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The Arab Vote in the Elections to the 14th Knesset, 29 May 1996

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FOREWORD

The elections for the 14th Knesset marked the first time in Israel that the balloting for the office of prime minister and that for the Knesset were separated. This had dual significance for the Arab electorate, for two reasons. First, the close race between the two contenders for the office of prime minister elicited the assessment that the Arab vote might well tip the balance in favor of Shimon Peres, prompting intensified courting of the Arab vote before the elections, and, once the results were in, an assigning of blame to the Arab sector for Peres' defeat. Second, the separation of the vote allowed many Arabs to vote for the Arab parties that represented their national, communal and sectoral interests with a clear conscience, in the same way that the Jewish sector did.

Four Arab lists contended in the elections, two of which failed to pass the electoral threshold while the other two doubled their electoral strength. Arab representation in the Knesset rose from 8 seats in the outgoing Knesset to 11 in the new one.

However, despite the high rate of voter participation, increased political participation, and expanded representation of the Arab parties, Arab strength in the 14th Knesset was weakened as a result of the change of administration.

This study describes pre-election organizational efforts and voting patterns, presents a breakdown of the voting results, and analyzes their significance. Appendices list the official results of the elections in the Arab sector by locality and various other indexes based on data collected by the Central Elections Committee. One appendix is devoted to segments from the platforms of new Arab parties relating to demands regarding the status of the Arab population as a national minority in Israel and regarding basic changes in the nature and definition of the state.

The analyses in this study represent the opinions of the authors.

Chapter One

Overall Characteristics of the Election Campaign in the Arab Sector

The election campaign for the 14th Knesset in the Arab sector in Israel differed from previous campaigns in several respects:

1. Direct elections for the office of prime minister placed the Arab electorate in a key position. In light of the close race between the two main contenders, the common wisdom was that the Arabs were likely to determine who the prime minister would be. This perception, however, boomeranged. During the final month of the campaign, and in light of Arab anger over Operation Grapes of Wrath in Lebanon, the Labor Party worked intensively to bring out the Arab vote for Shimon Peres. By contrast, the rightist camp highlighted Arab support for Peres as a factor working against him and in favor of Netanyahu, whom they portrayed as the candidate who was "good for the Jews." "Ultimately, the Arabs' strength turned into a weakness: despite their unprecedentedly massive support for the Labor candidate, they were blamed by Labor Party spokesmen for Peres' defeat.
2. As was the case in the Jewish sector, the new electoral system allowed the Arabs, too, to split their vote between support for the prime minister they favored and the Arab list for the Knesset that directly represented their communal interests. This led to a significant rise in the strength of both Hadash (the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality; DFPE) and the United Arab List (UAL), from a total of five seats in the 13th Knesset to nine in the 14th.
3. The rate of electoral participation in the Arab sector rose significantly, reaching 77%, as compared with 69.7% in the 1992 elections. This rate was the highest since 1973 (80%), and for the first time since then nearly paralleled the general rate of electoral participation, which was 79.3% this time. Although voting in the Arab sector was sluggish at the start of Election Day, once this was reported in the media, along with assessments that Peres would fail
4. The phenomenon of multiple parties and the establishment of new Arab political movements was notable in this campaign. Some of these political organizations centered on single individuals, such as Dr. Ahmad Tibi, Muhammad Zaydan, 'Atif Khatib or Dr. 'Azmi Bishara. Some of the organizations amalgamated, while others decided to run alone. Significantly, until 1996, there was only a single purely Arab party - the Arab Democratic Party (ADP), established by MK 'Abd al-Wahhab Darawsha in 1988. With the approach of the 1996 elections, however, the phenomenon of political separatism grew, ultimately gaining the confidence of 67% of the Arab electorate.
5. Political unification, which was mooted several months before the elections, failed to materialize despite both internal and outside efforts to implement it. In the end, four new parties announced their intention to enter the race: the Arab Union for Progress and Renewal, the National-Democratic Alliance (NDA), the Progressive Alliance, and the Arab Islamic Bloc. Although Dr. Ahmad Tibi, leader of the Arab Union for Progress and Renewal, announced his withdrawal from the race shortly before the elections, his party nevertheless ran. Two lists that did manage to amalgamate - Hadash and the NDA, as well as the ADP and part of the Islamic movement, did increase their strength significantly. Yet, some 17,000 votes - approximately 5% of the Arab electorate - were wasted in support of parties that failed to pass the electoral threshold.
6. The tendency in the Arab sector ever since the Oslo Accords to focus inward on communal problems, in contrast to the previous intensive pre-

cupation with Palestinian issues and the peace process (see Ozacky-Lazar and Ghanem, 1995), was reflected in the emphases of the electioneering propaganda and the party platforms. Although the major parties' general propaganda for the elections for prime minister dealt with the continuation and intensification of the peace process, the material prepared by the Arab parties was geared primarily to topics related to improving the civil status of the Arabs of Israel and advancing the process of equalization with the Jewish population.

7. The challenging of the Jewish character of the State of Israel and the demand to define it as a "state of all its citizens" metamorphosed from an intellectual debate to a political platform incorporated in various versions by most of the Arab lists (see Appendix 1). Conceivably, this demand will intensify with the increase in the Arab parties' strength and the acquisition of support for it by Jewish allies. The growth of the Jewish right and an emphasis on the Jewish content of the state could actually intensify this trend.
8. The new Arab politicians are nearly all professionals by education and are in their forties, some of them new to national politics. The four new MKs are 'Abd al-Malik Dahamsha, head of the United Arab List (UAL), a lawyer and new to politics; Dr. 'Azmi Bishara, a lecturer in philosophy; Dr. Ahmad Sa'ad, an economist and journalist; and Tawfiq Khatib, head of the Jaljuliyya local council and a master's student at Bar-Ilan Uni-

versity. The candidates who failed to get elected were Dr. Ahmad Tibi, a physician, who, while not new to public life, was new to Knesset elections; Rafiq Haj Yihya, mayor of Taibe, formerly a journalist; and Nadia Hilu, a social worker, the first Arab woman to attain a high ranking in the race - 37th in the Labor Party list. Lower-ranking candidates came from similar backgrounds.

9. For the first time, the Likud did not place an Arab or a Druze candidate in a realistic place in its list. As a consequence of the union between the Likud, Tsomet and Geshet, then-MK As'ad As'ad of the Likud was relegated to 46th place. This development was reflected in the Druze vote for the Likud, which dropped from approximately 25% in the preceding elections to 11.7% in 1996. However, support for Netanyahu in this sector - 21.3% - was relatively high in comparison with other Arab sectors.
10. Despite known attempts by Arafat and the Palestinian Authority (PA) to influence Arab party leaders in Israel, their intervention in the campaign was not evident in the electioneering propaganda, as had been the case in the local elections of 1993 (see Ghanem and Ozacky-Lazar, 1994). Arafat did not identify himself with any one party, although he expressed support for Shimon Peres. In fact, the list headed by Ahmad Tibi, who was identified with the PA to a greater degree than any other Arab political leader from Israel, showed little success in the opinion polls, which led to his withdrawal from the race entirely.

* * *

Chapter Two

Political Organization and Behavior in Preparation for the Elections

Significant developments in various areas of the Arab sector in Israel from the early 1970s onward included the political realm as well. Arab society embarked on a marked process of modernization and the raising of its educational level; pursued the struggle for civil equality more intently; established internal leadership bodies, such as watch commissions devoted to various social issues, led by the Supreme Follow-up Committee for the Arabs; and altered its political organizational and behavioral norms. Two traits in particular characterized Arab political activity from the mid-1970s onward:

1. Political organization underwent a process of heightened pluralism, manifested in the establishment of a growing number of political bodies and organizations, and growing membership in them. Following Mapam, which began to accept Arabs as full members as far back as 1954, the other Jewish parties, too, opened their ranks to Arab membership and activism in the 1960s and '70s. Maki, the Communist Party, created the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (Hadash), a coalition of the Jewish Black Panthers, heads of Arab local councils, student committees and non-Communist Arab community activists. In 1970, Arab students in Israeli universities founded the Sons of the Land, a Marxist movement, in protest against what it perceived as Maki's moderation, presenting an ideological alternative that owed its origins to the PLO at that time, namely the demand to establish a secular, democratic Palestinian state on the entire territory of historic Palestine. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, political Islam began to organize in Israel, first as the Jihad Family (*Usrat al-Jihad*), a semi-military underground advocating violent struggle against the state and its Jewish majority. While still in a formative stage, however, the movement's membership was apprehended by the security forces, its leadership was jailed, and the movement disbanded.
2. Pluralism and factionalization typified not only the organizational area but political behavior generally. Political pluralism prompted the factionalization of Arab votes in Knesset elections and resulted in a significant, and growing, scattering of this vote. From the first Knesset elections in 1949 until the eighth Knesset elections in 1973, Mapai and its affiliated lists obtained an average of 52.5% of the Arab vote, and the Communist Party an average of 21.75%, with the rest of the vote (25.75%) spread among Mapam, the National Religious Party and other Jewish parties. However, with the elections to the ninth Knesset in 1977, the pattern was reversed, and Hadash, founded that year, attained approximately 51% of the Arab vote. From then on, factionalism and the scattering of the vote increased. In the 10th Knesset, the leading party in the Arab electorate, Hadash, won 47% of the Arab vote; in the 11th Knesset 32%; in the 12th Knesset 33%; and in the 13th Knesset 23%. The rest of the parties gained small shares of the Arab vote, including parties that failed to cross the electoral threshold, so that the votes they acquired were wasted, thereby sapping Arab electoral strength. Pluralism stemmed from the growing politicization of the Arab population in Israel and the rise of new groups that demanded politi-

cal and social representation and self-expression, such as young people, students, local political activists, religious Muslims and various ethnic groups. The Communist Party lost its exclusivity and its ideological attraction, while new groupings emerged espousing the same or other goals, such as the strengthening of Palestinian identity in light of the rise of the PLO's aura, or the strengthening of the commitment to Islam and its values in light of the growth of the Islamic trend in the states of the region.

These processes peaked during the 14th Knesset elections of May 1996, alongside the influences of developments stemming from the Labor-Meretz administration, most significantly the Oslo Accords, the peace agreement with Jordan, and the growing thaw between Israel and the Arab world.

Other influences on the organization, the electioneering propaganda and the vote for the prime minister and the Knesset in the Arab sector were the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, the Hamas terrorist acts, Operation Grapes of Wrath in Lebanon, and the prolonged closure of the territories, as will be discussed below.

The New Arab Lists Formed for the Elections

In comparison with the period preceding the elections to the 13th Knesset, in June 1992, when no new Arab parties were formed, the intense organizational and behavioral political factionalization that characterized the Arab sector resulted in a major change in the elections for the 14th Knesset in 1996. This factionalization was not merely an outgrowth of pluralism, but was a reflection of the entrenched political divisiveness within the Arab population, and in turn actually heightened this problem. Several organizations and movements were established before the elections and were registered officially as political parties, announcing their intention to run in the national elections. Following are brief profiles of these new groupings:

1. *Arab Union for Progress and Renewal (al-Ittihad al-ʿArabi li-l-Taghayyur)*. Initiated by Dr. Ahmad Tibi, advisor to Arafat, this movement was

granted approval as a party despite appeals submitted by Jewish bodies against such a move. The official announcement of its establishment as a party was made only some two months before the elections, in late March 1996. During the brief campaign period that remained, the party made intensive efforts to recruit activists and garner public support centering mainly on its leader, Dr. Tibi, who was closely identified with Arafat, the PA and the peace process.

Tibi and his party attained wide coverage in the Israeli electronic and print media. In its campaign, the party emphasized Tibi's status, role and activity, as well as the need for "change and democracy" to rise to the fore in Arab society and for a new breed of young leadership (see, e.g., the movement's advertisement in *Kull al-'Arab*, 26 January 1996; interview with Tibi, *ibid.*, 2 February 1996).

Tibi and his supporters fostered a series of talks and contacts with other elements in the Arab sector, such as the Progressive Alliance and the Islamic movement, with the aim of forming a large Arab bloc for the elections, intending to bring in Darawsha's ADP as well. According to reports in the press, an initial meeting between Tibi and Darawsha was held at the initiative of a senior PA figure, Hakam Bal'awi, during which the main principles for a joint election campaign were drawn up (*ibid.*, 19 January 1996).

Polls at first showed that the movement had significant support in comparison with the other new movements. However, the decision by part of the Islamic movement to join forces with the ADP lowered the stature of Tibi's movement and eventually led him to take the unusual step, about a week before the elections, of dropping out of the race. According to persistent rumors, senior PA figures put pressure on him and his movement's leaders to withdraw in light of the assessment that the list would fail to pass the electoral threshold, resulting in the loss of a large number of Arab votes and the weakening of the leftist bloc. Tibi himself cited this reason for withdrawing, stating that he did not want to take the "moral responsibility" for wasting votes. Upon exiting the race, Tibi called on his supporters to vote for Shimon Peres as prime minister. The party itself announced that it would continue to function, and

its leaders ran in the elections without Tibi, obtaining some 2,000 votes, which were lost.

2. National-Democratic Alliance (NDA; *al-Tajammu' al-Watani al-Dimukrati*). This body was an amalgamation of several small leftist political movements that operated in the Arab sector, including the Sons of the Land, the Equality Alliance, a wing of the Progressive List for Peace identified with Muhammad Mi'ari, and several local groupings such as the Mghar Socialist Party, the Ansar Movement of Umm al-Fahm, the al-Nahda Movement of Taibe, the Sons of al-Tira and individual Arab activists. Heading the new body was Dr. 'Azmi Bishara of Nazareth, a lecturer at Bir Zeit University and a research fellow at the Van Leer Institute in Jerusalem. The movement applied for and received approval as a political party. Its platform advocated a change in the definition of the State of Israel from a "Jewish state" to a "state of all its citizens," and the granting of a special, recognized status of "national minority" to the Arab population of Israel, which would be expressed by Arab cultural autonomy and the opportunity for the Arab leaders to conduct a portion of their communal affairs themselves. NDA leaders openly criticized the nature of the Israeli-Palestinian peace agreements, while also expressing dis-satisfaction with the running of the PA by Arafat and his supporters. Their platform was unique in that the ideas it expressed, while held by broad sectors of the Arab community, had never been presented in a political platform by an organized body seeking to implement them.

The NDA joined forces with Hadash, running for the Knesset on a joint list that blurred the ideological differences between them to some extent. Bishara, fourth on the list, was elected to the Knesset.

3. Progressive Alliance (*al-Tahaluf al-Taqaddumi*). This organization was officially registered and approved to run for the elections despite a priori assessments that it would not cross the electoral threshold and despite pressures exerted on it to drop out. One of its three main components was the Independents Movement headed by Muhammad Zaydan, formerly chairman of the Kafr Manda local council and spokesman of the Committee of Heads of Arab Lo-

cal Councils, who was supported by a small number of activists in the Arab sector. This movement had joined forces with the ADP before the 1992 elections, and Zaydan had been placed third on the list of candidates for the Knesset, with a rotation agreement drawn up between him and the second candidate on the list, MK Talib al-Sana'. The agreement, however, was not honored, and Zaydan and his supporters left the ADP two years later, in 1994. The second component of the Progressive Alliance was the Voice of Agreement movement (*Nida'a al-Wifaq*), a small group established by Bedouin communal activists in the Negev, represented in the Alliance by Sa'id Zabarqa of Laqia, who was placed second on the list. The third component consisted of the remnants of the Progressive List, who continued to function in a small number of localities, maintained a headquarters and retained its main office in Nazareth after parting ways with Mi'ari and his supporters. Its representative in the Alliance was 'Aziz Shihada, an attorney from Nazareth.

The Alliance platform was dedicated "to work for the improvement of the condition of the Arab citizens in the state and for the entrenchment of peace in the region." The party conducted negotiations with Tibi to establish a joint list for the elections, but differences of opinion among its members prevented the union (*al-Sinara*, 13 February 1996). The Voice of Agreement movement announced that it favored an alliance with Hadash over one with Tibi (*ibid.*, 15 March 1996), but this union was not implemented either, despite negotiations conducted up to the last moment. The essence of the problem was the placement of the representative of the Alliance on the list of candidates for Knesset. In the end, the Alliance ran alone, obtaining some 14,000 votes, which was insufficient to cross the electoral threshold.

4. The Arab-Islamic Bloc (*al-Kutla al-'Arabiyya al-Islamiyya*). This small grouping was headed by Shaykh 'Atif Khatib of Kafr Kana, who had left the Islamic movement because of local differences of opinion with his relation Shaykh Kamal Khatib, a prominent leader of the Islamic movement in Israel and an opponent of participation by the movement in the Knesset elections. The bloc was registered as a

party that, according to its platform, sought "to protect the civil and religious rights of the Arab sector"; support the peace process; and "act to establish a broad Arab coalition, to the extent possible. "The movement obtained a religious permit (*fatwa*) for participation in the elections to the Knesset (see publication titled *Sawt al-Kutla*, January 1996). Khatib made concerted efforts to establish a large Arab bloc for the elections and initialed an agreement with Tibi's movement (*al-Sinara*, 12 January 1996), but once the agreement between the ADP and the Islamic movement was made public, Khatib and his supporters joined them instead and was placed sixth on their united list for the Knesset.

5. Democratic Action Organization. This small Jewish-Arab body was founded by Asaf Adiv, previously of the Path of the Spark movement. It called for a protest vote against the prime minister by Arab and Jewish citizens in the form of casting blank ballots (one-time party publication in Arabic, 21 May 1996), winning only 1,351 votes.

This proliferation of bodies with overlapping political and social messages raised questions of differentiation and orientation. The causes of this factionalization were varied and signified the problematic political situation of the Arabs in Israel, as follows:

1. Crisis of leadership. The parties that functioned in the Arab sector until then, including those that were represented in the Knesset, did not display high-level leadership capacities. They suffered from a lack of central leadership figures capable of attracting a large proportion of supporters and voters. Arab personalities in the Jewish parties, too, failed to attain the status of national leaders accepted by all sectors of the population.

2. Weakness of the "blocking bloc" parties. Hadash and the ADP, which in the 13th Knesset constituted a "blocking bloc" for the Labor-led coalition, failed to achieve domestic gains for the Arab sector. They indeed supported the government from the outside, helping it progress in the peace process, conclude the Oslo Accords, and take important political steps - worthy accomplishments in themselves. However,

tangible achievements by these parties in the civic realm were lacking despite the special status they had acquired, which enabled them to exert pressure and make demands. Disappointment over this failure spurred new elements to enter the contest.

3. Preponderance of personal ambition. A prime motivation for some of the political organization was personal ambition, namely the attempt by individuals to reach the Knesset or some other leadership position by establishing a new political base. In practice, most of the new groupings did not put forward alternative platforms or ideologies to those that existed, even if they portrayed themselves as struggling to implement new politico-ideological programs touted in the media as having wide support.

4. Ideological polarization. Side by side with the preceding factor, sincere attempts in the Arab sector to deal with the issue of the status of the Arabs in the State of Israel in light of the current political processes did constitute a major impetus for the formation of some of the new groupings. Various elements and individuals proposed new formulas for dealing with the condition of the Arabs as a minority and with the refusal of the governmental authorities and the Jewish parties to consider significant changes in minority-majority relations. This explains the establishment, for example, of the NDA and the entry of the Islamic movement into the national political arena.

Attempts at Unification: The Agreement Committee

The Agreement Committee (*Lajnat al-Wifaq*), a body that had operated before the elections to the 13th Knesset, was reinstated for the current electoral campaign, led once again by the chairman of the Supreme Follow-up Committee of the Arabs in Israel, Ibrahim Nimr Husayn. The members of the committee were personalities known to be politically unaffiliated. The purpose of the committee was to attempt to unify the contending Arab parties and movements by conducting separate meetings with each group's representatives to ascertain their position on forming a unified apparatus, followed by efforts at organizing such a framework and working out a platform acceptable

to all the partners. The goal of forming a joint list, however, faced a series of barriers that ultimately foiled these efforts, as follows:

1. The barrier of past experience. The Arab parties had tried to establish various coalitions for the elections in the past. A successful effort was that of the Communist Party, which established the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (Hadash) in 1977. This unified list won about 50% of the Arab vote in the elections to the ninth Knesset that year, and has survived to this day despite personality, ideological, political and communal problems that have weakened its ability to preserve its position as the central political force in Arab life. Far less successful, however, was an attempt to unify the Arab parties for elections to the Histadrut convention in 1989. Hadash, the Progressive list and the ADP formed a joint list which met with a stinging defeat and disbanded thereafter (see Ozacky-Lazar and Ghanem, 1990 and 1995). Similarly, unification efforts were made before the elections to the 13th Knesset, led by the Islamic movement and outside elements. Not only did these experiments fail, but because of personal rivalries the parties involved did not even manage to conclude mutual surplus-vote agreements, leading to the loss of thousands of Arab votes and the disappearance of the Progressive list from the political map.

2. The ideological barrier. Some of the Arab parties had ideological platforms that explicitly distanced them from other parties in terms of world view, Jewish-Arab cooperation, solutions to the Palestinian problem, the status of the Arabs in the State of Israel, commitment to social change (such as the status of women or the relationship with the *hamula* [clan]). Hadash, controlled by the Communist Party, was the outstanding example in this category. It advocated a communist world view, centralism, Jewish-Arab cooperation even if it gained few Jewish votes, and a social platform that was more progressive than the other Arab parties. The possibility of unification with the ADP, the Arab Islamic Bloc or even with Tibi's movement was thus practically nil. Hadash conducted serious negotiations only with the NDA,

which was closer to its platform than any of the other parties. Yet, although they concluded an agreement and ran for the Knesset on a joint list, differences of opinion remained over such issues as equality and parliamentary and extra-parliamentary strategies. These differences came to a head with the approach of the elections over the question of support for Peres for prime minister. The NDA called for casting blank ballots in light of Operation Grapes of Wrath and the closure of the territories, while Hadash equivocated until the last moment but in effect supported the vote for Peres.

3. The personal barrier. Ultimately, negotiations on unification for elections reached the stage of compiling the list of candidates, with the guiding principle being that the order of the list reflect the electoral strength of the participating bodies. At that stage, the main differences of opinion were personal, namely, who would head the list, what the order of candidates would be, and whether places would be assured for various groups such as women, communal populations, religious affiliation and geographic regions. Declarations by leaders that their position on the candidate list was not important to them personally and that their primary interest was the platform were proven to be empty phrases. The personal struggle for positioning on the list had constituted a key factor in the rise and fall of efforts to form joint lists in the past.

4. The sectoral and communal barrier. Every joint list was predicated on representation of various sectors of the Arab population in Israel from the communal, religious and regional aspects, which would be integrated with personal attributes as well. For example, would a candidate from the Negev or a candidate from the Galilee attain a realistic place on the joint list? What about the placement of a Christian, a Druze or a Bedouin candidate—would these sectors or groups attain a realistic place or would they be shunted aside in favor of known personalities considered to be vote-getters? Moreover, if a group did not obtain a good position on the list, would electoral participation drop from that sector? These were weighty considerations in every party, and the final composition of the lists was largely determined by them.

Chapter Three

The Election Results and their Significance

The assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995, which prompted the advance of the elections for the 14th Knesset, elicited strong reactions in the Arab population, namely fully shared sorrow, mourning and rage along with the rest of the Israeli public. Politically, the trend following the assassination was support for the Labor Party and its new leader, Shimon Peres.

Two additional painful events were to occur that also affected the Arab voter strongly. The first was the brutal terrorist acts by Hamas in February 1996, which evoked an unprecedented negative reaction by the Arabs in Israel. Demonstrations, protest rallies and mourning processions were held in many Arab localities throughout the country, and sharp censure was directed at the murderers of the innocent and the perpetrators of grave damage to the peace process, which harmed not only Israel but the Palestinian people as well. The second event was Operation Grapes of Wrath mounted in Lebanon in April 1996, during which hundreds of thousands of Lebanese citizens were forced to leave their homes because of heavy bombardment by Israel. This affected the Arabs in Israel deeply, as their collective memory of exile and dispossession was still strong. Moreover, the tragic incident at Kafr Kana in South Lebanon, during which over 100 Lebanese civilians were killed by IDF bombs, shocked the Arab population in Israel, stirring a wave of protest against Prime Minister Peres and appeals to cast blank ballots in the prime ministerial vote.

Percentage of the Vote

The elections thus took place during a period of stormy political activity and critical developments in the relations between the two peoples, which may explain the rise in Arab electoral participation. Another explanation may lie in the depiction by the media of the elections, and especially of the prime min-

isterial election, as dependent on the Arab vote. Countless articles dealt with the issue of whether and how the Arabs would decide the outcome of the campaign, whether it was legitimate that they tip the balance in the fateful questions facing the state, and how a prime minister "dependent on the Arab vote" would continue to progress in the peace process. The common wisdom was that the likelihood of Peres' victory was in direct proportion to the size of the Arab turnout at the polls. In the event, the "Netanyahu is good for the Jews" advertising campaign was viewed as racist and insulting by the Arabs and their reaction was a mass turnout at the polls voting for Peres. These events were linked to several additional factors, such as a rise in the political consciousness of the Arab public generally and the young generation specifically; the unification of several Arab political organizations; the separation for the first time of the vote for the Knesset from the vote for the prime minister; the importance of the elections to the continuation of the peace process; and intensive work by activists from all the parties and by a specially formed body for "the promotion of democracy" to bring out the Arab vote on Election Day itself. All this resulted in an Arab voter turnout of approximately 77%, in contrast to 69.7% in the preceding elections - the highest Arab voter turnout since 1973, although still relatively low in comparison with the Jewish and nationwide turnouts (see Appendixes 3 and 6).

The Vote for the Office of Prime Minister

Surveys conducted in the Arab sector after Rabin's assassination, and again about two months before the elections, indicated a decisive majority for the candidacy of Shimon Peres for the office of prime minister. Strong support for the peace process, despite criticism of certain details in it and of the pace of the progress; traditional support for the left; and the influence of the assassination itself led, not surprisingly,

to nearly complete support for Peres.

By comparison, the Likud and the right had never evoked very much support from the Arab electorate, and, furthermore, Binyamin Netanyahu had no record of activity in areas of special interest to them. Moreover, rightist deligitimation of the Arab MKs and of the Rabin government for being dependent on the Arab "blocking bloc," and the fact that the Likud, Shas (ultra-Orthodox Sephardi party) and the National Religious Party (NRP) had been opposition parties in the 13th Knesset, distanced most of those Arabs who had supported the rightist bloc in previous elections.

Operation Grapes of Wrath, however, nearly reversed the situation. So intense was the Arab reaction to it, that the Labor Party feared the Arabs would boycott the elections; refrain from voting for Peres; or even cast a protest vote for Netanyahu. Frenzied activity took place in the Arab parties over the issue of the vote for the prime minister in April and May. The Arab politicians seemed to vie with each other in extremist censure of Peres as a "child-murderer" and a "war criminal." Arab public figures boycotted Independence Day receptions held by the prime minister, called for casting blank votes at the polls, and threatened to boycott the elections entirely. A survey conducted in early May showed that only 47% of the Arab electorate would support Peres (*Yediot Aharonot*, 3 May 1996). Ten days before the elections, however, 85% of the Arab electorate was reported to be in support of him (*Ma'ariv*, 2 June 1996).

Intensive activity on the part of the Labor Party's Arab headquarters engendered a series of meetings between the leaders of the Arab parties and high-ranking Labor ministers, including the prime minister himself. Promises were made to meet Arab demands for budgets, jobs, the righting of old wrongs (e.g., releasing *waqf* properties, easing property tax regulations, and recognizing as-yet unacknowledged villages officially), and even the possibility, though not an actual promise, that should he be elected, Peres would appoint an Arab minister for the first time in Israeli history.

The signing of an understanding with Hizballah and the termination of the operation in Lebanon dif-

fused the tension, and the Arab leaders gradually resumed advocating support for Peres. The first to do so openly was Muhammad Zaydan, followed by MK Darawsha, Ahmad Tibi and lastly, albeit half-heartedly, hesitantly and in a generally roundabout way, part of the Hadash leadership. However, some leaders continued to urge the casting of a blank ballot, namely the head of the NDA, Dr. 'Azmi Bishara, who, although having amalgamated with Hadash, differed with it on this issue; and the small Democratic Action Organization. The Islamic movement faction opposed to the movement's participation in the elections and its unification with the ADP, headed by Mayor of Umm al-Fahm Shaykh Ra'id Salah, maintained the movement's traditional policy of allowing its followers to vote "according to their conscience," i.e., no boycott of the elections, yet no open advocacy of a particular candidate.

The outcome of this conflict and confusion was that 72% of the Arabs cast blank or disqualified ballots, constituting some 24,000 votes that were lost. Even if part of the disqualified ballots resulted from a lack of understanding of the new system of voting or from errors, clearly, a significant protest vote was cast. The Jewish population, by comparison, registered only 4.8% disqualified votes. Nevertheless, of the total valid Arab votes, 94.8% were cast for Shimon Peres, a monumental rate of support by any criterion, and especially in comparison with the results in the Jewish sector, where Peres obtained about 44%, thereby losing the prime ministry. Support for Netanyahu came primarily from the Druze localities, amounting to 21.3% of their vote. Bedouin support for Netanyahu was 6.8%. Of the total Arab vote, 5.2%, or some 15,000 voters, supported Netanyahu, emanating from small traditional pockets of Arab and Druze support for the Likud; from the presence of Likud activists in Arab localities just before the elections; from visits by Netanyahu himself to several villages; and from local factional and clan rivalries, e.g., in Taibe.

Immediately upon the release of the official results, persons in the Labor Party, as well as various commentators, ascribed the blame for Peres' defeat to the Arab sector. Arab spokesmen, too, expressed

disappointment with the results and called for soul-searching by the Arab parties and electorate (see numerous interviews in the Arabic press and on radio and TV the day after the elections, 2 June 1996). An analysis of the results showed that had an additional 10% of the Arab electorate gone to the polls and voted for Peres, the gap between him and Netanyahu would have been closed. However, so high a rate of voter turnout was improbable and unprecedented since the 1950s. Moreover, the Arab vote ought not have been perceived as monolithic or homogeneous, given its multi-faceted population and its political factionalization.

The Vote for the Knesset

The outstanding characteristic of the vote for the Knesset was its sectoral nature, which in this election typified the entire voting public and was a product of the new electoral system that permitted a split vote. The trend of voting for a party that represented a group interest led to a large increase in the strength of both Hadash and the United Arab List (UAL). Hadash received 37% of the total Arab vote, as compared to 23.2% in the previous elections, increasing its strength in the Knesset from three to five seats. This represented a significant recovery for the party, which in 1988 had attained approximately a third of the Arab vote but in 1992 dropped to less than a quarter. Hadash ran on a joint list with the new NDA, which had a small electorate, yet the fact of amalgamation itself drew voters who would not have supported either of the movements had they run separately. Hadash also received several thousand Jewish votes, amounting to an estimated 1/2 mandate.

Similarly, the UAL won 25.4% of the Arab vote, as compared to the Arab Democratic Party (ADP), which received 15.2% when it ran alone in 1992. This gave the UAL four seats in the 14th Knesset, as compared to two held by Darawsha's party in the previous Knesset. The primary reason for the list's increase in strength was the cooption of part of the Islamic movement into the Knesset race for the first time ever, a move that was preceded by intense debate which led to a split in that movement (Rekhess, 1996). Before the split, the ADP was not seen as passing the

electoral threshold. Clearly, the support of even part of the Islamic movement, and the decisive stand by its leader, Shaykh 'Abdallah Nimr Darwish, favoring participation in the elections, brought about the large increase in the strength of the joint list. In the southern Triangle and Negev localities, where this faction of the Islamic movement enjoyed support, and from which UAL candidates were selected (i.e., Mayor of Jaljuliyya Tawfiq Khatib and MK Talib al-Sana' of the Negev), the rise of the UAL was significant. For example, it achieved 51% of the vote in Kafr Qasim as compared to the ADP's 20% in the preceding elections. In Jaljuliyya, it received approximately 40% as compared to the ADP's 19% in the preceding elections. In the total Bedouin community it received 64.3% as compared to the ADP's 35% in 1992.

The main cause of the electoral growth of Hadash and the UAL was, therefore, the introduction of the split vote. An additional factor was the very fact that they managed to present themselves in a unified format, even though not all their political elements were fully consolidated.

The rise in strength of Hadash and the UAL came largely at the expense of the vote for the Labor Party - 16.6% as compared to 20.3% in the previous elections, and the nearly total disappearance of the vote for the Jewish right - 5.2% for the Likud, the NRP and Shas together, as compared to 19.3% in the previous elections. The sharp drop in the latter case is attributable to the fact that those parties were no longer in the government, in light of their opposition to the peace process. Meretz, by contrast, increased its strength in the Arab sector slightly, from 9.7% in 1992 to 10.5% in 1996, both because of its well-known stand on the topic of peace and its ministers' record during the previous four years - especially that of the minister of education - in improving the level of public services in Arab localities and in coopting more Arabs into government service. Conceivably, Labor neglected its party campaign in the Arab localities in favor of efforts to bring out the vote for Peres in the campaign for prime minister. Although during the primaries, the party ministers and MKs had paid frequent visits to the Arab localities and advertised extensively in the Arabic press, the spot-

light during the national election campaign was on Peres, with only sparse electioneering propaganda for the party itself. The impression projected was that the party in effect had yielded the campaign for the Arab vote to Hadash and the UAL. Moreover, there was an unspoken understanding between Labor Party officials and the activists in the Arab parties that the vote for Peres on the one hand and for their parties on the other would be mutually beneficial. (This was confirmed by Minister of Tourism Uzi Baram, head of the Labor Party's Arab headquarters, at a study day at Haifa University, 13 June 1996.)

The failure of the small Arab parties revived the lessons of the past, when factionalization had resulted in the loss of thousands of Arab votes. Moreover, the nature of these parties was not attractive to the electorate. Tibi's new movement lacked a base and branches, and had few activists. It also lacked sufficient time and budgets to entrench its message and recruit support. Tibi's close link with 'Arafat, moreover, did not prove beneficial, as the central concern of the Arab public in Israel was the improvement of their status rather than political issues. In addition, this public had harsh criticism, albeit not always openly expressed, for the nature of Arafat's rule, the undemocratic methods of his PA, and some of his positions in his negotiations with Israel. All these factors undermined Tibi's movement, which, after the withdrawal of its leader from the race, obtained some 2,000 votes only.

Muhammad Zaydan's Progressive Alliance, another of the small parties, was an undistinguished list with a generalized platform and a traditional *hamula* base, perceived as a party unwilling to join the trend toward amalgamation and therefore likely to lead to further factionalization and a loss of votes. Despite desperate attempts, Zaydan failed to consolidate with Hadash and the NDA, leaving him no choice, he explained, but to run alone. The Alliance won some 14,000 votes, primarily in the Negev and in the Galilee villages.

The results of the Arab vote for the Knesset reinforced the extant division of the Arab electorate into three political streams of approximately equal strength:

1. Supporters of Jewish-Zionist parties: nearly a third.
2. Supporters of Hadash - the communist, Jewish-Arab nonreligious stream: over a third.
3. Supporters of the United Arab List (UAL) - the Arab national and Islamic stream, which, with the addition of the segment of the Islamic movement that did not vote, constituted approximately a third of the population.

A New Ideological Trend

Beyond the realm of political organization and behavior, a significant development in the elections in the Arab sector was the new ideological trend cited earlier, namely the appearance in the platforms of the large Arab parties, for the first time, of a detailed demand to discuss and implement a change in the status of the Arab minority in the State of Israel. Some parties demanded changing the definition of the State of Israel and its Jewish character and turning it into a civil state; some demanded the recognition of the Arabs as a "national minority"; and some proposed cultural and institutional autonomy for the Arabs. This development was a product of the Oslo Accords and the peace process, as well as of changes taking place in Arab society in Israel (see also Ozacky-Lazar and Ghanem, 1995). The main body dealing with this topic was the National-Democratic Alliance (NDA), which turned an intellectual debate that began in the early 1990s, led, inter alia, by Dr. 'Azmi Bishara, into a political platform. Paragraph 2 of the movement's platform states: "The NDA will struggle to turn the State of Israel into a democratic state and for all its citizens - Jews, Arabs and others, as obligated by the implementation of human and civil rights based on complete equality between all citizens of the state, with no discrimination on the basis of nationality, religion or sex." (See the complete platform in Appendix 1.) The United Arab List (UAL) platform of 1996, in addition to its traditional demands for equality, included a similarly worded segment: "Recognition of the Arab citizens as a national minority in Israel, so that it will become a state of all its citizens." (See Appendix 1.) This version had not been included in the ADP platform for the preceding elections,

which mentioned "assuring equal opportunities for all citizens of the state" only. Ahmad Tibi, in his public appearances, also enthusiastically supported the idea of turning Israel into a "state of all its citizens," although his party platform contained a somewhat softened version emphasizing the status of the Arabs but not the nature of the state, i.e. that the movement would work for "changing the political, legal and civic position of the Arab public in Israel" (advertisement in *Panorama*, 10 May 1996). The plan of action of the Progressive Alliance stated that the movement would work toward "the state being for all its citizens, and this would be translated into practice in all areas" (advertisement, *ibid.*). Of the Jewish parties, only Meretz dealt with the topic openly, and from 1992 included a paragraph in its platform defining the state as "a Jewish and democratic state, a state of all its citizens, Jews and Arabs alike." Although agreement is absent among the Arabs themselves on these topics, and although the general Arab public does not deal with these issues - only its leaders do - the trend is significant and is likely to become further entrenched. The anticipated administration of the Jewish national and religious parties, and the fact that the Arab parties, and in fact all the Arab MKs, are in the opposition, will intensify the need, in the authors' view, for more explicit definitions of the status of the Arab minority in the state. As early as the first few days after the elections, a distinct differentiation was made by spokesmen of the right between the Jewish and the Arab vote, and emphasis was placed on Netanyahu's having attained a large majority within the Jewish population. Moreover, a proposal to legislate a basic law on "The Jewish State" was raised during the initial stages of the coalition negotiations by MK Avner Shaki of the NRP as a counterweight to the demand of the Arabs to change the definition of the state (*Kol Yisrael*, 6 June 1996). Continued intensive debate on this topic, therefore, is likely both in academic circles and in the political and public realm, along with sharp debate in the Knesset forum.

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Reactions of the Arab Parties to the Election Results, and their Future Status in the Opposition

Initial reactions by the Arabs to the results of the elections were mixed. There was satisfaction, on the one hand, with the increased strength of the Arab parties, yet grave disappointment with the overall outcome, on the other. In addition, accusations by Labor Party persons that the Arabs were responsible for Peres' defeat evoked anger. MK Hashim Mahamid pointed out that the 95% vote for Peres in fact constituted proof of the sense of responsibility displayed by the Arab voters despite their criticism of Peres' policy. "We chose between bad and worse, and tried to support the candidate who was less bad," Mahamid said (*al-Sinara*, 31 May 1996).

MK Darawsha attacked the Arab voters who cast blank ballots or who refrained from voting, yet pointed out that Peres, too, bore responsibility for his failure. He also observed that splitting the vote contributed to the sizable increase in strength of the Arab lists (*ibid.*). MK Salah Tarif of the Labor Party was angered by the election results, predicting that they would lead to the marginalization of the Arab MKs despite their numerical increase, and reduce their influence on governmental decision-making to nil. Tarif attacked the Arab leadership that had called for refraining from voting for Peres, saying that it rescinded this move too late to change the results (*ibid.*) Tibi, too, vigorously attacked "a number of irresponsible Arab politicians," in his words, who confused the public and ultimately brought about a negative result from the Arabs' point of view (*Israel TV, Channel 1, News*, 1 June 1996). He called for soul-searching and a thorough debate on the issue (*Kull al-'Arab*, 31 May 1996). Dr. 'Azmi Bishara, however, laid the blame squarely on Peres, rejecting the attempt to blame the Arabs for his failure (*ibid.*).

The chairman of the Committee of Heads of Arab Local Councils, Ibrahim Nimr Husayn, in contrast to most of the Arab leaders, voiced satisfaction with the high rate of Arab electoral participation in the elections and with the increase in strength of the parties representing them. He expressed hope that Prime Minister-elect Netanyahu would understand that the

state contained Arabs who have rights, and would change his position toward them. "I always say that to be in the opposition is one thing and to be in the government is another, and I hope that this will be the case with Netanyahu as well," Husayn observed (*ibid.*). MK Walid Sadiq of Meretz depicted the election results as "a black day in the life of the State of Israel, both in the domestic and the foreign arenas." He called for the establishment of a strong opposition front to consist of MKs from Labor, Meretz, Hadash and the UAL, "which would prevent the rightist government from implementing its declared policies regarding both the territories and the peace process and questions of the equal civil rights of the Arabs in Israel" (*ibid.*).

Can such a front be established? The Labor Party - the senior partner in the opposition - will probably have difficulty aligning itself with Meretz and the Arab parties in the anticipated struggles against the government both on foreign and domestic issues alike. Labor will want to develop itself once again as a centrist party and shed the "pro-Arab" and leftist image that clung to it during the election campaign, and that may have led to its defeat. Without Labor support, the 12-MK "Arab lobby," should it be formed, will have only a single ally left - Meretz, with its nine MKs. This will constitute too small a force to combat government moves and decisions in conflict with the interests of the Arab parties and the Arab public, both in relation to the peace process and to troublesome civic issues.

In addition, interfactional difficulties are foreseeable between the two Arab blocs. Both Hadash and the UAL are composed of various bodies that amalgamated for the purpose of the elections but that harbor conflicting ideological principles and personal rivalries. Differences of opinion especially over social issues exist between the secular Hadash and the NDA on the one hand, and the conservative-religious UAL on the other.

Furthermore, four of the Arab MKs are entirely new to politics and will require a period of adjustment to the rules of the game. An example of this was evident as early as the first week after the elections when one of the new MKs, 'Abd al-Malik

Dahamsha, announced in the media, apparently without prior coordination with his colleagues, that his party could cooperate with the prime minister-elect and even join the coalition if Arab rights were guaranteed. Thereafter, he attempted in various interviews to correct the impression that was created (e.g., *Panorama*, 7 June 1996). He stated that no option should be closed and that the new government must be given an opportunity to prove its intentions and its attitude toward the Arabs (statement during a study day at Haifa University, 13 June 1996).

Conceivably, four lean and frustrating years are to be anticipated for the Arab MKs and for the trends that had been initiated in terms of significant improvement in the status and condition of the Arabs in Israel. With this, it should be noted that the Likud as a party has no problem with Arab citizens as private individuals, but rather with the Arab collective national identity. Under previous Likud governments, the Arab sector enjoyed equalized budgets and various municipal and economic benefits, and the likelihood is that the new government will proceed in this vein. Several times in his victory speech Netanyahu addressed the "non-Jewish" citizens, in his definition, promising them that he viewed himself as their prime minister as well and that they were entitled to fully equal treatment even though most of them did not vote for him. He stated that a child from Kafr Tamra is entitled, in his words, to whatever opportunities his own son receives (Israel TV, Channel 1, Netanyahu's speech, 2 June 1996).

The Netanyahu government guidelines included the pledge that the government would act to "foster the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, and preserve a fitting balance between the will of the majority and the rights of the individual and the minorities." In the subsection devoted to "minorities," the advantage of those in this group who served in the defense forces is emphasized, as are the efforts that the government will make to advance and integrate them in public service, as follows:

1. The government will act for the complete integration of the members of the minorities in Israel in all aspects. Special efforts will be made to advance

members of the minorities who have tied their fate to the Jewish people and the State of Israel and have served in the defense forces of the state.

2. The government will act to enlarge the budgets of the Arab local authorities that require improved basic infrastructures, in an effort to reduce gaps between them and other localities.
3. Efforts will be made to absorb academic members of minorities, and especially military service veterans, in the civil service and in public bodies in order to include them in state and public responsibility for the life of the country that they have served in the context of the defense forces" (*Ha'aretz*, 17 June 1996).

Apparently, the Likud will retain its traditional perception of the Arabs as members of various communities and groups rather than as a single national minority, and will not be prepared even to initiate a discussion over changing their status in the state or

instituting autonomy on certain issues, and certainly not changing the definition of the nature of the state. It will make a clear distinction between those who have served in the IDF - namely the Druze, the Circassians and a small number of Christian and Muslim Arabs - and the large Arab public that did not "serve the state in the context of the defense forces," as cited in the guidelines.

This wording evoked sharp responses by the Arabs. In a lead headline, *al-Ittihad*, the Maki organ, focused on the new government's terminology of integration instead of equality, and its division of Arab citizens into two classes based on army service (*al-Ittihad*, 18 June 1996). Presumably, in the practical, day-to-day realm, there will not be any significant retreat from closing the gaps in budgets in the Arab localities. However, basic and significant problems are likely to arise in reciprocal relations between the Arab population and the government.

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SUMMARY

The 1996 elections and their outcome constitute an important landmark in the positioning of the Arab citizens within the Israeli political system, in the continuation of their dialogue with the civil authorities, and in the forging of their status as a national minority in the State of Israel.

In terms of political organization and behavior, the Arabs, like the rest of the citizens in Israel, were significantly affected by the introduction of the new system of direct elections for the office of prime minister and separate elections for the Knesset. This system spawned new political parties and entities during the months preceding the elections, a development that threatened to factionalize the Arab vote and lead to a loss of votes, as had happened in the past. Pressures and intensive activity by both internal and external elements ultimately brought about the formation of two blocs: Hadash and the National-Democratic Alliance (NDA) on the one hand, and the Arab Democratic Party (ADP) and part of the Islamic

movement on the other. The creation of these mini-amalgamations; the withdrawal of Ahmad Tibi from the race; and the tendency toward sectoral voting, as occurred in the entire Israeli public, resulted in a large increase in the strength of these parties and in its wake a significant increase of Arab representation in the Knesset.

The Arab vote for the Knesset followed three trends:

1. Approximately a third of the electorate voted for the Zionist parties: 16.6% for Labor, 10.5% for Meretz, and 5.2% for the rightist parties. By contrast, over half this electorate had voted for this trend in the 1992 elections.
2. Hadash-NDA received 37% of the Arab vote, a significant increase over the previous elections, in which Haash alone obtained 23.2%.
3. A quarter of the electorate - 25.4% - voted for the United Arab List (UAL), which was made up of the ADP, part of the Islamic movement and the small Islamic bloc formed in Kafr Kana.

Approximately 5% of the votes were lost to lists that failed to cross the electoral threshold, mostly to the Progressive Alliance headed by Muhammad Zaydan of Kafr Manda.

Although 23% of the electorate did not vote, no official group called for a boycott of the elections on ideological grounds. Even the segment of the Islamic movement that opposed the movement running in the elections as a party did not oppose actual participation in the balloting, its leaders advising their followers to "vote according to their conscience."

All three trends, with the exception of the marginal percentage that voted for the Likud and the Jewish religious parties, belonged to the leftist bloc. Ideological differences between the Arab parties, and between them and the Jewish parties of the left, were fading in the area of foreign policy positions on the solution to the conflict with the Palestinians and with the Arab world. Gaps remained only on certain domestic social issues, on the extent of militancy, and on Zionist principles. Despite these differences, it might be said that the Arabs had become an integral part of the Israeli left, which without them could not attain a majority either in the Knesset or in the race for the office of prime minister.

Arab representation in the 14th Knesset consists of four Hadash MKs - Hashim Mahamid, Salah Salim, 'Azmi Bishara and Ahmad Sa'ad (the fifth, MK Tamar Guzansky, is Jewish); four UAL MKs - 'Abd al-Malik Dahamsha, 'Abd al-Wahhab Darawsha, Talib al-Sana' and Tawfiq Khatib; two Labor Party MKs - Nawaf Masalha and Salah Tarif; and one Meretz MK - Walid Sadiq. The total - 11 - plus Guzansky constitutes 10% of the Knesset, precisely the size of the Arab electorate and an unprecedented representational proportion. Its significance, in effect, is that the Arab electorate chose only Arab MKs this time, in contrast to the past. Notably, two additional Arab candidates in the Labor Party, Rafiq Haj Yihya (36th on the list) and Nadia Hilu (37th), are well-positioned for entry in the Knesset (the Labor Party has 34 representatives in the Knesset), as the 35th member on the list has recently entered the house.

The new electoral system for the office of prime minister has created a situation in which monolithic

electoral blocs, such as the ultra-Orthodox or the Arabs, can determine the outcome of the vote, as indeed happened. According to widespread conjecture before Election Day, large voter participation on the part of the Arabs would assure the election of Shimon Peres, inasmuch as the gap between him and his rival, Binyamin Netanyahu, was 3.4%. However, Operation Grapes of Wrath in Lebanon in April 1996 had evoked bitter Arab criticism of Peres and declarations by some that they would refrain from voting for him and would cast blank ballots in protest against his policy in Lebanon and in the territories. This development evoked conflicting responses: the left exerted pressure on the Arab leadership and on the electorate to vote for Peres, while the right highlighted the slogan "Netanyahu is good for the Jews" and warned against allowing the Arabs to determine the fate of the State of Israel.

The results of the election show that the Arabs in Israel have not yet reached the point where they constitute the swing vote, even when their electoral turnout is high. Within the Arab sector, 77% went to the polls, while 7.2% of their ballots were disqualified, part of them because of the protest vote and part of them through errors. Of the valid ballots, nearly 95% were cast for Peres, a very high - nearly maximal - proportion, especially in light of the fact that the population in question is not homogeneous. With the Arabs consistently viewed as part of the leftist bloc and not as a floating vote, the swing vote, then, emanates from other sectors of the population. In 1992 it was the new immigrants who facilitated the election of the Rabin government, and in 1996 it was the mass vote by the ultra-Orthodox and the Shas electorate that brought about Netanyahu's victory by a single percentage point.

With this, the system of direct elections does empower large electoral blocs. Conceivably, the Labor Party will court the Arab electorate intensively during the next elections and actively seek its support for its candidate, which will allow for the presentation of demands and conditions by the Arab leadership in return.

An especially noteworthy aspect of the elections is the content of the Arab party platforms, which

articulated a new ideological trend centering on the demand to recognize the Arabs as a national minority in the State of Israel, grant them autonomy in various areas, and change the definition and character of the state from "a state of the Jewish People" to "a state of all its citizens." These ideas, which had been raised in academic circles for several years, were turned into a political platform in the 1996 elections, and conceivably will be further developed and aired in the Knesset, the media and the public at large. Ironically, these demands have emerged precisely with the establishment of an administration that lays emphasis on the Jewishness of the state and bases its guidelines on purely national values.

For the first time in Israeli history, these guidelines make a clear distinction between Arabs (or, in the official language used, "minorities") who have served in the defense forces and "tied their fate to the state," and those who have not (and who constitute the majority). A sharp ideological clash on this issue is conceivable. The government guidelines have already evoked a harshly negative response in the Arabic press and on the part of the Arab MKs (*al-*

Ittihad, 18-19 June 1996). The issue could be defused if the new government adopted a practical policy toward budgets, infrastructure development, and the allocation of resources to the Arab localities. However, the attitude of the Arabs to the new government will depend not only on domestic issues but also on the government's peace policy and on continuation of the talks with the Palestinians, which are of supreme interest to the Arab population in Israel.

The Arabs in Israel are poised between their growing political force electorally and their marginality and problematic status in Israeli civil governance. Despite their substantial numerical representation in the 14th Knesset, all the Arab MKs are at present in the opposition. Only in some issues will they be likely to be full partners with Labor and Meretz; on others they will constitute an opposition within the opposition, with marginal status. They will have to cooperate with the new administration in order to achieve everyday practical goals for the benefit of their electorate, yet confront the administration firmly on issues of principle concerning their collective status and the peace process.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1

Selected Segments of Arab Party Platforms on the Status of Arabs in the State

A. National-Democratic Alliance (NDA; Al-Tajammu' al-Watani al-Dimokrati): Platform

Goals

1. The NDA's political and social struggle is based on the principles of democracy and political pluralism. The NDA will act for true equality between all the citizens of the state and the honoring of human rights and the rights of peoples to self-determination, as established in international law and justice, in the United Nations Charter, and in the resolutions and declarations made in the various bodies of the UN on this topic.
2. The NDA will struggle to turn the State of Israel into a democratic state and for all its citizens - Jews, Arabs and others, as obligated by the implementation of human and civil rights based on complete equality between all citizens of the state, with no discrimination on the basis of nationality, religion or sex. The NDA will act for equality before the law and for equality of opportunity in employment, budgets, services and all that is related. The NDA will act for the respect of life, dignity and property.
3. In order to eliminate every type of discrimination between citizens based on race, nationality, religion, sex and political affiliation, the NDA will act for the legislation of a democratic constitution which will be based on changing the law of citizenship and which will ensure the Arabs in Israel true citizenship equal to that of the Jews. This is based on the UN charters on this issue. Such a constitution will comprise the legal basis for social equality and political partnership in a state of all its citizens.
4. The Arab citizens in Israel are part of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation by national and cultural identity.
5. The NDA will act for the recognition of the Arab minority in Israel as a national-cultural minority, and will insist upon its right of self-administration of those affairs that distinguish it from the Jewish majority in the state, first and foremost educational and cultural af-

fairs. The NDA will act for the recognition of the rights of the minority to establish institutions, organizations and councils that will function on a voluntary basis for the care and advancement of religious, educational and cultural services, the preservation of the heritage and moral values, charitable affairs and social solidarity. The minority has the right to conduct these institutions autonomously, while maintaining a link and cooperating with the central authorities of the state, which will be a state of all its citizens, on the basis of the general good and in accordance with the law.

6. The NDA will act to guarantee freedom of religion, conscience and thought, while opposing religious discrimination in the law and in government policy.
7. The NDA will act to institute an economic policy aimed at advancing the weak strata and guaranteeing their basic rights to a life of dignity, social justice and equal opportunities.
8. The NDA will act to advance the status of women in society, attain full equality between women and men in all areas, and eliminate all manifestations of violence against women in the family and in society.
9. The NDA will act toward the development of Arab society in Israel and toward its advancement based on the values of the heritage, namely the values of social solidarity and the preservation of human and personal dignity. The NDA will act to guarantee the rights of children within the family entity; encourage mutual respect and tolerance within Arab society and in its attitudes toward other societies; and reject any manifestation of racism, clannishness, tribalism and religious fanaticism.
10. The NDA will act for economic and technological progress and development in Arab society; the classification of the Arab cities and villages as "A" development regions; the encouragement of economic initiatives; the guarantee of jobs for unemployed Arab workers; the encouragement of Arab agriculture and irrigation allocations for this purpose; a practical solution to the problem of housing in the Arab villages and the mixed cities; the cessation of expropriation of Arab land and the return of lands expropriated, including Islamic and Christian trust properties; the allocation of sufficient "state lands" to prepare an infrastructure for the construction of neighborhoods, new cities and agricultural villages, especially for the Arab citizens in the Negev, while preserving their lands and their lifestyle; and the recognition of the unacknowledged villages and of the rights of the dispossessed, who are citizens

of the State of Israel ("present absentees"), to return to their localities and to attain a solution of their problem in a way acceptable to them.

11. The NDA will act against a policy of recruitment of the Arabs into the army and against propaganda in Arab society and Arab schools encouraging recruitment. The NDA will act against collaborators and against the policy of housing them in the Arab villages and cities in Israel. The NDA is committed to the matter of the Palestinian political prisoners and their release from prison, especially the Israeli citizens among them.
12. The NDA will act to find a formula for cooperation with the Jewish forces that share its outlook, in order to create a better future and build up relations between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority on the basis of national and civic equality. The NDA will strive for joint activity on the part of Arabs and Jews for the entrenchment of the rules of social justice, tolerance, mutual respect and cooperative living for all the citizens in the state.
13. The NDA will act to achieve a peaceful solution to the Palestinian problem that is just, comprehensive and lasting, on the basis of the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in the territories occupied since 1967, whose capital is East Jerusalem; the disbanding of all the settlements established on these territories; and the solving of the refugee problems based on international law and the decisions of the UN on this issue.
14. The NDA will act for the rapid withdrawal of the Israeli occupation forces from all the conquered Arab territories - the Golan Heights and southern Lebanon - to the borders of 4 June 1967.
15. The NDA views itself as part of the strong democratic movement functioning in the region for the formation of a democratic system of governance in the region based on equality and assent between the states and the peoples and without any foreign hegemony. Such a system will constitute a condition for economic development, social progress and the preservation of the rights and dignity of man.
16. The NDA opposes the existing "world order" today, by which some of the states impose their will on other states and peoples, utilize their resources, and impair their sovereignty.
17. The NDA aspires to an alternative world order based on equality, joint activity, joint interests, mutual cooperation, progress, social justice and the just allocation of resources between the northern and the southern countries, for the guarantee of economic security and the quality of the environment globally.

B. United Arab List (UAL; Al-Qa'ima al-'Arabiyya al-Mushtaraka): Segments of the Platform

The UAL election platform contains the list's program in various areas, titled "A Clear and Just National Program." It is divided into a brief political program that deals with the solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict and the peace process, and a long socio-cultural program that details its demands on domestic issues, the Muslim and Christian *waqf* properties, construction and housing, social security and welfare issues, the status of women, education and culture, industrialization and tourism, sports and youth, lands and agriculture, and the preservation of the environment. Below are the segments that relate to "Local Issues" (p. 4 of the platform): Recognition of the Arab citizens as a national minority in Israel, so that it will become a state of all its citizens.

1. Activity to bring back emigrants from the villages whose inhabitants emigrated in 1948, and to return them to their original villages.*
2. Steps to guarantee the recognition of the rights of the unacknowledged Arab villages and residential centers by the authorities until their residents receive municipal services.
3. Active participation in every political or social event related to civic society generally, to Arab citizens particularly, and especially to the problems of unemployment, the development of the poor areas, and the industrialization of the Arab villages.
4. The [united] list will join the Supreme Followup Committee of the Arab Citizens in Israel and its affiliated committees.
5. The reestablishment of the Committee for Land Protection, in which all Arab national elements in the country will be represented, based on a clear line and program.
6. Activity for the establishment of local councils in places that lack local governance.
7. A demand that the government finance basic local services for all Arab villages on an immediate basis; activity to cover deficits in local government budgets; and the guarantee of equality on this topic. The establishment of an infrastructure in the Arab villages and cities on the basis of a comprehensive and clear plan.

* This refers to persons termed "internal refugees," who are citizens of the state, and not to Palestinian refugees outside Israel.

8. The improvement of the conditions of prisoners in Israel and the establishment and joining of committees to care for and rehabilitate them.
9. Combatting all manifestations of racism in the country and activity to legislate an explicit law to fight racism.
10. A demand to appoint Arab judges in civil and *shari'a* courts proportionally, and to appoint an Arab judge to the Supreme Court.
11. A demand to release all Palestinian political prisoners from Israeli prisons, including the Arab security prisoners who are citizens of Israel.

C. Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (Hadash; Al-Jabha al-Dimukratiyya li-l-Salam wal-Musawaa): Segments of the Platform

This platform, too, deals with the topic of peace between Israel and the Palestinians and the Arab world, as well as with the domestic problems of the Arab population. Additionally, Hadash emphasizes workers' rights, the improvement of the status of women, the fight against racism and for democracy, and disarmament. Below are the segments that relate to equality for the Arab public:

1. The recognition of the Palestinian Arab population in Israel as a national minority in all areas: political, social and cultural.
2. The revocation of the policy of national discrimination and repression in all areas.
3. Full equal rights for the Arab citizens; the cessation of land confiscation and the destruction of houses; the recognition of all existing Arab residential centers and the establishment of elected local authorities in them; and the granting of rights to the internal refugees, i.e., the inhabitants of the villages destroyed with the establishment of the state.
4. Academic recognition of Arabic as an official language side by side with Hebrew.
5. Equalization of budgets for the Arab local authorities and for development, education, health, agriculture, sports and housing; and the cooption of Arab citizens into governmental bodies.
6. Persistent struggle against the ethnic differentiation of the Arab population and for the revocation of the mandatory recruitment of Druze into the army.
7. Release of Islamic *waqf* properties and respect for the right of Muslim citizens to establish elected religious bodies.
8. Complete equality in the Histadrut and its institutions.

9. Official recognition of the representative bodies of the Arab public in Israel.
10. Equality for the Arab farmers.
11. Opening the doors of governmental offices to Arab academics.

Appendix 2

The Vote for the Office of Prime Minister and for the Knesset by Sector (percentages)

The Vote for the Office of Prime Minister: Arabs

Of entire electorate:	Of valid votes:
Peres 88%	Peres 94.8%
Netanyahu 4.8%	(countrywide 49.51%)
Disqualified 7.2%	Netanyahu 5.2%
	(countrywide 50.49%)

The Vote for the Office of Prime Minister by Sector (percentages)*

Bedouin

Peres 93.1
Netanyahu 6.8

Druze

Peres 78.6
Netanyahu 21.3

Large Villages

Peres 96.9
Netanyahu 3.0

Small Villages

Peres 95.3
Netanyahu 4.6

Cities

Peres 96.2
Netanyahu 3.7

* Official statistics of the Central Elections Commission, *Ma'ariv*, 2 June 1996.

The Vote for the Knesset in Comparison with 1992 (percentages)

	1992	1996
Hadhash	23.2	37.0
UAL	15.2 (ADP only)	25.4
Labor	20.3	16.6
Meretz	9.7	10.5
Likud and Religious	19.3	5.2
Others	12.3	5.3
% Vote	69.7	77.0

Failed to pass the electoral threshold: Arab Alliance for Renewal - 2,087 votes; Progressive Alliance - 13,983; Democratic Workers Organization - 1,351. Total: 17,421.

Note: Hadash and UAL include mixed cities.

Results of the Elections for Knesset by Sector (percentages)

Bedouin (39 polling stations)	1992	1996
Labor	17.4	14.9
NRP	2.5	0.7
Yahadut Hatorah	0.7	0.4
Haderekh Hashlishit	0.2	-
Hadash	2.8	2.3
Likud	1.5	1.5
Meretz	11.6	5.1
UAL	35.1 (ADP only)	64.3
Progressive Alliance	--	7.3
Shas	8.8	0.5

Druze (58 polling stations)	1992	1996
Labor	29.3	40.3
NRP	10.9	7.0
Yahadut Hatorah	0.8	0.5
Haderekh Hashlishit	--	2.5
Hadash	6.9	14.3
Likud	24.9	11.7
Meretz	8.2	12.1
UAL	2.5	5.1
Progressive Alliance	-	0.5
Shas	7.1	4.2

Large Villages (244 polling stations)	1992	1996
Labor	20.7	13.8
NRP	4.9	1.3
Hadash	22.1	37.3
Likud	7.7	1.1
Meretz	9.3	1.3
UAL	17.8	27.7
Progressive Alliance	--	5.0
Shas	4.5	1.1

Small Villages (60 polling stations)	1992	1996
Labor	27.7	25.8
NRP	5.9	1.7
Hadash	11.0	21.8
Likud	6.9	2.3
Meretz	18.2	16.7
UAL	13.1	23.3
Progressive Alliance	--	4.0
Shas	8.1	2.7

Cities (278 polling stations)	1992	1996
Labor	16.6	12.9
NRP	3.0	1.1
Hadash	32.5	47.1
Likud	5.5	1.5
Meretz	9.5	7.4
UAL	14.1	24.9
Progressive Alliance	-	2.7
Shas	3.5	0.6

Appendix 3

The Arab Vote for the Knesset from the Establishment of the State until 1996 (round percentages)

Election	Valid Votes	Participation (Percentage)	Rakah/Hadash	Arab Lists*	Labor Party	All Other Jewish Parties
1949	26,332	79	22	28	10	40
1951	58,984	86	16	55	11	18
1955	77,979	90	15	48	14	23
1959	81,764	85	11	42	10	37
1961	86,843	83	22	40	10	28
1965	106,342	82	23	38	13	26
1969	117,190	80	28	40	17	15
1973	133,058	73	37	27	17	23
1977	145,925	74	50	16	11	23
1981	164,862	68	47	12	29	22
1984	199,968	72	32	18	26	24
1988	241,601	74	33	26	16	25
1992	273,920	70	23	24	20	33
1996	307,497	77	37	30	16	17

* Until 1981 -- Arab lists affiliated with Jewish parties.

Locality	Eligible Voters	Voters	Disqualified Votes	Valid Votes	Netanyahu	Peres
REGION: Valleys						
Galilee						
Golan						
Buq'ata	207	52	6	46	25	21
Majdal Shams	197	48	3	45	39	6
Ghajar	669	553	2	551	7	544
Jishsh	1,600	1,186	93	1,093	28	1,065
Tuba-Zangariyya	2,019	1,458	22	1,436	26	1,410
Umm al-Ghanam	599	535	3	532	3	529
Mghar	7,835	5,503	346	5,157	577	4,580
'Ilabun	2,043	1,800	60	1,740	41	1,699
Hamam	570	470	28	442	16	426
Dahi	247	87	6	81	1	80
Iksal	4,470	3,581	258	3,323	55	3,268
Bu'ayna Nujaydat	2,682	2,323	35	2,288	49	2,239
Daburiyya	3,688	3,231	229	3,002	32	2,970
Tayiba (Valley)	549	455	13	442	14	428
Tur'an	4,689	3,678	211	3,467	37	3,430
Yafi'	6,420	4,607	432	4,175	150	4,025
Kafr Kana	6,760	5,149	600	4,549	135	4,414
'Aylut	2,324	1,298	154	1,144	21	1,123
Kafr Masr	825	633	47	586	29	557
Mashhad	2,635	2,027	261	1,766	123	1,643
Nin	656	600	18	582	6	576
Na'ura	672	537	2	535	2	533
Sulam	1,036	857	57	800	--	800
'Uzayr	856	665	--	665	8	657
'Ayn Mahel	4,338	3,390	53	3,337	47	3,290
Rumana	285	241	20	211	18	193
Reine	5,259	4,045	358	3,687	61	3,626
Tamra (Jezreel)	505	320	35	285	13	272
Muqaybala	1,061	849	104	745	51	694
Sandala	651	285	64	221	7	214
Basmat Tiv'on	2,498	1,733	122	1,611	96	1,515
Zarzir	2,298	1,594	115	1,479	249	1,230
Hajajra	457	332	56	276	4	274
Ka'biyya-Tabash	1,120	583	40	543	87	456
Khawalid	253	246	6	240	27	213
Manshiat Zabda	320	257	25	232	30	202
Rumat Heib	584	352	15	337	47	290
Nazareth	36,533	26,214	2,242	23,972	331	23,641
Peqi'in Hadasha	165	135	9	126	84	42
Abu Snan	4,925	3,961	336	3,625	423	3,202

Appendix 4*

Results of the Vote for the Office of the Prime Minister by Locality**

* The data presented is reproduced from the original Hebrew study published by the authors.

** Place names are not listed alphabetically in the English translation but rather reflect the order in which they appeared in the original Hebrew-language version.

Locality	Eligible Voters	Voters	Disqualified Votes	Valid Votes	Netanyahu	Peres
Beit Jan	4,460	3,646	110	3,536	1,329	2,207
B'ina	2,812	2,167	299	1,868	82	1,786
Julis	2,516	2,042	81	1,961	882	1,079
Dir al-Asad	3,897	3,526	54	3,472	48	3,424
Dir Hana	3,605	3,204	209	2,995	26	2,969
Khurfeish	2,220	1,758	25	1,733	434	1,299
Yirka	5,145	3,608	156	3,452	1,048	2,404
Kabul	3,904	3,254	212	3,042	29	3,013
Kawkab Abu al-Hija	1,359	1,087	70	1,017	4	1,013
Kafr Yasif	4,463	3,708	166	3,542	68	3,474
Kafr Manda	5,121	4,314	472	3,842	113	3,729
Majd al-Kurum	5,025	4,407	336	4,071	133	3,938
Mazra'a	1,642	1,426	64	1,362	19	1,343
Ma'iliyya	1,638	1,451	36	1,415	18	1,397
Nahf	3,727	2,869	332	2,537	78	2,459
Sajur	1,331	1,045	25	1,020	351	669
I'ebilin	4,831	4,560	97	4,463	74	4,389
'Araba	7,809	6,186	177	6,009	75	5,934
Fasuta	1,699	1,316	59	1,257	35	1,222
Peqi'in	2,443	1,975	83	1,892	231	1,661
Sha'b	2,344	2,038	189	1,849	32	1,817
Rama	4,229	3,176	215	2,961	319	2,642
'Ayan al-Asad	366	268	2	266	67	199
Shaykh Danun	918	766	44	722	7	715
Sawa'id (Hamriyya)	106	60	3	57	2	55
Sawa'id (Kamana)	599	484	--	484	24	460
Ras 'Ali	155	138	14	124	43	81
Bir al-Maksur	2,998	1,956	187	1,769	146	1,623
Tamra	11,340	10,554	201	10,353	94	10,259
Shafr 'Amr	15,051	11,870	518	11,352	511	10,841
Shakhnin	10,636	9,280	599	8,681	76	8,605
Kisra-Sami'	2,465	1,989	86	1,903	495	1,408
Yanuh-Jatt	2,170	1,913	30	1,883	529	1,354
Judeida-Makr	7,255	5,579	580	4,999	77	4,922
'Aramsha	500	444	--	444	44	400
Salama	871	649	82	567	65	502
=====						
Total: Valleys, Galilee Golan	247,153	193,583	9,809	183,774	10,607	173,167
%		78.3	5	95	5.5	89.5
					5.8	of the voters 94.2 of valid votes
=====						

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Locality	Eligible Voters	Voters	Disqualified Votes	Valid Votes	Netanyahu	Peres
<i>REGION: Triangle</i>						
Kafr Qasim	6,464	6,085	157	5,928	23	5,905
Kafr Bara	835	668	--	668	9	659
Jaljuliyya	2,877	2,577	23	2,554	10	2,544
Taibe	14,841	11,486	1,230	10,256	941	9,315
Tira	9,461	7,180	553	6,647	163	6,484
Zemer	2,174	1,674	145	1,529	82	1,447
Qalansawa	6,334	5,168	176	4,992	23	4,969
Baqa al-Gharbiyya	9,219	6,743	323	6,420	68	6,352
Umm al-Fahm	16,830	12,658	776	11,882	147	11,735
Umm al-Kutuf	328	281	15	266	1	265
Bayda	145	102	7	95	2	93
'Ayn Sahla	560	411	--	411	10	401
Maysar	655	486	48	438	7	431
Musheirifa	1,220	674	109	565	10	555
Salem	392	324	41	283	22	261
Mu'awiyya	1,008	888	114	774	15	759
Musmus	1,521	1,146	87	1,059	25	1,034
Zalafa	1,487	1,132	124	1,008	24	984
Barta'a	1,068	793	110	683	12	671
'Ar'ara	6,912	5,103	376	4,727	79	4,648
Jatt	4,034	2,809	187	2,622	45	2,577
Jisr al-Zarqa	3,883	2,903	147	2,756	53	2,703
Furaydis	4,256	3,003	125	2,878	31	2,847
Kafr Qara'	6,211	5,468	189	5,279	163	5,116
=====						
Total	102,717	79,762	5,042	74,720	1,965	72,755
%		77.6	6.3	93.7	2.4	91.2
						of the voters
					2.6	97.4
						of valid votes
=====						
<i>REGION: Haifa and the Carmel</i>						
Zubaydat	124	77	15	62	1	61
Ibtin	911	731	62	669	32	637
'Usfiyya	5,228	3,960	130	3,830	286	3,544
Daliat al-Carmel	7,227	5,073	242	4,831	780	4,051
=====						
Total	13,490	9,841	449	9,392	1,099	8,293
%		73	4.5	95.5	11.1	84.3
						of the voters
					11.7	88.3
						of valid votes

בחירות 96

Locality	Eligible Voters	Voters	Disqualified Votes	Valid Votes	Netanyahu	Peres
<i>REGION: Jerusalem</i>						
Abu Gosh	2,243	1,543	172	1,371	68	1,303
'Ayn Rafa	249	188	19	169	7	162
'Ayn Naquba	507	420	47	373	59	314
=====						
Total	2,999	2,151	238	1,913	134	1,779
%		71.7	11	89	6.2	82.8
						of the voters
					7	93
						of valid votes
=====						
<i>REGION: Beersheba and Eilat</i>						
'Aru'ar	2,185	1,397	401	996	57	939
Sayyid	706	556	122	434	35	399
Huashla	613	406	32	374	7	367
Rahat	10,119	8,090	1,103	6,987	345	6,642
Laqiyya	562	469	63	406	5	401
Kseife	1,978	1,392	171	1,221	182	1,039
Tel-Sheva'	2,763	2,178	212	1,966	40	1,962
Abu 'Ammar	126	108	13	95	3	92
Nasasra	289	211	11	200	5	195
Janabib	168	62	10	52	4	48
Qawa'in	330	246	46	200	11	189
Tarabin al-Sani'	323	148	10	138	5	133
'Atawna	553	419	59	360	12	348
Abu Qurinat	1,498	623	97	526	17	509
Abu Ju'eid	886	714	132	582	193	389
Abu Rubay'a	1,948	869	137	732	61	671
Atrash	592	325	50	275	5	268
Kudeirat al-Sani'	1,532	1,260	108	1,152	45	1,107
'Asam	1,750	1,003	144	859	47	812
Abu Ruqayq	2,479	1,386	213	1,173	77	1,096
Asad	522	300	39	261	22	239
Abu 'Abdun	164	93	18	75	4	71
'Uqbi	241	228	10	218	1	217
Huzayl	762	316	21	295	28	267
Mas'udin al-'Azazma	2,490	1,362	246	1,116	32	1,084
Dbira	256	216	--	216	5	211
Segev Shalom	844	710	10	700	19	681
=====						
Total	36,679	25,087	3,478	21,609	1,267	20,376
%		68.4	13.9	86.1	5	95
=====						

Appendix 5*
Results of the Vote for the Knesset by Locality**

Locality	Eligible Voters	Voters	Disqualified Votes	Valid Votes	Labor	Hadash	Likud	Meretz	United Arab List	Progressive Alliance	Other
REGION: Acre											
Abu Snan	4,925	3,961	137	3,824	749	1,605	146	275	596	33	420
Beit Jan	4,460	3,646	74	3,572	1,287	434	1017	311	28	17	478
Bi'na	2,812	2,170	42	2,128	307	527	4	226	911	70	83
Julis	2,516	2,042	55	1,987	896	1	318	107	7	1	523
Dir al-Asad	3,897	3,526	40	3,486	479	741	17	655	1,379	131	83
Dir Hana	3,605	3,204	49	3,155	172	1,651	11	154	935	69	163
Khurfeish	2,220	1,759	22	1,737	880	57	347	124	18	--	311
Yirka	5,145	3,608	77	3,531	1,385	308	486	536	12	2	804
Kabul	3,904	3,254	98	3,156	307	1,345	9	336	892	141	126
Kawkab Abu al-Hijal	3,359	1,087	22	1,065	41	555	1	141	218	96	13
Kafr Yasif	4,463	3,707	72	3,635	719	2,079	33	453	282	6	69
Kafr Manda	5,121	4,314	168	4,146	47	803	8	288	279	2,425	296
Majd al-Kurum	5,025	4,407	50	4,357	294	2,091	57	288	1,371	86	170
Mazra'a	1,642	1,426	26	1,400	374	250	9	224	498	6	39
Ma'iliyya	1,638	1,451	18	1,433	292	592	13	503	4	--	33
Nahf	3,727	2,870	94	2,776	367	934	11	348	733	169	914
Sajur	1,331	1,045	23	1,022	419	1	144	52	46	5	355
I'ebelin	4,831	4,560	51	4,509	531	2,590	12	277	712	29	358
'Araba	7,809	6,186	110	6,076	326	3,467	17	538	1,449	184	95
Fasuta	1,699	1,316	37	1,279	301	595	11	245	--	2	125
Peqi'in	2,443	1,975	47	1,928	477	608	99	228	25	4	307

Locality	Eligible Voters	Voters	Disqualified Votes	Valid Votes	Labor	Hadash	Likud	Meretz	United Arab List	Progressive Alliance	Other
Sha'b	2,344	2,038	61	1,977	307	674	15	308	546	38	89
Rama	4,299	3,176	69	3,107	666	1,415	283	338	256	36	113
'Ayan al-Asad	366	268	5	263	175	2	65	9	3	--	9
Sawa'id (Hamriyya)	106	60	--	60	29	8	1	6	11	--	5
Sawa'id (Kamana)	599	484	--	484	215	52	1	65	90	18	43
Shaykh Danun	918	766	13	753	158	115	4	24	306	25	123
Ras 'Ali	155	138	2	136	64	--	288	3	39	--	--
Bir al-Maksur	2,998	1,956	64	1,892	456	98	29	343	683	158	125
Tarshiha	2,185	1,772	54	1,718	263	909	449	147	197	45	--
Salama	871	649	29	620	201	11	26	65	227	39	51
'Aramsha	500	444	--	444	355	4	42	35	8	--	--
Judeida-Makr	7,255	5,584	169	5,415	628	2,280	14	568	1,363	150	412
Yanuh-Jatt	2,170	1,913	20	1,893	602	89	325	261	--	--	616
Kisra-Sami'	2,465	1,989	27	1,962	975	86	329	153	115	2	123
Sakhnin	10,636	9,280	165	9,115	500	4,840	31	333	3,181	84	146
Shafr 'Amr	15,051	11,880	158	11,722	2,451	5,491	249	928	1,383	841	379
Tamra	11,340	10,604	104	10,500	974	4,163	67	620	3,892	718	66
Total	138,760	114,515	2,252	112,263	19,669	41,041	4,718	10,517	22,695	5,600	7,365
%		82.5	1.9	98.1	17.1	35.8	4.1	9.2	19.8	4.9	6.4

* The data presented is reproduced from the original Hebrew study published by the authors.

** Place names are not listed alphabetically in the English translation but rather reflect the order in which they appeared in the original Hebrew-language version.

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Locality	Eligible Voters	Voters	Disqualified Votes	Valid Votes	Labor	Hadash	Likud	Meretz	United Arab List	Progressive Alliance	Other
<i>REGION: Haifa</i>											
Zubaydat	124	77	4	73	8	2	2	22	27	10	2
Daliat al-Carmel	7,227	5,073	131	4,942	2,507	215	401	937	106	26	750
'Usfiyya	5,228	3,959	66	3,893	2,085	441	187	627	313	32	206
Ibtin	911	732	28	704	92	53	11	56	351	78	63
Total	13,490	9,841	229	9,612	4,692	711	601	1,642	797	146	1,021
%		72.9	2.3	97.7	47.6	7.2	6.1	16.7	8	1.5	10.4
<i>REGION: Safed and Kinneret</i>											
Jishsh	1,600	1,186	31	1,155	233	459	12	249	153	30	19
Tuba-Zangariyya	2,019	1,456	19	1,437	973	53	5	245	127	12	22
Umm al-Ghanam	599	535	4	531	198	15	3	41	230	37	7
Mghar	7,835	5,503	131	5,372	1,827	1,216	389	711	698	59	472
'Ilabun	2,043	1,800	29	1,771	505	819	12	219	152	14	50
Shibli	1,489	871	26	845	281	42	52	48	357	13	52
Hamam	570	470	12	458	214	31	6	15	174	2	16
Total	16155	11821	252	11569	4231	2635	479	1528	1891	167	638
%		73.2	2.1	97.9	35.8	22.3	4	12.9	16	1.4	5.4

Locality	Eligible Voters	Voters	Disqualified Votes	Valid Votes	Labor	Hadash	Likud	Meretz	United Arab List	Progressive Alliance	Other
<i>REGION: Golan</i>											
Ghajar	669	553	--	553	535	2	6	10	--	--	--
Majdal Shams	197	48	1	45	3	--	40	4	--	--	--
Buq'ata	207	52	1	51	21	--	23	--	--	--	7
Total	1973	653	2	651	559	2	69	14	--	--	7
%		60.8	0.3	99.7	85.6	0.3	10.5	2.1	--	--	1
<i>Circassians</i>											
Kafr Kama	1,503	1,033	56	977	415	26	44	280	173	2	37
Rihaniyya	515	416	8	408	246	--	34	51	48	--	29
Total	2,018	1,449	64	1,385	661	26	78	331	221	2	60
%		71.8	4.4	95.6	45.6	1.7	5.3	22.8	15.2	0.1	4.5
<i>REGION: Jezreel</i>											
Nazareth	36,533	26,209	691	25,518	2,182	14,808	88	1,547	6,239	305	349
Iksal	4,470	3,581	137	3,444	217	1,224	8	272	1,613	16	94
Bu'ayna Nujaydat	2,682	2,323	26	2,297	718	683	5	464	270	112	45
Daburiyya	3,688	3,230	61	3,169	225	1,215	3	325	1,276	47	78
Taibe (Valley)	549	455	11	444	246	2	3	30	110	53	--

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Locality	Eligible Voters	Voters	Disqualified Votes	Valid Votes	Labor	Hadash	Likud	Meretz	United Arab List	Progressive Alliance	Other
Tur'an	4,689	3,681	121	3,560	612	1,358	3	485	753	233	116
Dahi	247	87	3	84	26	5	1	33	17	1	1
Yafi'	6,420	4,608	137	4,471	447	2,637	71	387	749	110	74
Kafir Kana	6,760	5,149	269	4,880	271	1,950	48	579	1,817	156	59
'Aylut	2,324	1,297	39	1,258	306	293	4	73	469	55	62
Kafir Masr	825	633	15	618	204	55	4	137	171	40	7
Mashhad	2,635	2,028	81	1,947	414	450	47	231	710	56	39
Nin	650	600		600	80	9	1	470	25	4	11
Na'ura	672	537	4	533	103	60	1	240	98	22	9
Sulam	1,036	857	14	843	149	208	3	260	52	40	131
'Uzayr	856	665	14	651	119	139	2	55	82	119	135
'Ayn Mahel	4,338	3,391	63	3,328	266	1,676	7	267	916	136	60
Rumana	285	241	14	227	74	73	--	36	12	23	9
Reina	5,259	4,045	150	3,895	619	1,777	18	343	1,011	91	36
Tamra (Jezreel)	505	321	10	311	73	93	9	55	49	29	3
Muqaybala	1,061	849	44	805	261	230	34	83	187	2	8
Sandla	651	285	16	269	14	144	--	30	73	3	5
Basmat Tiv'on	2,498	1,732	57	1,675	347	48	19	261	719	194	87
Zarzir	2,298	1,592	54	1,538	522	24	150	102	372	264	104
Hajajra	457	332	18	314	70	33	2	25	147	33	4
Ka'biyya-Tabash	1,120	584	21	563	302	28	77	48	71	18	19
Khawalid	253	246	4	242	76	13	11	61	50	--	31

Locality	Eligible Voters	Voters	Disqualified Votes	Valid Votes	Labor	Hadash	Likud	Meretz	United Arab List	Progressive Alliance	Other
Manshiyat Zabda	320	257	11	246	92	14	18	22	80	12	8
Rumat Heib	584	352	6	346	46	5	3	16	148	--	133
=====											
Total	94,665	70,167	2,091	68,076	8,681	29,254	640	6,937	18,286	2,074	1,602
%		74.1	3	97	12.4	41.7	0.9	9.9	26	2.9	2.8
=====											
REGION: Hadera and Triangle											
Furaydis	4,256	3,003	100	2,903	400	821	12	427	1,018	148	77
Jisr al-Zarqa	3,883	2,903	147	2,756	773	332	14	976	439	62	160
Jatt	4,094	2,809	112	2,697	234	1,478	8	365	385	82	145
'Ar'ara	6,912	5,107	139	4,968	505	2,243	32	813	1,153	75	147
Barta'a	1,068	793	54	739	225	165	4	116	108	2	119
Musmus	1,521	1,146	37	1,109	34	612	3	140	283	1	36
Zalafa	1,487	1,132	27	1,105	165	582	5	82	177	45	49
Mu'awiyya	1,008	888	29	859	62	600	1	100	52	4	40
Salem	392	324	6	318	83	67	8	5	78	1	76
Musheirifa	1,220	674	26	648	132	390	1	27	81	4	13
Maysar	655	486	30	456	29	203	1	97	120	2	3
Kafir Qara'	6,211	5,468	121	5,345	940	2,551	56	442	1,215	24	119
'Ayn Sahla	560	411	6	405	107	158	1	70	9	--	60

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Locality	Eligible Voters	Voters	Disqualified Votes	Valid Votes	Labor	Hadash	Likud	Meretz	United Arab List	Progressive Alliance	Other	
Bayda	147	102	1	101	36	23	2	4	1		5	
Umm al-Kutuf	6,328	281	9	272	78	19	1	10	33	-	11	
Umm al-Fahm	16,830	12,659	343	12,316	520	9,636	11	947	965	59	172	
Baqa al-Gharbiyya	9,219	6,743	184	6,559	585	4,136	22	716	95	56	90	
Total	59,731	44,929	1,371	4,558	4,908	24,136	182	5,337	7,101	565	1,322	
%		75.2	3	97	10.9	53.7	0.4	11.8	15.8	1.2	2.9	
REGION: Sharon												
Qalansawa	6,334	5,167	95	5,072	296	2408	8	784	1390	150	36	
Zemer	2,174	1,674	50	1,624	321	48	19	235	541	109	51	
Tira	9,461	7,225	105	7,120	946	2577	69	472	2,967	25	62	
Tayiba	14,841	11,485	274	11,211	1725	5166	157	966	2,917	112	218	
Total	32,180	25,551	524	25,027	288	10,449	253	2,457	7,815	396	367	
%		77.8	2.0	98.0	12.8	40.9	1.0	9.6	30.6	1.5	1.4	
REGION: Petah Tikva												
Jaljuliyya	2,877	2,577	32	2,545	349	1,067	6	96	1,014	1	12	
Kafr Bara	835	668	2	666	62	235	2	20	347	--	--	
Kafr Qasem	6,464	6,086	63	6,023	196	2,297	2	419	3,077	10	22	
Total	10,176	9,331	97	9,234	607	3,599	10	535	4,438	10	34	
%		91.7	1.1	98.9	6.5	38.5	0.1	5.7	47.5	0.1	0.3	

Locality	Eligible Voters	Voters	Disqualified Votes	Valid Votes	Labor	Hadash	Likud	Meretz	United Arab List	Progressive Alliance	Other	
REGION: Jerusalem												
Abu Gosh	2,243	1,552	89	1,463	378	176	34	227	559	6	89	
'Ayn Rafa	249	188	5	183	83	18	3	51	20	6	2	
'Ayn Naquba	507	422	23	399	130	1	43	55	153	1	16	
Total	2,999	2,162	117	2,045	591	195	80	333	732	13	107	
%		72	5.4	94.6	27.3	9	3.7	15.4	33.8	0.6	4.9	
REGION: Beer Sheba												
<i>Eilat</i>												
Segev Shalom	844	710	33	677	101	8	2	8	480	47	15	
Huashla	613	406	8	398	1	2	2	--	383	3	3	
Sayyid	703	556	19	537	229	9	27	15	220	34	--	
'Aru'ar	2,185	1,397	94	1,303	178	5	22	12	905	123	22	
Rahat	10,119	8,085	334	7,751	1,441	709	95	402	4,078	751	85	
Tel Sheva'	2,763	2,181	95	2,086	54	164	12	99	1,454	237	21	
Abu 'Ammar	126	108	6	102	11	1	2	--	64	24	-	
Nasasra	289	210	4	206	63	7	1	20	41	72	1	
Janabib	168	62	6	56	2	--	2	1	36	7	3	
Qawa'in	330	246	3	243	61	--	11	13	147	5	3	
Tarabin al-Sani'	323	147	2	145	1	17	3	--	113	6	2	
'Atawna	553	419	11	408	136	31	1	41	149	20	28	

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Locality	Eligible Voters	Voters	Disqualified Votes	Valid Votes	Labor	Hadash	Likud	Meretz	United Arab List	Progressive Alliance	Other
Abu Qurinat	1,498	624	15	609	138	13	8	7	372	10	15
Abu Ju'eid	886	728	17	711	57	--	7	1	629	5	4
Abu Rubay'a	1,948	868	47	821	203	12	41	57	417	41	12
Atrash	592	325	5	320	51	1	2	2	256	3	--
Kudeirat al-Sani'	1,532	1,260	28	1,232	30	5	--	6	803	364	8
A'sam	1,750	1,002	65	937	76	10	164	--	755	14	17
Mas'udin al-											
'Azazma	2,490	1,359	57	1,302	63	13	9	20	1019	123	55
Huzayl	762	316	7	309	58	25	15	33	160	10	8
'Uqbi	241	228	2	226	106	21	--	36	60	1	2
Abu 'Abdun	164	93	4	89	7	13	1	14	50	--	4
Asad	522	300	18	282	1	2	9	72	162	25	11
Abu Ruqayq	2,479	1,385	83	1,302	40	9	7	68	1098	28	52
Laqiyya	562	469	9	460	12	10	2	13	199	217	7
Kseife	1,978	1,403	54	1,349	321	8	8	99	439	377	25
Dbira	256	216	--	216	52	2	5	152	--	--	5
Total	36,676	25,103	1,026	24,077	3,493	1,097	458	1,191	14,489	2,547	408

Locality	Hadash	United Arab List	Progressive Alliance
Ramla	1046	1577	59
Lod	776	1738	447
Nazareth Elit	946	111	64
Acre	1501	2303	47
Haifa	6105	1557	459
Tel Aviv-Jaffa	2487	2133	122
Total	12861	9419	1198

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Appendix 6
Summary of Electoral Results:
Arab Sector vis-a-vis Nationwide

	<u>Arabs (excluding mixed cities)</u>	<u>Nationwide</u>
Eligible Voters	407,923	3,933,250
Voters	315,522	3,119,832
Disqualified	8,025	67,703
Valid	307,497	3,052,130
% Vote	77.3	79.3
Major Parties:		
Labor	50,780 (16.6%)	818,570 (26.8%)
Hadash-NDA	122,435 (37%)	129,455 (4.2%)*
UAL	87,884 (25.4%)	89,513 (2.9%)*
Meretz	30,822 (10.5%)	226,257 (7.4%)
Likud-Gesher-Tsomet	7,568 (2.2%)	767,178 (25.1%)
Failed to pass		
Electoral Threshold	17,418 (5.5%)	75,122 (2.4%)

* Includes mixed cities.

Elections for the Office of Prime Minister

Eligible Voters	407,923	3,933,250
Voters	310,458	3,121,270
Disqualified	19,016	148,681
Valid	291,442	2,972,589
% Vote	76.1	79.3
Netanyahu	15,072 (5.2%)	1,501,023 (50.49%)
Peres	276,370 (94.8%)	1,471,566 (49.51%)