
Ownership of house (X11)	-0.232 (-0.940)	-0.787 (-2.551**)
House living conditions (X12)	0.135 (0.641)	-0.289 (-1.063)
Population mix (X13)	0.255 (0.899)	0.628 (1.771*)
Political affiliation (X14)	0.324 (1.402)	-0.264 (-0.941)
Constant	-0.291 (-0.674)	2.057 (3.569**)
<i>City dummies</i>		
Acre (CD1)	-0.668 (-2.1188**)	-2.990 (-7.090**)
Jaffa (CD3)	-0.945 (-2.745**)	-1.607 (-3.193**)
Lydda (CD4)	-0.344 (-1.062)	-1.865 (-4.239**)
Ramla (CD5)	-0.349 (-1.012)	-2.227 (-4.824**)
Log-likelihood	-330.97	-222.27
Likelihood ratio test	35.483**	157.211**
R^2_{LRT}	0.07	0.261
Prediction accuracy	0.619	0.808

The figures in the parentheses are asymptotic *t*-values. The symbols ** and * indicate statistical significance at 5 per cent and 10 per cent respectively.

among city dummy variables but, perhaps not surprisingly, not nearly so important as in the case of perspective on co-existence within the city itself.

In terms of influencing in a positive manner the feelings of co-existence within the city, the provision of municipal services stands out as a particularly interesting one. The Arabs feel dependent on the Jewish majority for such considerations and it is certainly viewed as an important issue. This is a reflection on the particular local political situation in which Arabs find themselves as a result of historical events. Age is also a factor in explaining perceptions of co-existence within the city, with younger respondents more likely to view co-existence in a positive fashion—a strongly significant effect for co-existence in the city. Younger individuals are more likely to interact so-

cially within the community and so this is evidence that greater local interaction is important in attitude formation and, moreover, in a positive way in this instance.

The particular impact of the variable population mix is not directly relevant to distinguishing among our various hypotheses. However, the variable 'ownership of a house' has a statistically significant and negative effect on perceptions of co-existence in the city, a result which is consistent also with the importance of the political-historical reality for Arabs living in mixed cities in Israel. Two possible factors may be driving this result. First, about 60 per cent of the Arabs living in the five selected 'mixed' cities are of pre-1948 origin and most of them live in the older sectors of these cities. It is in these areas that discrimination in the provision of municipal services is the great-

est. Secondly, Arabs who bought houses through the public housing agency, *Amidar*, are always in a vulnerable state because the agency can displace them from their house if it decides to do so.

Examples of variables which do not influence the dependent variable in a statistically significant manner are household living conditions or neighbourhood conditions and respondents' education, income and religious or political affiliation. The lack of relevance of many of these variables is consistent with the discussion in section 2 which focused on the factors relating to the historical realities within the specific city in which an Arab resides as being of prime importance in shaping their perspectives on co-existence. In fact, the relevance of provision of municipal services by the Jewish-dominated city government even has a statistically significant impact on Arab perceptions of co-existence within Israel.

Also interesting is that Arabs with higher incomes are more likely to perceive positively co-existence within Israel, as are women. In the former case, it is not too surprising that those who have done relatively better in terms of income are more satisfied with co-existence. The fact that Arab women are more likely to view co-existence in a favourable fashion is mirrored in the analysis of Jewish perspectives. This suggests that, for this variable, a general sociological explanation is more appropriate than one based on historical context. However, in terms of relative importance, we propose that the set of personal characteristics (political, socioeconomic, and religious) used in this analysis is not as relevant to the determination of Arab views concerning co-existence as are those variables that are city-specific characteristics rooted in the historical context of the Arab reality in Israel (i.e. provision of services by the municipal government and specific city effects as opposed to neighbourhood or household living conditions).

Each city has a different composition of individuals in terms of their personal and neighbourhood characteristics, as discussed

above. This could account for some of the difference in attitudes of co-existence among the five cities as observed in Table 2. However, the inclusion of dummy variables for each city (except Haifa which is considered as the base case) in our regression analysis indicates that perceptions of co-existence are more positive for residents of Haifa than for those in all the other cities independently of any other factors already accounted for in the regression equation. The city effects are highly significant for all cities in terms of co-existence within the city and, for Acre and Jaffa, in terms of co-existence within Israel. The biggest differential is between Haifa and Acre. This result stems from the fact that Haifa is a large cosmopolitan city which has the largest Arab community, while Acre is a smaller and less cosmopolitan city. According to our survey, the Arab residents in Acre feel that various government institutions do not promote mixed living between Arabs and Jews. On the contrary, these institutions contribute to discriminatory municipal services against Arab residents in this city and encourage residential separation between the two ethnic groups. It is perhaps not surprising that Acre is the only one of the five cities in which the Arab population has declined in percentage terms between 1961 and 1994.⁸

Jewish Sample

Table 4 shows the results for the Jewish sample. In discussing the historical events leading to the establishment and political development of Israel, we suggested that political and religious views and affiliations of Jews would be important determinants of their views on co-existence. Looking at Table 4 we find this to be substantiated to a large degree by our empirical results.

As in the case of the Arab sample, goodness-of-fit measures suggest that the models explaining perceptions on co-existence within cities and within the country fit well. Variables which have a statistically significant impact on Jews' perceptions of co-existence within the city are: neighbourhood

Table 4. Factors determining the level of satisfaction with co-existence in mixed Arab–Jewish cities in Israel: the Jewish sample

Explanatory variables	Co-existence in Israel (Y1)	Co-existence in city (Y2)
Neighbourhood conditions (X1)	0.517 (2.398**)	0.809 (2.927**)
Sex (X2)	0.537 (2.630**)	– 0.161 (– 0.593)
Age (X3)	0.263 (1.147)	– 0.013 (– 0.045)
Education (X4)	– 0.328 (– 1.673*)	– 0.372 (– 1.254)
Religious affiliation (X5)	– 0.107 (– 0.489)	– 0.130 (– 0.470)
University student (X6)	– 0.619 (– 0.764)	– 1.306 (– 1.355)
Ownership of house (X7)	0.734 (2.590**)	0.300 (0.759)
Length of tenure (X8)	– 0.040 (– 0.172)	– 0.439 (– 1.402)
Living conditions in apartments (X9)	– 0.089 (– 0.308)	– 0.020 (– 0.050)
Arabs living in apartments (X10)	0.376 (1.699*)	0.221 (0.751)
Know Arabic (X11)	0.052 (0.226)	0.498 (1.647*)
Political affiliation (X12)	– 1.440 (– 5.175**)	– 2.183 (– 7.140**)
Population mix (X13)	0.028 (0.108)	– 0.109 (– 0.331)
Constant	– 0.221 (– 0.482)	2.240 (3.527**)
<i>City dummies</i>		
Acre (CD1)	0.291 (0.944)	0.663 (1.378)
Jaffa (CD3)	– 0.717 (– 2.325**)	– 0.929 (– 2.241**)
Lydda (CD4)	– 0.760 (– 2.417**)	– 1.409 (– 3.527**)
Ramla (CD5)	– 0.645 (– 1.598)	– 1.125 (– 2.217**)
Log-likelihood	– 311.24	– 201.68
Likelihood ratio test	78.773**	122.100**
R^2_{LRT}	0.141	0.210
Prediction accuracy	0.665	0.857

The figures in the parentheses are asymptotic *t*-values. The symbols ** and * indicate statistical significance at 5 per cent and 10 per cent respectively.

conditions; whether the respondent knows Arabic; and, political affiliation. The results concerning the city dummy variables suggest that in three of the cities (Jaffa, Lydda, Ramla) there is less optimism concerning co-existence than in Haifa—even after taking account of differences in population characteristics as identified in all the other included variables. The differences between cities, however, are not as pronounced as in the Arab sample.

In terms of statistical significance, the variable for political affiliation has the strongest impact on views of co-existence for Jews and this result holds as well when considering co-existence within Israel. As is consistent with our discussion of the literature on the Arab–Jewish relationship in Israel (section 2), right-wing political affiliation strongly affects in a negative fashion atti-

tudes towards co-existence. These outcomes, as well as the fact that there is less variation in attitudes towards co-existence across different cities, suggest that attitudes towards co-existence within the Jewish population are determined more by a general perspective than by local experiences—at least relative to the Arab population. However, knowing Arabic is demonstrated to have a statistically significant and positive impact on the perspective of co-existence within the city, and having Arabs living in the same apartments also has a positive impact on the perceptions of co-existence within Israel. Thus, readiness to integrate with Arabs, not surprisingly, does have a significant effect on perceptions of co-existence for Jews.

Also significant is the positive effect of neighbourhood conditions on Jews' perceptions of co-existence and this relationship

applies as well to the issue of co-existence within Israel. The fact that this variable also has a significant impact at the level of country perceptions suggests that it may reflect some excluded socioeconomic variables correlated with neighbourhood conditions, rather than that neighbourhood conditions themselves create a positive attitude towards co-existence—although this latter interpretation is also a possible explanation. In either case, we see that general sociological factors are not entirely without relevance to the personal formulation of perspectives on co-existence.

Other variables not mentioned above that have a statistically significant impact on Jewish perceptions of co-existence within the country are sex, education level and ownership of a house. If the respondent is female, a positive response on co-existence is more likely, while the more highly educated (> 11 years of education) are less likely to respond positively and those who own their own houses are more likely to be positive about co-existence. The last of these results is particularly interesting since home ownership has the opposite effect on Arab perceptions of co-existence, at least within the city. This probably reflects the fact that, for Jews, home ownership is a positive reflection of their security within Israel, while for Arabs the lack of full security and ownership rights creates a concern for the value of their housing asset.

To summarise, our empirical results do largely support that literature on views of co-existence in Israel by Arabs and Jews which stresses the historical and political developments within the country. Political affiliation has a strongly significant impact on Jewish perceptions of co-existence, whether one is considering this question within the city or within the country. The results support the contention that, for Jews, right-wing affiliation is reflective of a negative attitude towards co-existence between Arabs and Jews, while Arabs are very sensitive to whether at a local (municipal) level they feel the Jewish majority is accommodating to their needs. In both instances, these

factors influence co-existence both at the local municipal and at the country-wide level.

However, we also see that some socioeconomic–demographic variables are influential in explaining perceptions of co-existence. This is consistent with sociological explanations of behaviour and attitude formation such as the compositional theory and sub-cultural approach to understanding relations among ethnic groups.

Finally, it is worth stressing that in a number of ways our empirical results demonstrate the relevance of the urban context in forming perceptions of co-existence. For one group or the other, we find provision of municipal services, ownership of house, neighbourhood conditions and population mix—for example, for Jewish perceptions, this is so in the context of whether Arabs live in the same apartment as Jews—to be relevant variables in determining perceptions about co-existence. Perhaps most interesting is that, even after accounting for the various differences in personal and neighbourhood characteristics, inclusion of dummy variables for the cities allow us to establish that there is a further effect on perceptions of co-existence determined by which particular city a respondent lives in.

Policy Implications

The empirical results bring out quite clearly that for the Arab respondents individual and social factors within the neighbourhood and city are very important for determining perceptions of the quality of life and of co-existence within the city and within the region. This result has an important policy implication. The perception of positive co-existence between Arabs and Jews is essential for lasting peace and sustainable growth and prosperity in Israel. Our results suggest that the best way to promote and consolidate the perception of positive co-existence among Arabs in ‘mixed’ cities is to provide necessary municipal services in a fair and non-discriminatory manner. This can be ensured within the existing administrative structure if

policies are introduced to hear Arab complaints related to municipal services and to take immediate measures to deal with those problems. Similar non-discriminatory policies should also be provided beyond the provision of municipal services into areas such as university education and other social services.

It is quite clear from the results of the Jewish sample that extreme political views are a major obstacle to the development of the perception of positive co-existence among Jewish people in Israel. Given the hostile political environment in which the state of Israel was created in 1948 and the series of hostilities that followed, one cannot be very optimistic about changing extreme political views to a significant degree. However, if measures are taken to promote a culture of exchanging political views in a non-aggressive manner between Arabs and Jews, it will go a long way in terms of the development of the perception of co-existence among the Jewish people.

Finally, the perception of positive co-existence is significantly higher in Haifa than in any other ‘mixed’ cities in our sample. This is true for both the Arab and the Jewish samples. It will be very useful for policy purposes to discern the factors that set Haifa apart as far as the perception of positive co-existence is concerned. While it is impossible to replicate the types of dynamic social interaction among Arabs and Jews existing in Haifa to other ‘mixed’ cities in Israel, at least the learning will be helpful in making some long overdue adjustments in other cities.

5. Concluding Remarks

The issue of peaceful co-existence is very important in a multicultural and ethnically diverse society. This is particularly true for people living in major urban centres in Israel. While the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 and the subsequent push for Jewishness drove many Arabs from Israel to neighbouring Arab countries (i.e. Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt), some Arabs stayed in Israel.

Instead, they accepted Jewish rules and a minority status. They have also maintained their own language and a distinct cultural identity in a number of ‘mixed’ cities in Israel, where Arabs and Jews continue to live together in close proximity. While there have been some disputes and conflicts between Arabs and Jews in these ‘mixed’ cities, they seem to have developed adequate mutual understanding and tolerance to be able to resolve these disputes through non-violent means. This is refreshing not only from the viewpoint of peaceful co-existence between Arabs and Jews in Israel—it is also important for lasting peace and economic prosperity in this region. If we can have a better understanding of this co-existence and the factors contributing to the level of satisfaction with co-existence, then public policies could be formulated to promote it. Such an understanding also has the potential to contribute to the fragile peace process in the Middle East.

The results suggest that the discrimination in the provision of municipal services, the age and gender of the respondent and ownership of a house are the most important factors contributing to the level of satisfaction with co-existence among Arab households in the ‘mixed’ cities in Israel. The results also indicate that the level of satisfaction with co-existence for Arab respondents is heavily influenced by their interactions within their own neighbourhoods. For the Jewish sample, however, the results suggest that neighbourhood living conditions and political affiliation are the most important factors influencing the level of satisfaction with co-existence among Jewish households in the ‘mixed’ cities. These results suggest that the provision of municipal services in a fair and non-discriminatory manner to Arab and Jewish residents and proactive measures taken by the government of Israel to promote a non-aggressive culture of exchanging political views between Arabs and Jews will go a long way to promote and consolidate the perception of positive co-existence among both Arabs and Jews living in the ‘mixed’ cities in Israel. Our results also suggest that

the experiences of Arabs and Jews living together in Haifa should be examined more closely so that the resulting knowledge of more peaceful co-existence in Haifa between the two ethnic groups can be used to promote more positive co-existence between them in other 'mixed' cities in Israel.

The fact of co-existence between Arabs and Jews as well as the nature and perceptions of co-existence are largely determined by historical factors. However, we do find that attitudes towards co-existence are also influenced, to some extent, by local conditions and personal choices—such as the degree of access to municipal services for Arabs and the choice of some Jews to relate better to their Arab neighbours by learning some Arabic. Thus, consideration of these factors suggest that improvements in the relationship between Arabs and Jews in mixed cities is feasible.

Acknowledgements

The first author is grateful to the Ford Foundation (New York) for a grant (No. 890–0439) to finance this research and to the Centre for Urban and Community Studies, University of Toronto, for providing office space and a good academic environment. The second author would like to recognise SSHRC for financial support and GREQAM, Université d'Aix Marseille for their hospitality where he spent the academic year of 1997/98 when most of his contribution to this paper was made. The third author would like to thank OMAFRA for financial support. We are also grateful to two referees whose comments led to substantial improvements in the paper. Any remaining errors, omissions or shortcomings are, of course, our own responsibility.

Notes

1. The term 'Arabs' in this study refers to Palestinian Arabs living in Israel. The term 'mixed cities' is used here to indicate those cities in Israel which contain a significant proportion of Arab residents in their population. Although the local governments are

headed by Jewish members, the identity of the minority Arabs is also well established in these cities.

2. In 1994, there were about 846 700 Arabs living in Israel (excluding those in East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights) which constituted about 15.5 per cent of the total population in Israel.
3. We do not have 1994 data for Jaffa and so must rely on the 1983 census.
4. According to Smootha's (1992, p. 240) three attitudinal surveys for the years 1980, 1985 and 1988, the percentages of Jews who responded positively to the statement: "I think that Israel should use any opportunity to encourage Israeli Arabs to leave the state" are 50.3, 42.4 and 39.9 respectively. Although these figures may suggest that Jews are becoming relatively more tolerant towards Arab citizens, the reality is still unpleasant.
5. It is to be noted here that the estimated coefficients of a logit model do not represent the marginal effects of respective independent variables on the dependent variable. Instead, they reflect the effects of changes in independent variables on the log of the odds ratio. The marginal effects can be generated, however, using the estimated coefficients of the logit model. The marginal effect is given by

$$\frac{\partial P_i}{\partial X_{ij}} = \frac{\beta_j \cdot \exp(-\mathbf{X}_i^T \beta)}{[1 + \exp(-\mathbf{X}_i^T \beta)]^2}$$

where, X_{ij} is the j th element of \mathbf{X}_i .

Notice that the marginal effect depends on the original probability and thus on the initial values of all independent variables and their coefficients. Since we are interested in the signs of the coefficients for the purpose of this research, the marginal effects of individual variables are not discussed.

6. The correlation coefficient for the Arab sample is 0.470 with a t -value (for $H_0: \rho = 0$) of 0.923. The correlation coefficient for the Jewish sample is 0.71 with a t -value 8.698.
7. The R^2_{LRT} is a more general measure of goodness-of-fit than the available ones. This measure was proposed by Kent (1983), Maddala (1983) and Magee (1990). It is specified as follows:

$$R^2_{LRT} = 1 - \exp(-LRT/n)$$

where, n is the total number of observations and LRT is the likelihood ratio test statistic for the joint significance of the slope parameters. The LRT is defined as follows:

$$LRT = -2[\ln(L^*) - \ln(\tilde{L})]$$

where, $\ln(L^*)$ is the value of the log-likeli-

hood function evaluated at the restricted estimates while $\ln(L^{\sim})$ is the value of the log-likelihood function evaluated at the unrestricted estimates. The LRT is asymptotically distributed as Chi-squared with J degrees of freedom, where J is the number of parametric restrictions imposed (Greene, 1997, pp. 303–304). The value of R^2_{LRT} lies between 0 and 1, is invariant to units of measurement and becomes larger as the model ‘fits better’. Moreover, R^2_{LRT} is equal to R^2_{OLS} in a linear model (Cameron and Windmeijer 1997).

8. It is interesting to note that in the Jewish sample there is no negative city effect on perceptions of co-existence for Acre relative to the other cities.

References

- AL-HAJ, M. and ROSENFELD, H. (1988) *Arab Local Government in Israel*. Tel Aviv: International Centre for Peace in the Middle East.
- AZRIYALI, Y. and ABU ROQUN, J. (1989) *A Brotherhood that Passed the Test*. Israel: World Zionist Organization (in Hebrew).
- Cambridge International Dictionary Of English (1995) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- CAMERON, A. C. and WINDMEIJER, F. A. G. (1997) An R -squared measure of goodness of fit for some common nonlinear regression models, *Journal of Econometrics*, 77, pp. 329–342.
- EMMETT, C. F. (1995) *Beyond the Basilica: Christians and Muslims in Nazareth*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
- FALAH, G. (1989) *The Forgotten Palestinians: Arab An Naqab 1906–1986*. Tayiba, Israel: Research Centre for Arab Heritage (in Arabic).
- FALAH, G. (1993) *Al-Jalil wa-mukhattatat at-tahwid* [Galilee and the Judaization Plans]. Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies (in Arabic).
- FALAH, G. (1996a) Living together apart: residential segregation in mixed Arab-Jewish cities in Israel. *Urban Studies* 33, pp. 823–857.
- FALAH, G. (1996b) The 1948 Israel-Palestinian War and its aftermath: the transformation and de-signification of Palestine’s cultural landscape, *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 86, pp. 256–285.
- FALAH, G. (1997) Ethnic perceptual differences of housing and neighbourhood quality in mixed Arab-Jewish cities in Israel, *Environment and Planning A*, 29, pp. 1663–1674.
- FISCHER, C. S. (1984) *The Urban Experience*, 2nd edn. San Diego: Harcourt Jovanovich.
- GANS, H. J. (1962a) Urbanism and Suburbanism as a Way of Life: A Reevaluation and Definitions, in: A. M. ROSE (Ed.) *Human Behaviour and Social Processes*, pp. 625–648. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
- GANS, H. J. (1962b) *The Urban Village*. New York: Free Press.
- GANS, H. J. (1967) *The Levittowners*. New York: Vintage.
- GREENE, W. H. (1997) *Econometric Analysis*, 3rd edn. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
- HAIDAR, A. (1987) *The Palestinians in Israeli social science writings*. Occasional Paper No. 9, Near East Cultural and Educational Foundation of Canada, Kingston, Ontario.
- HAREVEN, A. (1981) The Arabs of Israel: a Jewish problem, in: A. HAREVEN (Ed.) *Every Sixth Israeli: Relations Between the Jewish Majority and the Arab Minority in Israel*, pp. 3–13. Jerusalem: The Van Leer Jerusalem Foundation (in Hebrew).
- ISRAEL CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS (1995) *List of Localities, their Population and Codes 31 XII 1994*. Technical Publication Series No. 67. Jerusalem: Central Bureau of Statistics.
- JIRYIS, S. (1976) *The Arabs in Israel*. New York: Monthly Review.
- KANAANA, S. (1976) *Socio-cultural and psychological adjustment of the Arab minority in Israel*. San Francisco, CA: R and E Research Associates.
- KENT, J. T. (1983) Information gain and a general measure of correlation, *Biometrika*, 70, pp. 163–173.
- KRETZMER, D. (1990). *The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- KRUPAT, E. (1985) *People in Cities: The Urban Environment and its Effects*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- LUSTICK, I. (1980) *Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel’s Control over a National Minority*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
- MADDALA, G. S. (1983) *Limited Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- MAGEE, L. (1990) R^2 measures based on Wald and likelihood ratio joint significance tests, *The American Statistician*, 44, pp. 250–253.
- MINNS, A. and HUJAB, N. (1990) *Citizens Apart: A Portrait of the Palestinians in Israel*. London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd.
- NISAN, M. (1986) *The Jewish State and the Arab Problem*. Tel Aviv: Hadar Publishing House Ltd (in Hebrew).
- PELED, Y. (1992) Ethnic democracy and the legal construction of citizenship: Arab citizens of the Jewish state, *American Political Science Review*, 68, pp. 432–443.
- REKHESS, E. (1981) The intelligentsia, in: A. LAYISH (Ed.) *The Arabs in Israel*, pp. 180–196. Jerusalem: The Magnes Press (in Hebrew).

- ROSEN, H. M. (1970) *The Arabs and Jews in Israel: The Reality, the Dilemma and the Promise*. Jerusalem: The American Jewish Committee.
- ROUHANA, N. N. and FISKE, S. T. (1995) Perception of power, threat, and conflict intensity in asymmetric intergroup conflict: Arab and Jewish citizens of Israel, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 39, pp. 49–81.
- SCHNELL, I. (1994) *Perceptions of Israeli Arabs: Territoriality and Identity*. Aldershot: Avebury.
- SHAMIR, M. and SULLIVAN, J. L. (1985) Jews and Arabs in Israel: everybody hates somebody, sometime, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 29, pp. 283–305.
- SLATER, J. (1988) Palestinians in Israel (1): Who are they?, *Middle East International*, 329 (July), pp. 16–17.
- SMOOHA, S. (1984) *The orientation and politicization of the Arab minority in Israel*. Monograph Series on the Middle East No. 2, University of Haifa.
- SMOOHA, S. (1992) *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Change and Continuity in Mutual Intolerance*, vol. II. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- STENDEL, O. and HAREOUVENI, E. (1973) *The Minorities in Israel*. Giv'atayim, Israel: Hakkibutz Hameuchad (in Hebrew).
- STOCK, E. (1981) Israel—a Jewish polity with a multi-ethnic population, *Patterns of Prejudice*, 15(4), pp. 34–41.
- YIFTACHEL, O. (1992) *Planning a Mixed Region in Israel*. Aldershot: Avebury.
- ZUREIK, E. T. (1979) *The Palestinians in Israel: A Study of Internal Colonialism*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Copyright of Urban Studies is the property of Carfax Publishing Company and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.